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AbstractWe owe Williamson for the formal introduction of hybrid organizations as essential building blocks in 'the institutional structure of production'. The analysis of these institutional arrangements, which culminated inThe Mechanisms of Governance, provided a unified approach to the variety of setting within which transactions are embedded, opening a new perspective on a cornerstone of modern economies. This essay explores the past, present, and future of this breakthrough. First, it reviews the progressive integration of hybrids as a category of their own in the classic 'make-or-buy' model, inserting hybrids as an 'intermediate' form different from markets in that adaptation cannot be done unilaterally and different from 'unified organizations' in that adaptation cannot be done by fiat. Second, it shows how this initial characterization of hybrids, besides providing a coherent approach to empirical research available at the time, gave a powerful impulse to new contributions, identifying more rigorously the fundamental features of hybrids, throwing light on why firms go hybrid, and explicating the governance structure chosen. Last, it offers insights on a research program that remains a work in progress, delineating new terrains to explore and new puzzles to solve.

AbstractThis comment concurs with Skarbek's paper that much more room should be made for qualitative evidence in economics. However, it raises questions about the modalities through which case studies could carry general lessons when it comes to broad institutional issues. It also suggests the need to extend the set of qualitative evidence beyond case studies and to complement them with formal approaches as well as with quantitative analysis. Persuading economists to open windows to alternative methods is at stake

Abstract This contribution is about the 'progressive research program', as Imre Lakatos would have called it, initiated by New Institutional Economics. After a short reminder of the 'golden triangle' of concepts and tools introduced by the founders (Coase, North, Ostrom, Williamson) and their followers, the paper turns to a quick overview of the attainments of this paradigm along its dominant branches: organization theory and institutional analysis. The emphasis is on the new paths opening up, with a focus on two key issues: hybrid arrangements, which may well be the prevailing organization of transactions in developed market economies; and intermediate, 'meso-institutions', which likely provide the missing link between the general rules framing socioeconomic activities and the actors operating within these rules. The underlying argument is that whatever happens to the label 'NIE', this research program will remain with us for a long time ahead.

AbstractIn his rich contribution, Arruñada (2017) debates what institutions are needed to enforce complex 'sequential' transactions embedded in interdependent private contracts, and more specifically discusses the conditions of their efficiency when it comes to transferring property. Beyond acknowledging the importance of this issue and the very stimulating and often counterintuitive ideas developed in the paper, this short note challenges some of the positions adopted by Arruñada, particularly regarding the relevance of 'The problem of social cost' (Coase, 1960) for dealing with this issue. It also raises questions about the institutional, hybrid arrangement advocated as the solution for dealing with sequential transactions.

International audience ; Institutions, particularly informal ones, are heavily value-loadedand evolve slowly over time. Economic policies adopted through majority voting procedures atdifferent tiers of government, which is a central characteristic of democratic regimes, are deeplyinfluenced by the singular institutions of each country. Scholars wanting to understand the logic ofthese policies must take this situational, contextualization aspect on board (and even more so if theyintend to make recommendations and influence policy-makers). As stressed along this book and byOstrom in the final chapter, we must get rid of the technocratic views about the 'one fits all'approach to economic policies. We must all become fully aware, as the contributors to this book are,that alternative solutions always exist, and that choices must be based on comparatively assessingthese alternatives, which needs careful investigation, particularly since public policies almost ofteninvolve important and unexpected distributional consequences. We must be grateful to the editorsof this book for having initiated a project that contributes so nicely to this goal.

International audience ; Institutions, particularly informal ones, are heavily value-loadedand evolve slowly over time. Economic policies adopted through majority voting procedures atdifferent tiers of government, which is a central characteristic of democratic regimes, are deeplyinfluenced by the singular institutions of each country. Scholars wanting to understand the logic ofthese policies must take this situational, contextualization aspect on board (and even more so if theyintend to make recommendations and influence policy-makers). As stressed along this book and byOstrom in the final chapter, we must get rid of the technocratic views about the 'one fits all'approach to economic policies. We must all become fully aware, as the contributors to this book are,that alternative solutions always exist, and that choices must be based on comparatively assessingthese alternatives, which needs careful investigation, particularly since public policies almost ofteninvolve important and unexpected distributional consequences. We must be grateful to the editorsof this book for having initiated a project that contributes so nicely to this goal.

AbstractNotwithstanding its major contributions, the 'Williamsonian' branch of New Institutional Economics suffers from black holes that recent developments have pinpointed. Rather than taking stock, this paper capitalizes on some of these developments to look ahead. Section 2 provides a reminder of the hard core of transaction cost economics (TCE) with an emphasis on problems that TCE has allowed to identify, particularly the richness of organizational arrangements, an issue that needs further investigation. Section 3 discusses how to better understand the embedment of organizational arrangements in their institutional environment. The concept of 'meso-institutions' is introduced as a mean to capture mechanisms providing the needed interface. Section 4 considers another neglected dimension that requires renewed attention: the interactions of organizational arrangements with technologies that partially define their setting. This paper proposes a roadmap to explore this issue, based on an ongoing research developed around the key concept of 'criticality'. Section 5 concludes.

International audience ; This paper focuses on how to deal with environmental problems, through the lenses of the New Institutional Economics. The emphasis is on the intertwined role of organizational solutions and their institutional settings. This is not to say that technological solutions to environmental problems should be dismissed. However, it is argued that 'environmental innovation' is often of organizational nature, deeply embedded in institutions that adapt very slowly, making 'societal transitions' particularly challenging. The New Institutional Economics provides some key concepts to explore these dimensions and their interactions, thus shedding light on alternative solutions and the conditions of their implementation. Most examples come from the water sector.

International audience ; This paper focuses on how to deal with environmental problems, through the lenses of the New Institutional Economics. The emphasis is on the intertwined role of organizational solutions and their institutional settings. This is not to say that technological solutions to environmental problems should be dismissed. However, it is argued that 'environmental innovation' is often of organizational nature, deeply embedded in institutions that adapt very slowly, making 'societal transitions' particularly challenging. The New Institutional Economics provides some key concepts to explore these dimensions and their interactions, thus shedding light on alternative solutions and the conditions of their implementation. Most examples come from the water sector.