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Does internal migration following natural hazards increase the likelihood of protests in migrant-receiving areas? To address the question, this study first looks at the extent to which experiencing different forms of natural hazards contributes to a household's decision to leave their district of residence. In a second step, the article explores whether that internal migration flow increases the number of protest events in migrant-hosting districts. In doing so, it contributes to the existing debate on the extent to which natural hazards impact the likelihood of social contention, and the role of migration as a linking pathway in that relationship. The impact of climate-related shocks may erode household assets and therefore adaptive capacity in ways that can eventually influence decisions to migrate to larger urban centres. Although migrants are agents of economical and technological change, urban environments may impose challenges to recently arrived migrants and their host communities, affecting the motivations and mobilization resources of urban social groups to protest. As a consequence, the probability of urban unrest in these locations is expected to increase. To test this, I use geo-referenced household-level data from Bangladesh for the period 2010–15, which records households' experiences of different forms of natural hazard and internal migration flows, available from the Bangladesh Integrated Household Survey. It combines this with data on protests, derived from the Armed Conflict Location and Event Data. Findings suggest that flood hazards in combination with loss of assets increase the likelihood of internal migration, but unlike other types of domestic mobility, hazard-related migration does not increase the frequency of protests in migrants' districts of destination.

Does the occurrence of flood disaster increase the risk of communal conflict and if so, does trust in state political institutions mitigate the adverse effect? This study addresses these questions by studying the intervening effect of trust in local governmental institutions at a sub-national level. The effect of flood disasters on the risk of communal violence is expected to be contingent on peoples' trust that local political structures are able to address potential disputes between groups. Violent conflicts, in that sense, are neither inevitable nor directly determined by the occurrence of disasters. They largely depend on the context of a given society and political response to these external shocks. To test this expectation, the study uses survey data on trust in local state institutions in Sub-Saharan Africa from the Afrobarometer (2005–2018), combined with geo-referenced communal conflict and flood data. In line with theoretical expectations, results suggest that flood disasters are associated with communal violence only for administrative districts that are governed by distrusted local state institutions. Conversely, flood disasters tend to be negatively associated with the risk of communal clashes in the presence of highly trusted local government councils and (especially) trusted judicial courts. Changing model specifications and estimation techniques produces similar results. An out-of-sample cross-validation also shows that accounting for political variables, in addition to flood disasters, improves the predictive performance of the model.

In the third climate change, conflict and security scan, covering the period from December 2018 to March 2019, we show that this quadrimester has witnessed the release of an astonishing array of new publications – reviewed through our summary of academic articles and grey literature, debates and announcements, and also conveyed through our summary of the blogosphere, and opinions found on Twitter. Many new authors appear in our bibliography, publishing on different aspects of the intersection of climate change, conflict and security. There is also a completely new list of top five individuals tweeting, which reveals that the breath of individuals and agencies engaging in the topic continues to expand. Prominent institutions continue to feature widely in the policy discourse, publication of grey literature and the blogosphere, with reporting from the World Economic Forum (WEF), United Nations (UN) Security Council debates on the security implications of disasters, and the fourth Planetary Security Conference. However, these high-profile forums are increasingly being complemented by evidence on the local experiences of the intersection of climate change, conflict and security. For example, through articles exploring the 'double vulnerability' of climate and conflict risk, with implications for humanitarian, development, peacebuilding and climate communities. Across the blogosphere, debate rages about the place of climate change in US national security priorities, and there is continued academic analysis of the political discourse of climate change found in policy documents and statements. This complements analysis on international and transboundary dimensions of the climate security nexus, with literature pointing to potential ways forward for such challenges in the context of: territory allocation in the Arcticregional cooperation around shared natural resources in Africa and Asiaunderstanding and responding to changing patterns of human mobility across borders. Themes less prominent in previous scans that appear here include urban landscapes, human mobility, and rights and justice. This complements new evidence on the intersection of disasters with conflict and violence, this time drawing on themes of poverty, inequality and marginalisation. As with the previous two scans, we aim to provide time-poor policy-makers, practitioners and academics with a summary of the new knowledge and evidence that has emerged over a four-month period. As described in the methodology for each section, the scan is not exhaustive but in featuring 25 top blog posts, 39 publications from grey literature and 66 articles from the academic articles, we believe this provides a good starting point for anyone wanting to better understand the nexus.

