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AbstractThis paper presents a political economy model in which self‐interested natives decide when citizenship and/or voting rights should be granted to foreign‐born workers. Native voters know that immigrants hold different 'political' preferences and would thus tend to postpone their enfranchisement as much as possible. They also consider, however, that a more restrictive naturalization policy may reduce the gains from immigration. We find that the optimal timing of naturalization depends on the quantity, quality (productivity), and preferences of potential immigrants, the political composition and the age structure of the native population, as well as the sensitivity of migration choices to the citizenship issue.

This paper provides the first political economy model in which self-interested natives decide when voting rights should be granted to foreign-born workers. This choice is driven by the maximization of net gains from immigration. We focus on the provision of a public good: immigrants enlarge the tax base by increasing the total workforce, but at the same time they influence the tax rate by eventually exerting their political rights. We find that the quantity and the quality (human capital) of potential immigrants, the political composition and the age structure of the native population, and the sensitivity of the migration choice to voting rights, all are decisive factors in determining the political choice over the optimal timing of naturalization

This paper provides the first political economy model in which self-interested natives decide when voting rights should be granted to foreign-born workers. This choice is driven by the maximization of the net gains from immigration. We focus on the provision of a public good: immigrants could enlarge the tax base by increasing the total workforce, but at the same time they influence the tax rate by eventually exerting their political rights. We find that the quantity and the quality (human capital) of per- spective immigrants, the political composition of the native population, and the sensitivity of the migration choice to voting rights, are all decisive factors in determining the political choice over the optimal timing of naturalization

This paper provides the first political economy model in which self-interested natives decide when voting rights should be granted to foreign-born workers. This choice is driven by the maximization of the net gains from immigration. We focus on the provision of a public good: immigrants could enlarge the tax base by increasing the total workforce, but at the same time they influence the tax rate by eventually exerting their political rights. We find that the quantity and the quality (human capital) of per- spective immigrants, the political composition of the native population, and the sensitivity of the migration choice to voting rights, are all decisive factors in determining the political choice over the optimal timing of naturalization

This paper provides the first political economy model in which self-interested natives decide when voting rights should be granted to foreign-born workers. This choice is driven by the maximization of the net gains from immigration. We focus on the provision of a public good: immigrants could enlarge the tax base by increasing the total workforce, but at the same time they influence the tax rate by eventually exerting their political rights. We find that the quantity and the quality (human capital) of per- spective immigrants, the political composition of the native population, and the sensitivity of the migration choice to voting rights, are all decisive factors in determining the political choice over the optimal timing of naturalization

Dans ce numéro de Regards économiques, nous discutons les liens entre économie souterraine, protectionnisme et immigration clandestine. Nous montrons que la réduction de la pression fiscale et la lutte contre la fraude fiscale peuvent contribuer à contenir l'immigration clandestine, et sont donc une alternative possible aux politiques coercitives basées sur le contrôle des frontières et les rapatriements. Au contraire, la mise en œuvre de politiques protectionnistes pourrait engendrer l'effet opposé et conduire à une augmentation du nombre d'immigrants clandestins.

Le contrôle de l'immigration clandestine est un sujet très controversé qui anime le débat public, en Belgique comme dans d'autres pays occidentaux. L'immigration clandestine vers les pays européens est un phénomène important, mais qui reste par sa nature difficile à mesurer. Selon les estimations de l'Union Européenne (Clandestino, 2009), en 2008, il y avait en Belgique 1,1 immigrés irréguliers pour 10 migrants réguliers, une situation comparable aux Pays-Bas (1,4 immigrés irréguliers pour 10 réguliers), à la France (0,8 immigrés irréguliers pour 10 réguliers), et à l'Italie (1 immigré irrégulier pour 10 réguliers). Dans ce numéro de Regards économiques, nous nous proposons de clarifier les termes du débat et d'en discuter les implications de politique économique. Nous montrons que la réduction de la pression fiscale et la lutte contre la fraude fiscale peuvent contribuer à contenir l'immigration clandestine, et sont donc une alternative possible aux politiques coercitives basées sur le contrôle des frontières et les rapatriements. Au contraire, la mise en œuvre de politiques commerciale protectionnistes (de nouveau à la mode ces derniers temps) pourrait conduire à une augmentation du nombre d'immigrants clandestins. Une partie de l'opinion publique semble aujourd'hui poursuivre des chimères dangereuses, et se réfugie dans l'espoir illusoire qu'un contrôle plus strict des frontières puisse résoudre tous les problèmes. Notre contribution est une mise en garde partielle contre cette illusion, et propose des solutions alternatives. Selon notre analyse, un gouvernement qui s'engage sérieusement dans la lutte contre l'économie souterraine et qui ne cède pas aux tentations protectionnistes, serait mieux placé pour relever les défis de l'immigration illégale.

Dans ce numéro de Regards économiques, nous discutons les liens entre économie souterraine, protectionnisme et immigration clandestine. Nous montrons que la réduction de la pression fiscale et la lutte contre la fraude fiscale peuvent contribuer à contenir l'immigration clandestine, et sont donc une alternative possible aux politiques coercitives basées sur le contrôle des frontières et les rapatriements. Au contraire, la mise en œuvre de politiques protectionnistes pourrait engendrer l'effet opposé et conduire à une augmentation du nombre d'immigrants clandestins.

This paper provides a rationale for the revival of protectionism, based on the rise of the educated class. In a trade model with heterogeneous workers and entrepreneurs, globalization generates aggregate gains but has distributional effects, which can be attenuated through taxation. By playing a two-stage political game, citizens decide on trade openness and the extent of redistribution. In this setting, trade liberalization is politically viable as long as the losers from trade are compensated through the redistributive mechanism. When skilled workers account for a large share of the population, however, there may be limited political support for redistribution, and those who are left behind by globalization – namely unskilled workers and importing-sector entrepreneurs – can form a coalition to impose protectionist measures. We then build a dynamic version of the model, where human capital accumulation is driven by public education. Our analysis suggests that globalization – by favoring the ascent of the educated class and thus eroding the political support for redistribution – may ultimately breed its own decline.

This article considers the relationship between financial and technological integration in Europe. It finds that market-based financial systems support output growth, investment and total factor productivity (TFP) more than bank-based ones. It identifies three groups of countries and estimates the probability of transition between the groups. It finds that financial integration might be a necessary but not sufficient condition for moving towards the 'Lisbon benchmark'.

This article considers the relationship between financial and technological integration in Europe. It finds that market-based financial systems support output growth, investment and total factor productivity (TFP) more than bank-based ones. It identifies three groups of countries and estimates the probability of transition between the groups. It finds that financial integration might be a necessary but not sufficient condition for moving towards the 'Lisbon benchmark'.