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Abstract

Objectives
Infection control policies and guidelines recommend using facemasks and respirators to protect healthcare workers (HCWs) from respiratory infections. Common types of respirators used in healthcare settings are filtering facepiece respirators (FFRs) and powered air-purifying respirators (PAPRs). Aims of this study were to examine the current attitudes and practices of HCWs regarding the selection and use of respiratory protection and determine the acceptability of a novel PAPR.


Methods
In-depth interviews were undertaken with 20 HCWs from a large tertiary hospital in Sydney, Australia. Participants were fit tested with a lightweight tight-fitting half-facepiece PAPR (CleanSpace2™ Power Unit, PAF-0034, by CleanSpace Technology®) using the TSI™ Portacount quantitative fit test method.


Results
Interview results showed that HCWs had a limited role in the selection and use of facemasks and respirators and had been using the devices provided by the hospital. The majority of subjects had no knowledge of hospital policy for the use of facemasks and respirators, had not been trained on the use of respirators, and had not been fit tested previously. Compliance with the use of facemasks and respirators was perceived as being low and facemasks and respirators were typically used only for short periods of time.
All 20 participants were successfully fit tested to the CleanSpace2™ PAPR (overall geometric mean fit factor—6768). According to the exit surveys, CleanSpace2™ PAPRs were easy to don (14/20) and doff (15/20) and comfortable to wear (14/20). Most participants believed that PAPRs provide higher protection, comfort and reusability over N95 FFR and can be used during pandemics and other high-risk situations.


Conclusions
HCWs should be aware of infection control policies and training should be provided on the correct use of respiratory protective devices. PAPRs can be used in hospital settings to protect HCWs from certain highly infectious and emerging pathogens, however, HCWs require adequate training on storage, use, and cleaning of PAPRs.

IntroductionRecipients of solid organ transplants are at risk of serious infection due to immunosuppression. Some infections are preventable with vaccination; infection rates vary with immunosuppression, vaccination rates and baseline disease prevalence. Both adherence with and response to vaccination in this population are variable, and optimum vaccination strategies continue to be refined.
Objectives and ApproachWe aimed to characterise the incidence and complications of vaccine-preventable infections in transplant recipients. Eligible participants received an organ transplant in New South Wales, Australia, in 2000-2015. Linkage was undertaken between transplant registries and the notifiable conditions information management system. Vaccine-preventable infections were diphtheria, Haemophilus influenzae type b, influenza, invasive pneumococcal disease, measles, mumps, pertussis, poliovirus, rubella and tetanus. Standardized incidence ratios (SIR) were calculated relative to Australian population notification rates, standardizing for gender, age and calendar year.
ResultsAmong 3,394 recipients, 399 vaccine-preventable infections affected 339 (10%) recipients. Influenza was the most common vaccine-preventable infection with 352 notifications among 305 recipients. Influenza cases were 8.9 times more common among transplant recipients than the general population (95%CI: 8.0-10.0). In 36 cases (10%), hospitalization was required, and 2 deaths due to influenza were reported.
There were 20 notifications of invasive pneumococcal disease (IPD) for 18 recipients. IPD occurred 10.2 times more often among transplant recipients than the general population (95%CI: 6.4-16.2). Most (n=13, 65%) cases were hospitalized, and one patient died from IPD.
Cases of pertussis occurred only slightly more often than in the general population (SIR 1.5, 95%CI: 1.0-2.3). Of 26 cases, there was one reported hospitalization and no deaths due to pertussis. Only one case of mumps, and no other vaccine-preventable infections, were reported.
ConclusionTransplant recipients have excess cases of influenza and IPD compared to the general population, although this has improved over time. The need for appropriate recipient vaccination is emphasized.

