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The article is devoted to energy policy of Germany. In the coalition treaty, the new German "red-green-yellow" coalition confirmed the commitment to achieve climate neutrality by 2045. In line with this goal Germany has developed a strategy to move away from coal as a primary source of energy. And, in the meantime, Berlin will close the last three Nuclear Power Plants by the end of the year 2022. The Russian special military operation in Ukraine has influenced the German energy policy significantly. Since February 2022, the German government has put a premium on substitution of Russian energy. The aim of this article is to analyze the coherence of the two policies: energy transition and rejection of Russian energy resources. The author explores phasing out nuclear power and coal, import of oil and gas, development of hydrogen production and renewables in Germany. The analysis revealed that two tracks do not complement each other. Both tracks should trace to the same goal – carbon-free energy, – but they have different temporal frameworks. While political elites claim to phase out Russian fuels within two years, the energy transition should take around 30 years. The natural gas was supposed to be the transitional energy, but more than half of it comes from Russia. Substitution of Russian coal and Russian oil requires more investment, and it could reduce the ability to subsidize renewables. Potential cooperation between Germany and Russia in hydrogen production was frozen. Only the policy aimed at improving energy efficiency and developing new building standards is likely to fit both tracks.

The article is devoted to changes in the party-political system of Germany. Elections to the Bundestag are to be held in Germany on September 26. After 16 years of the leadership, Angela Merkel will not run for chancellor. Currently, the main German political parties face challenges. Major parties lose electoral support. The emergence of a new party, the "Alternative for Germany", split votes, and makes it difficult to form a coalition. Parties should also overcome internal split and find their identity in a changing world. An analysis of the electoral programmes revealed that German political parties seek to return to traditional identity. CDU/CSU moves to the right, seeking to win back the AfG supporters. SPD and FDP in their electoral documents also appeal to their traditional electorate. The AfG's nomination of lead candidates supported by the right wing of the party also indicates that the "Alternative for Germany" will move towards radical right-wing positions. The Left Party comes out with radical leftist demands, which limits the possibility of its entry into the coalition. The most successful is the Green Party's electoral strategy. Party leaders abandoned radical demands of their predecessors. Greens advocate a citizen-supported climate program, but pay attention to the economic viability of reforms. According to polls, the black-green coalition (CDU/CSU and Union 90/Greens) seems the most likely. However, in the course of coalition negotiations, the parties may face difficulties in finding a compromise on tax policy and environmental reforms. At the same time, the parties have no significant contradictions on the foreign policy agenda (with the exception of a number of specific issues). Acknowledgments. The article was prepared within the project "Post-Crisis World Order: Challenges and Technologies, Competition and Cooperation" supported by the grant from Ministry of science and higher education of the Russian Federation program for research projects in priority areas of scientific and technological development (Agreement № 075-15-2020-783).

The study is focused on the COVID 19 pandemic as a challenge for Franco-German leadership in the European Union. The authors investigate whether joint actions by Berlin and Paris can strengthen the EU's resilience to crises. As it is shown, the first isolationist reaction of the EU states to pandemic was followed by their attempts to find a common decision. The negotiations on an anti-crisis plan were complicated by the division of the European Union states into opposing camps. Two projects proposed by them – the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) and the "coronabonds" – reflected the narrow interests of rich, frugal "Northern" and economically modest "Southern" groups, and failed. In contrast, the Franco-German cooperation became a breakthrough. In March-April 2020, Germany and France opposed each other, supporting ESM and coronabonds, respectfully. In May-June 2020, A. Merkel and E. Macron agreed to a compromise and came up with a unified position. While Germany left "frugal" group by agreeing to allocate money to support the "South" without insisting on mandatory reforms, and endorsed the idea of joint debt obligations, France refused to support the "Southern" coronabond project and agreed to the mediation of the EU Commission. That gave new breath to negotiations where a new regrouping of countries took place: the "South" states failing to defend coronabonds supported the Franco-German plan based on subsidies, while the "frugals" put forward an alternative based on loans. The EU Commission's project which included both proposals was discussed in July 2020: at that moment, the Franco-German tandem backed by the "South" states had to persuade both the "frugal" and the East- European states. Finally, the EU Commission's plan promoted by Merkel and Macron was adopted, though with serious adjustments. The authors conclude that the Franco-German alliance has confirmed its capability to strengthen the European Union resilience, but its leadership is no longer unconditional, and in the future, they should take into account the interests of the EU regional groups. Acknowledgments. The article was prepared within the project "Post-Crisis World Order: Challenges and Technologies, Competition and Cooperation" supported by the grant from Ministry of Science and Higher Education of the Russian Federation program for research projects in priority areas of scientific and technological development (Agreement № 075-15-2020-783).