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AbstractLittle is known about why individuals place either a high or a very low value on mitigating risks of disaster‐type events, like floods. This study uses panel data methods to explore the psychological factors affecting probability neglect of flood risk relevant to the zero end‐point of the probability weighting function in Prospect Theory, and willingness‐to‐pay for flood insurance. In particular, we focus on explanatory variables of anticipatory and anticipated emotions, as well as the threshold of concern. Moreover, results obtained under real and hypothetical incentives are compared in an experiment with high experimental outcomes. Based on our findings, we suggest several policy recommendations to overcome individual decision processes, which may hinder flood protection efforts.

This paper examines the problem of "charity hazard", which is the crowding out of private insurance demand by government compensation. In the context of flood insurance and disaster financing, charity hazard is particularly worrisome given current trends of increasing flood risks as a result of climate change and more people choosing to locate in high-risk areas. We conduct an experimental analysis of the influence on flood insurance demand of risk and ambiguity preferences and the availability of different forms of government compensation for disaster damage. Certain and risky government compensation crowd out demand, confirming charity hazard, but this is not observed for ambiguous compensation. Ambiguity averse subjects have higher insurance demand when government compensation is ambiguous relative to risky. Policy recommendations are discussed to overcome charity hazard