IntroductionSolid organ transplant recipients are at risk of infections, which may be either derived through transplantation or acquired later. Blood-borne viruses (BBV) are a particular concern for donor-derived transmissions. There is an increasing emphasis on biovigilance – monitoring the safety of donated organs. However, systematic surveillance to distinguish donor-transmitted infection from de novo post-transplant infection is challenging. Additional information can be obtained through linkage of administrative health data.
Objectives and ApproachWe aimed to identify donor-transmitted and de novo BBV infections among organ transplant recipients. We conducted a cohort study of all solid organ donor-recipient pairs in New South Wales, Australia, 2000-2015. Donor and recipient BBV infections were identified by linking transplant registries with administrative health data. Proven/probable donor-transmissions were identified among new recipient infections within 12 months of transplant, classified according to an international algorithm. All other new BBV infections were classified as de novo infections.
ResultsAmong 2,120 organ donors, 73 had a BBV infection (11/73 active, 62/73 past). Donors with BBV donated to 176 recipients, of whom 24/176 had the same BBV as their donor, and 152/176 did not; these 152 recipients were at risk of donor-transmission. Among those at risk, there were 3/152 proven/probable BBV transmissions (1 hepatitis C, 2 hepatitis B [HBV]) and 149/152 recipients with non-transmissions. All donor-transmissions were previously recognised by donation services, and were from donors with known BBV. There were no deaths from transmissions. There were 70 recipients with de novo BBV; 2/70 died from new HBV.
Conclusion / ImplicationsThis work confirms the safety of Australian organ donation, with no unrecognised BBV transmissions and many non-transmissions from donors with BBV. This may support increasing targeted donation from donors with BBV. However, de novo BBV infections were substantial and preventable. Data-linkage may be a useful adjunct to current biovigilance systems.

Smallpox was declared eradicated in 1980, with known seed stock retained in two high security Biosafety Level 4 laboratories in the United States and Russia. Experts agree the likelihood of theft from these laboratories is low, and that synthetic creation of smallpox is a theoretical possibility. Until 2017 it was believed that synthetic smallpox was technically too complex a task to be a serious threat. However, in 2017, Canadian scientists synthesised a closely related orthopoxvirus, horsepox, using mail order DNA and $100,000. Simultaneously, terrorist groups have declared intent to conduct biological attacks. In this context an exercise was held on August 16th 2018, with international and cross-sectoral stakeholders to review preparedness for a bioterrorism attack in the Asia-Pacific region and globally. The exercise was conducted by The National Health and Medical Research Council (NHMRC) Centre for Research Excellence, Integrated Systems for Epidemic Response, with contextual input from the Ministry of Health and Medical Services Fiji. The scenario involved a deliberate release in Fiji, followed by a larger release in a more populous Asian country. Mathematical modelling was used to underpin epidemic projections under different conditions. The exercise alternated between clinical, public health, emergency and societal responses, with participants making real-time decisions on cross-sectoral response across the region and the world. Key weak points which are influential in determining the final size and impact of the epidemic were identified (based on mathematical modelling of transmission in Fiji and globally). We identified potential gaps in preparedness for smallpox and factors which influence the severity of a smallpox epidemic. This included identifying which determinants of epidemic size are potentially within our control, and which are not. Influential factors within our control include: preventing an attack through intelligence, law enforcement and legislation; speed of diagnosis; speed and completeness of case finding and case isolation; speed and security of vaccination response, including stockpiling; speed and completeness of contact tracing; protecting critical infrastructure and business continuity; non-pharmaceutical interventions (social distancing, PPE, border control); protecting first responders; operational support and logistics; social mobilisation and risk communication. Based on discussion at the workshop between diverse stakeholders, recommendations were made to guide improved prevention, mitigation and rapid response, thus providing a holistic, cross-sectoral framework for prevention of a worst-case scenario smallpox pandemic.

In 2016, the Transplantation Society of Australia and New Zealand, with the support of the Australian Government Organ and Tissue authority, commissioned a literature review on the topic of infectious disease transmission from deceased donors to recipients of solid organ transplants. The purpose of this review was to synthesize evidence on transmission risks, diagnostic test characteristics, and recipient management to inform best-practice clinical guidelines. The final review, presented as a special supplement in Transplantation Direct, collates case reports of transmission events and other peer-reviewed literature, and summarizes current (as of June 2017) international guidelines on donor screening and recipient management. Of particular interest at the time of writing was how to maximize utilization of donors at increased risk for transmission of human immunodeficiency virus, hepatitis C virus, and hepatitis B virus, given the recent developments, including the availability of direct-acting antivirals for hepatitis C virus and improvements in donor screening technologies. The review also covers emerging risks associated with recent epidemics (eg, Zika virus) and the risk of transmission of nonendemic pathogens related to donor travel history or country of origin. Lastly, the implications for recipient consent of expanded utilization of donors at increased risk of blood-borne viral disease transmission are considered.