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Two key variables appear to have influenced the varying responses of national armies to the "Arab Spring." The first is the manner and degree of the institutionalization of the military into authoritarian systems, and even into the few democratic or partially democratic polities, in the Middle East. No 1960s-vintage military regimes remain in the region: the various direct and indirect consequences of the oil price revolutions of the 1970s—including massive urbanization and a huge expansion of state bureaucracies and of the diversity and complexity of national economies—have seen to that. In the process, however, boundaries have blurred between the military, on the one side, and political elites, the economy, and social actors on the other. The second variable—which is partly a function of the first—is that many armies have had both inclusionary and exclusionary impacts at the same time, serving to co-opt, control, or intimidate various social sectors according to whether the latter are perceived as friendly or hostile within "threat profiles" held by state leaders, security officials, and, occasionally, wide swathes of society. The tension between inclusion and exclusion has been replicated in the social-welfare role of military employment, through which governments have shielded core constituencies from the worst impacts of deepening economic liberalization and privatization while growing numbers of their compatriots have experienced widening income disparities, declining living standards, and a descent to or below the poverty line. These trends are brought together most powerfully in the ground forces. They are not only the largest component by far of most militaries and the most affected by pressures on living standards and pensions but also the only ones that can be deployed effectively in the streets as a last resort to confront protesters. Whether armies support peaceful transition, revert to repression, or fragment will be key to their ability to maintain or develop professional, corporate identities. This ability will also be highly contingent on their readiness to accept readjustment of their institutionalization into state systems and on the manner and pace in which this is pursued by other actors. The outcome is not assured.

The readiness of army commanders in Egypt and Tunisia to counter the internal security agencies deployed by their own governments against civilian protestors in early 2011 proved decisive in bringing down presidents-for-life Husni Mubarak and Zayn al-ʿAbidin bin ʿAli. This brings into sharp relief questions about how to approach and assess the various coercive agencies of the state. Should we regard them as different branches of a single coercive apparatus, through which the state seeks to exercise a monopoly on the legitimate means of violence? Or should we see them as manifestations of more fragmented political institutions and social forces and consequently as performing distinct, and potentially divergent, functions in constantly evolving relation to each other?

The policies of the Quartet of the United States, the UN, the EU and Russia have contributed materially to systemic, probably irreversible collapse - 'state failure' - in the Palestinian Authority. The Hamas takeover of Gaza in June 2007 underlined the consequences of applying sweeping, punitive sanctions against an entity and a population already exhibiting signs of severe political, social and economic stress. The risk is that this approach will polarise Palestinian politics even further, expanding the scope and scale of internecine violence. If Hamas is brought down in the Gaza Strip neither the Palestinian Authority emergency government nor the government of Israel would be able genuinely to govern the area. But the alternative is that Hamas will succeed in consolidating its power in Gaza. A resumption of external trade or even a ceasefire agreement may allow a power-sharing deal to be reached once more with Fatah, but will not endure in the absence of a diplomatic initiative that reinstates firm benchmarks and detailed goalposts for the two-state solution. This is unlikely as long as the international community will not engage in forceful political intervention. The fact that the Quartet confined the mandate of its new special envoy, former UK Prime Minister Tony Blair, to assisting Palestinian political and economic reform suggests that it has opted for the default choice of persevering in a failed policy. (Survival / SWP)

In light of dramatic and risk-laden change in the Palestinian political landscape, explored are the substance of domestic changes impacting the development of Palestinian political and governing systems and the dynamics of relations with Israel, and the incentive structure in which key Palestinian players have decided their objectives, crafted policy perspectives, and conducted cost-benefit analyses. The failures of Fatah and the rise of Hamas, as well as the lack of a credible alternative, or "third force," are discussed before examining the relationship between internal structures and processes, eg, Palestinian Authority reform, to external ones, eg, the peace process. Attention is given to the implications of Hamas' electoral victory over Fatah for the peace process, noting that the international community's unwillingness to address fundamental political issues of Israeli-Palestinian relations while fixating on the notion of Palestinian reform, has made it complicit in Israeli unilateralism, a problem that predates Hamas' win. How Hamas will approach the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, particularly in terms of US and EU policy prescriptions, is considered in closing.

The article argues that Yaser Arafat's death, while presenting a chance for positive political evolution among the Palestinians, might not result in a similarly positive shift in Israeli policies, especially since the Israeli government does not appear ready to take advantage of the opportunity. Because the US also appears unwilling to shift policy, & because the international community appears unwilling to create its own initiative, Palestine & Israel face the continued prospect of violence in the post-Arafat period. Furthermore, from the perspective offered here, the Israeli scheme for unilateral withdrawal from Gaza will create an insurmountable barrier to the revival of serious peace efforts. The article concludes by urging the key powers in the world community to pressure Israel to engage the Palestinians in a meaningful way, lest the violence continue without end. R. Young