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"Why are transitions from authoritarian rule often marked by spikes in communal violence? Through examining Indonesia's recent transition to democracy, this book develops a novel theoretical explanation for this phenomenon that also accounts for why some communities are vulnerable to violence during such transitions while others are able to maintain order. Yuhki Tajima argues that repressive intervention by security forces in Indonesia during the authoritarian period rendered some communities dependent on the state to maintain intercommunal security, whereas communities with a more tenuous exposure to the state developed their own informal institutions to maintain security. As the coercive grip of the authoritarian regime loosened, communities that were more accustomed to state intervention were more vulnerable to spikes in communal violence until they developed informal institutions that were better adapted for less state intervention. To test the theory, Tajima employs extensive fieldwork in, and rigorous statistical evidence from, Indonesia as well as cross-national data"--

Why do gangs proliferate during democratization and decline in number during authoritarian consolidation? I utilize primary evidence of two Indonesian gangs to inform a model of protection gangs under varying states of political development. Modeling gangs as territorial firms under different regulatory conditions, I attribute their number and political affiliation to the interaction between state capacity and political fragmentation. In weak states, gangs will lack political affiliations and their number will be determined by the scalability of their coercive capacities. In countries where states have the capacity to significantly constrain gangs, but lack significant costs for politicians to associate with them, gangs will seek political affiliation, trading coercive services for lax law enforcement. In such contexts, their number will be determined by state factionalization. Thus, gangs proliferate during democratization due to more political actors sharing state control. I assess the theory examining Indonesia's history of statebuilding and political transition.

When authoritarian regimes break down, why does communal violence spike and why are some locations more prone to violence than others? To understand violence during transitions, it is necessary to understand what sustains order when regimes are stable. While existing theories attribute order to formal or informal security institutions on their own, I argue that intercommunal order obtains when formal and informal security institutions are aligned. During authoritarian breakdowns, the state's coercive grip loosens, exposing mismatches between formal and informal institutions and raising the risk of communal violence. Formal-informal mismatches emerge in communities accustomed to heavy state intervention since they will have developed more state-dependent informal security institutions. I apply an instrumental variables approach on a nationwide dataset of village-level data to show that prior exposure to military intervention, proxied by the distance to security outposts, led to Indonesia's spike in violence during its recent democratic transition. Adapted from the source document.

This paper documents significant differences in the impacts the war in Aceh had on ex-combatants and civilians and how these differences shaped the post-war decision-making processes of their households. Because of the overwhelming percentage of the ex-combatant population in rural areas (over 90 percent), particular attention is paid to the agricultural sector. The second section provides summary statistics of former combatants' household and individual characteristics, and economic conditions. In order to place the economic conditions of former combatants in context, the section will include a comparison of former combatants with civilians. After the end of the war, ex-combatants were found to have fewer assets, more injuries, and lower educational attainment than civilians. After providing an overview of the economic welfare of former combatants and civilians, an analytical framework is developed in the third section that will be used to understand the variation in economic outcomes of former combatants. The framework will draw connections between the varying degree to which war affects individuals and communities to the post-war decisions and processes that lead to differences in ex-combatants' economic outcomes. In the fourth section, field data from nine village case studies from three districts in Aceh will be marshaled to place the analytical framework in the context of Aceh. In particular, the framework and field data suggest that the more limited physical and human capital endowments constrained the choices of former combatants since they had to maintain enough liquidity to meet their consumption needs rather than being able to invest in more productive activities. The fifth section will outline various hypotheses that emerge from the analytical framework as well as from the qualitative data and section six will assess the various hypotheses on the statistical evidence from the ARLS data. Thus, section six will provide a broad assessment of the observable implications of the analytical framework developed in sections three and four. In particular, ex-combatants with fewer assets and a lack of access to capital were more likely to have lower incomes and to engage in quickly maturing, but lower return, economic activities. The paper will conclude with an examination of the implications of the findings for reintegration and development policy in Aceh as well as for other post-war contexts elsewhere.

Recent scholarship on communal violence in Indonesia since the late New Order has focused on identifying causal mechanisms of particular subtypes of communal violence such as large-scale communal violence, town-level communal rioting, intervillage violence, and lynching. While such analyses are useful in understanding aspects specific to each subtype of violence, analyzing each subtype separately risks the analytical problem of selection on the dependent variable if there are important similarities across subtypes. Drawing on the observation that each of these subtypes appeared to rise and fall together since the late New Order, I propose a common factor that can explain the broad temporal patterns of communal violence. In particular, I point to increasing restraints on the military that arose from intraregime infighting, greater scrutiny of military actions during theketerbukaan(political openness) period, and the withdrawal of the military from police duties during Reformasi. I examine four cases of communal conflict: (1) a case in which intravillage violence was averted, (2) a case of lynching, (3) a case of lynching and subsequent intervillage reprisals, and (4) a case of large-scale communal violence. The first three cases are from Lampung province, and the fourth is the case of Poso district, Central Sulawesi.

AbstractThis article analyzes the efficacy of border enforcement against smuggling. We argue that walls, fences, patrols, and other efforts to secure porous borders can reduce smuggling, but only in the absence of collusion between smugglers and state agents at official border crossings. When such corruption occurs, border enforcement merely diverts smuggling flows without reducing their overall volume. We also identify the conditions under which corruption occurs and characterize border enforcement as a sorting mechanism that allows high-skilled smugglers to forge alternative border-crossing routes while deterring low-skilled smugglers or driving them to bribe local border agents. Combining a formal model and an archival case study of opium smuggling in Southeast Asia, we demonstrate that border enforcement has conditional effects on the routes and volumes of smuggling, depending on the nature of interactions between smugglers and border agents. By drawing attention to the technological and organizational aspects of smuggling, this article brings scholarship on criminal governance into the study of international relations, and contributes to debates on the effects of border enforcement and border politics more generally.

This article contributes to the study of ethnic diversity and public goods provision by assessing the role of the spatial distribution of ethnic groups. Through a new theory that we callspatial interdependence, we argue that the segregation of ethnic groups can reduce or even neutralize the "diversity penalty" in public goods provision that results from ethnic fractionalization. This is because local segregation allows communities to use disparities in the level of public goods compared with other communities as leverage when advocating for more public goods for themselves, thereby ratcheting up the level of public goods across communities. We test this prediction on highly disaggregated data from Indonesia and find strong support that, controlling for ethnic fractionalization, segregated communities have higher levels of public goods. This has an important and underexplored implication: decentralization disadvantages integrated communities vis-à-vis their more segregated counterparts.

Since the end of Suharto's so-called New Order (1966-1998) in Indonesia and the eruption of vicious group violence, a number of questions have engaged the minds of scholars and other observers. How widespread is the group violence? What forms—ethnic, religious, economic—has it primarily taken? Have the clashes of the post-Suharto years been significantly more widespread, or worse, than those of the late New Order? The authors of Collective Violence in Indonesia trenchantly address these questions, shedding new light on trends in the country and assessing how they compare with broad patterns identified in Asia and Africa