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AbstractDisasters challenge the equilibrium of regulatory regimes and make policy shifts more likely. Using an institutional theory of cultural biases and the concept of cultural "surprise", this article analyses the direction and intensity of media argumentation in respect of policy shifts. Instead of assuming a demand for greater State intervention after dramatic focusing events, as suggested by other theoretical frames, cultural theory opens a variety of options that range from embracing regulatory responses from different cultural biases to the radicalization of current, but failing, instruments. The analysis of media reaction to the environmental disasters caused by the oil spills of Exxon Valdez (United States), Erika (France) and Prestige (Spain) shows that the demand for more hierarchy does not monopolize the overall argumentation. The change demanded often implies a radicalization of a particular prevalent view where the associated institutional setting is failing its supporters.

Résumé La structure politique espagnole est passée, ces trois dernières décennies, d'un système centralisé à un système quasi-fédéral, qui présente les caractéristiques d'un modèle à compétences partagées avec des compétences qui se chevauchent d'un niveau de gouvernement à l'autre. Le nouveau système a entraîné une évolution des fonctions du gouvernement central, qui a renoncé à la prestation de service au profit de la planification et de la formulation des politiques. Dans le présent article, nous allons plus loin que l'étude de la fonction hiérarchique/non hiérarchique du gouvernement central que l'on retrouve dans les études intergouvernementales et appliquons des notions de contrôle comme la supervision, la réciprocité, la concurrence et le hasard artificiel (« contrived randomness ») issues de la théorie culturelle du « grid-group » afin d'examiner sur le plan empirique l'évolution du rôle du gouvernement central dans les relations intergouvernementales. Même si les caractéristiques institutionnelles de la structure politique espagnole sont censées favoriser les relations intergouvernementales coopératives et une fonction de médiation du gouvernement central favorisant les relations (entre pairs) réciproques des régions, le texte laisse entendre que la pratique institutionnelle et la « jeunesse » du processus de décentralisation espagnol sont responsables de l'orientation prise par la structure étatique espagnole. Le système est caractérisé par un gouvernement central toujours ancré dans l'inertie de la supervision (avec des exemples de cas où il a encouragé la réciprocité à certains moments et dans certains domaines stratégiques) et par des régions à la recherche d'unilatéralisme au moyen d'un hasard artificiel. Remarques à l'intention des praticiens Dans le présent article, nous tentons de découvrir deux aspects distincts du rôle du gouvernement central dans les relations intergouvernementales. Premièrement, nous ne respectons pas l'axe traditionnel (hiérarchie et autonomie) entre le gouvernement central/fédéral et les régions/États lorsque nous examinons les relations intergouvernementales en incluant des cas de concurrence et de collégialité entre les parties constitutives. Deuxièmement, nous partons du principe que les premières étapes des relations intergouvernementales ont des chances d'être conflictuelles, indépendamment du modèle institutionnel (coopératif) formel du système. En reconnaissant cela, les promoteurs de la décentralisation devraient être conscients non seulement des aspects formels de la coopération, mais aussi des mécanismes informels permettant de renforcer les pratiques coopératives.

The Spanish polity has made the transition in the last three decades from a centralized system to a quasi-federal one characterized as having features of a shared power model with overlapping powers among levels of government. The new system has implied a change in the functions of central government from service delivery to planning and policy design. Enquiring beyond the hierarchy—non-hierarchy role of central government of intergovernmental studies, this article applies control concepts of oversight, mutuality, competition and contrived randomness from grid & group cultural theory in order to empirically examine the evolution of the role of central government in intergovernmental relations. Although the institutional features of the Spanish polity are expected to foster cooperative intergovernmental relations and a brokerage role of central government fostering mutual (peer) relations of the regions, the text suggests that institutional praxis and the 'youth' of the Spanish decentralization process are accountable for the direction taken by the Spanish polity. The system is characterized by central government still embedded in the inertia of oversight (with examples of fostering mutuality at times and in some policy fields) and by the regions seeking unilateralism through contrived randomness.Points for practitionersThis text tries to unveil two distinct aspects of central government's role in intergovernmental relations. First, it crosses the traditional axis (hierarchy and autonomy) between central/federal government and the regions/states when examining intergovernmental relations by including cases of competition and collegiality among the constituent parts. Second, it assumes that early stages of intergovernmental relations are likely to be conflictual regardless of the formal (cooperative) institutional design of the system. By acknowledging this, promoters of decentralization should be aware not only of the formal aspects of cooperation, but also of the informal mechanisms for building up cooperative practices.

Italy and Spain were the first countries affected by the shift of the pandemic epicentre from east to west. The rapid spread of the virus in allegedly similar social settings, the relatively high numbers of cases and casualties, and the adoption of drastic containment measures were similar in the two countries during the first wave of the pandemic. Both countries are enmeshed in an unstable political equilibrium at the centre, governed by recently established national political coalitions that have continuously been called into question and exposed to significant public debt. The two countries differ in the role of the executive vis-a-vis the legislative, and the tensions between central coordination and regional centrifugal forces. To improve the understanding of how the pandemic has influenced decision-making and crisis management, this article explains the relevance of institutional veto points, as well as differences between the two countries. There is room to match coordination, policy capacity and shared accountability through more collaborative governance.Points for practitionersGoverning a transboundary crisis that involves different governmental levels is about creating an effective coordination mechanism that clarifies responsibilities, avoiding those who may block decision-making processes (veto players) through being incentivized to do so due to the absence of adequate shared accountability systems. National and regional managers should realize that the separation of territorial powers not accompanied by political coordination jeopardizes policy capacity in both the short and long term.