Introduction. The origin of the Jetyasar culture's population remains a subject of debate. It was generally accepted that the Xiongnu penetrated into the Aral Sea region and participated in the formation of the local population. Previous studies have shown a complex and admixed origin of the Jetyasar people. But the spread of the head deformation tradition in this population imposes serious limitations on the application of craniometric methods for studying Jetyasar samples. Those limitations can be potentially mitigated with the use of geometric morphometrics (GM). The purpose of this work was to assess the degree of variation in the facial skeleton of the Jetyasar people in comparison with populations of the Early Iron Age and the Hunno-Sarmatian period. Material and methods. Digital, three-dimensional models of the skulls were created. Ten landmarks were placed on each of the models and subjected to general Procrustes analysis (GPA) and principal component analysis (PCA). Results. The first PC of the analysis of the total male sample reflects variation in the height of the face, nasal bridge protrusion, and the relative width of the infraorbital region. The second component describes the height of the lateral part of the zygomatic process of the maxilla and the adjacent part of the zygomatic bone. The Kosasar 2 male sample is the most diverse morphologically. This burial ground, according to archeological data, belonged to a migrant population related to the Xiongnu. In the female total sample, high values of the first PC are associated with a tall face, a weak nasal bridge protrusion, and a long zygomatic-maxillary suture. The second PC describes the morphology of the zygomatic process of the upper jaw. The Jetyasar samples are morphologically distinct from the skulls from China, Mongolia, Western Siberia, and Southern Siberia. An exception are the crania from the burial grounds of Kosasar 2, 3, and Altyn-Asar 4t which are similar to the early Iron Age samples from China (inner Mongolia, Warring States period, 5 th – 3rd centuries BC), Mongolia (Xiongnu period), and Tuva (Arzhan-2). Discussion. The Xiongnu migration could become a catalyst for the admixture and ethnogenetic processes in the region. Conclusion. Our study shows that the population of the Jetyasar culture was morphologically heterogeneous at all stages of the culture's development. The hypothesis about the migrant roots of a part of the population is confirmed by our data.

This article presents ViEWS – a political violence early-warning system that seeks to be maximally transparent, publicly available, and have uniform coverage, and sketches the methodological innovations required to achieve these objectives. ViEWS produces monthly forecasts at the country and subnational level for 36 months into the future and all three UCDP types of organized violence: state-based conflict, non-state conflict, and one-sided violence in Africa. The article presents the methodology and data behind these forecasts, evaluates their predictive performance, provides selected forecasts for October 2018 through October 2021, and indicates future extensions. ViEWS is built as an ensemble of constituent models designed to optimize its predictions. Each of these represents a theme that the conflict research literature suggests is relevant, or implements a specific statistical/machine-learning approach. Current forecasts indicate a persistence of conflict in regions in Africa with a recent history of political violence but also alert to new conflicts such as in Southern Cameroon and Northern Mozambique. The subsequent evaluation additionally shows that ViEWS is able to accurately capture the long-term behavior of established political violence, as well as diffusion processes such as the spread of violence in Cameroon. The performance demonstrated here indicates that ViEWS can be a useful complement to non-public conflict-warning systems, and also serves as a reference against which future improvements can be evaluated.

This article presents ViEWS – a political violence early-warning system that seeks to be maximally transparent, publicly available, and have uniform coverage, and sketches the methodological innovations required to achieve these objectives. ViEWS produces monthly forecasts at the country and subnational level for 36 months into the future and all three UCDP types of organized violence: state-based conflict, non-state conflict, and one-sided violence in Africa. The article presents the methodology and data behind these forecasts, evaluates their predictive performance, provides selected forecasts for October 2018 through October 2021, and indicates future extensions. ViEWS is built as an ensemble of constituent models designed to optimize its predictions. Each of these represents a theme that the conflict research literature suggests is relevant, or implements a specific statistical/machine-learning approach. Current forecasts indicate a persistence of conflict in regions in Africa with a recent history of political violence but also alert to new conflicts such as in Southern Cameroon and Northern Mozambique. The subsequent evaluation additionally shows that ViEWS is able to accurately capture the long-term behavior of established political violence, as well as diffusion processes such as the spread of violence in Cameroon. The performance demonstrated here indicates that ViEWS can be a useful complement to non-public conflict-warning systems, and also serves as a reference against which future improvements can be evaluated.