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Tracing constitutional thought from the Enlightenment to the present, Martin Loughlin shows how a tool for the protection of self-government has become a means for subverting popular will. Across the globe, constitutions now displace democratic decision-making, as courts interpret values in the law that ultimately trump legislative action.

A critical analysis of the transformation of constitutionalism from an increasingly irrelevant theory of limited government into the most influential philosophy of governance in the world today. Constitutionalism is universally commended because it has never been precisely defined. Martin Loughlin argues that it is not some vague amalgam of liberal aspirations but a specific and deeply contentious governing philosophy. An Enlightenment idea that in the nineteenth century became America's unique contribution to the philosophy of government, constitutionalism was by the mid-twentieth century widely regarded as an anachronism. Advocating separated powers and limited government, it was singularly unsuited to the political challenges of the times. But constitutionalism has since undergone a remarkable transformation, giving the Constitution an unprecedented role in society. Once treated as a practical instrument to regulate government, the Constitution has been raised to the status of civil religion, a symbolic representation of collective unity. Against Constitutionalism explains why this has happened and its far-reaching consequences. Spearheaded by a "rights revolution" that subjects governmental action to comprehensive review through abstract principles, judges acquire greatly enhanced power as oracles of the regime's "invisible constitution." Constitutionalism is refashioned as a theory maintaining that governmental authority rests not on collective will but on adherence to abstract standards of "public reason." And across the world the variable practices of constitutional government have been reshaped by its precepts. Constitutionalism, Loughlin argues, now propagates the widespread belief that social progress is advanced not through politics, electoral majorities, and legislative action, but through innovative judicial interpretation. The rise of constitutionalism, commonly conflated with constitutional democracy, actually contributes to its degradation

A collection of brand new and revised essays from eminent scholar of public law, Martin Loughlin, that systematizes his work on political jurisprudence - a school of thought that contends the key to understanding the nature of legal order lies in how political authority is constituted

A collection of brand new and revised essays from eminent scholar of public law, Martin Loughlin, that systematises his work on political jurisprudence - a school of thought that contends the key to understanding the nature of legal order lies in how political authority is constituted

This text develops Martin Loughlin's distinctive and provocative theory of public law. Tracing the historical evolution of the concept of public law, the book rethinks the foundational concepts of state, constitution, and government, arguing that public power is created, not controlled, by law

This text develops Martin Loughlin's distinctive and provocative theory of public law. Tracing the historical evolution of the concept of public law, the book rethinks the foundational concepts of state, constitution, and government, arguing that public power is created, not controlled, by law

This work traces the main dimensions of the relationship between central and local government, concentrating upon the role played by law in shaping that relationship. It demonstrates how the issues raised are linked to the system of parliamentary democracy, and to the tradition of public law.

AbstractIn his 2019 Reith Lectures on the rise of law and decline of politics, Jonathan Sumption presents a thesis that, on its face, seems identical to that of J.A.G. Griffith's defence of the political constitution. Given the radical differences in their views on equality, democracy, and redistribution—with Griffith working in the tradition of democratic socialism espoused by the Webbs, Tawney and Laski, and Sumption expressing the libertarian philosophy underpinning Thatcherite policies—this is puzzling. This article sets their views in historical and political context and argues that the similarities are superficial, whereas the differences are profound. It then proceeds to show the weaknesses in Sumption's defence of his thesis.

AbstractIn 1885 A.V. Dicey identified the rule of law as a key principle of British constitutional law. Presenting it both as a product of English common law method and an expression of classical liberalism, Dicey's concept lingered on into the twentieth century but mainly as a contentious ideological doctrine or simply as a vague rhetorical slogan. During the last fifty years, however, the concept has been revived, recrafted, relocated and reified. The rule of law has become a universal trope, albeit with a range of contestable meanings. This article traces this development, showing how it has been converted into a phrase of considerable political potency not only domestically but also in the international arena.