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One of the axioms of political analysis is that office-holders desire to continue to hold office and behave accordingly. A key implication of this view is that if the policies chosen by leaders are selected because leaders believe the policies will enhance their position, then the wars we see in history do not represent a random sample of all possible conflicts, but rather are a biased sample of wars that were selected by the leader of the initiator state because he or she had the expectation of a favorable outcome that would enhance their position. This leads to selection effects in the occurrence of conflict. The theoretical and empirical implications of selection effects are explored in seeking a better understanding of two prominent puzzles in the study of international conflict: (1) the non-expansion of war and (2) the question of democratic war participation.

Two explanations have been advanced for the `democratic peace'; one is built on shared values and norms of democratic political systems, the other focuses on the constraints under which democratic political leaders make decisions or hold office. Constraints theory implies that democracies should be generally more peaceful, while previous analyses indicate they are as warlike as other states, except in their dealings with each other. However, constraints theory cannot be dismissed on this basis because extant empirical research has not distinguished between (1) various levels of war participation and (2) the different latitudes of choice available to leaders. An empirical analysis of international wars in the period 1816-1974 supports the expectations and strengthens the argument about the effects of institutional constraints in relation to expected losses in war. The article concludes with the suggestion that the shared values and norms explanation might be weakened if analysis was extended to include colonial wars.