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AbstractSecret back-channel communication is often employed in severe conflict to explore the feasibility of front-channel negotiation. It can also be used as an adjunct to front-channel negotiation when talks become deadlocked or as a substitute for front-channel negotiation. Its value lies partly in the flexibility and future orientation it brings to talks. In the prenegotiation phase, it also provides political cover, is cost-effective, does not require formal recognition of the adversary, and allows communication with adversaries who do not meet preconditions for negotiation such as a cease-fire. Intermediaries and intermediary chains are sometimes used in back-channel communication. Heavy reliance on back-channel communication can produce flimsy agreements that are too narrowly based or fail to deal with major issues. But this problem can be avoided if enough time is spent assembling a broad central coalition.

AbstractNegotiation with non-ideological ethno-nationalist terrorists is more common and more successful than with other kinds of terrorists. Additional strategies for dealing with terrorists include combating, isolating, and mainstreaming. There are many arguments against negotiation with terrorists, but most of them do not apply to secret backchannel talks, which are usually the method of choice in first approaching these groups. The success of negotiation depends on the development of flexibility by both the terrorists and the authorities. These and other points are illustrated with case materials from the Northern Ireland peace process, and the analysis is extended, on a speculative basis, to negotiation with several Islamic terrorist groups.

AbstractField experiments, in which the researcher manipulates one or more variables in a naturally occurring setting, have sometimes been used in studies of social conflict and should probably be used more often. They are more useful than observational studies for assessing the impact of novel conditions, establishing cause and effect, and reducing confounding. And they are more useful than laboratory experiments for examining long-term effects and those that involve strong passions, and for establishing external validity. However field experiments also have their limitations. Some variables cannot be practically or ethically manipulated and require the use of observational methods, which are also more useful for looking at the relationships among a large number of variables and for estimating the strength of association between variables. Furthermore, laboratory experiments allow more control of conditions and greater flexibility in designing manipulations. What this suggests is that all three methods have their value.

Except when there is substantial third-party pressure for settlement, participants in intractable conflict will only enter negotiation if they are motivated to end the conflict and optimistic about negotiation's chances of success. The sources of such optimism are explored using case material from three intractable interethnic conflicts that were ultimately resolved by negotiation. In all three cases, optimism developed during prenegotiation communication between the parties. Also there were two main channels of communication, each channel providing credibility to the other and serving as a back-up if the other failed. In two of the cases the communication was face-to-face and friendly, but in the third it was distant and mediated by a chain of two intermediaries. A possible reason for this difference is that the parties were positively interdependent in the first two cases but not in the third. The paper concludes with a summary of three psychological experiments that demonstrate the impact of positive vs. negative interdependence.

Except when there is substantial third-party pressure for settlement, participants in intractable conflict will only enter negotiation if they are motivated to end the conflict and optimistic about negotiation's chances of success. The sources of such optimism are explored using case material from three intractable interethnic conflicts that were ultimately resolved by negotiation. In all three cases, optimism developed during prenegotiation communication between the parties. Also there were two main channels of communication, each channel providing credibility to the other and serving as a back-up if the other failed. In two of the cases the communication was face-to-face and friendly, but in the third it was distant and mediated by a chain of two intermediaries. A possible reason for this difference is that the parties were positively interdependent in the first two cases but not in the third. The paper concludes with a summary of three psychological experiments that demonstrate the impact of positive vs. negative interdependence. Adapted from the source document.

After 20 years of heavy fighting in Northern Ireland, a peace process started in 1988. The fighting went on, with some interruptions, for another 9 years; but during this time there was a long series o;f back-channel communications and conciliatory signals that led to a cease-fire, negotiations, and a peace settlement. The dynamics of this peace process are analyzed by means of the author's readiness theory, which attributes the process to (a) Irish Republican Army and British discouragement about the likelihood of a military victory, (b) pressure from allies of both these parties, (c) growing optimism about the success of negotiation, and (d) the emergence of a broad central coalition that embraced most of the political groups in Northern Ireland.