Search results

Recalling the work of Niccolò Machiavelli, leading researcher Rinus van Schendelen distills the practices of successful lobbyists down to three basic principles: ambition, study, and prudence. Paying close attention to the special issues implicit in EU lobbying, this book illuminates the practice, its opportunities and pitfalls, and even its contributions to democracy. This revised edition has been strengthened with several new cases, insights and trends, and takes into account the new Treaty of Lisbon.

Analyzes almost 500 items on the agendas and proceedings of the EU Agricultural Council, 1992-93; whether any meeting of the Council of Ministers is in fact a decision-making body? Finds that ministers dislike submitting an important issue to the higher level of the General Council; that the atmosphere is tough and businesslike; and that information given to national parliaments is incomplete.

Arend Lijphart (The Politics of Accommodation: Pluralism and Democracy in the Netherlands, U of California Press, 1968) is taken as the leading scholar in the field of consociational theory, ie, the theory concerning the democratic stability of seriously cleavaged & segmented countries. After presenting Lijphart's views as completely as possible, criticisms collected from the political science literature are put forth concerning: his conceptualizations (pluralism, democracy, stability, accommodation, & the so-called conditions); his measurements of the structure of cleavages, mass attitudes & behavior, elite behavior, stability, democracy, & the conditions & other aspects of consociational countries; & the scientific qualities of his theory in terms of validity, verifiability, predictive power, & applicative potentials. Finally, three competing interpretations explaining the stability of segmented countries are given: elite control, corporatism, & Marxist theory. Modified AA

Compares structural & functional changes in the UK's House of Commons & the Netherlands' Second Chamber since 1953 that have resulted from the expansion of the public sector. On initial analysis of their legislation, it appears little changed relative to the public sector; however, other factors -- eg, accumulative effects, prevalence of delegated legislation, & appearance of pseudolegislation -- have produced a significant increase in legislation. Whereas the Second Chamber substantially increased its financial resources to counteract its growing public sector demands, the British government has strongly opposed any increase for the House of Commons. It is suggested that the prevalence of special committees in the Second Chamber will strengthen individual party committees. Increasing the number of Members of Parliament, meeting time, & specialist committees in the House of Commons are presented as alternative solutions to the problems created by an expanded public sector. Differences in the legislatures' response to the public sector crisis are attributed to historical factors, degree of specialization, government-parliament relations, & duration of the adaption process. 5 Tables. J. W. Parker

An examination of how the Dutch & British parliaments have adapted to societal change in the twentieth century. The growth of the public sector & legislative responses to it are examined. In neither country has there been an increase in the amount of legislation enacted commensurate with the growth of the public sector; however, new legislation has had a cumulative effect on the old & there has been increased reliance on the delegation of administrative authority. The Dutch parliament has adapted to social change by establishing a number of specialized committees to process individual bills; the Dutch chamber has thus been transformed into a parliament of specialists. In contrast, very little change has taken place in the English House of Commons; the limited change permitted has not kept pace with societal changes. Historical, cultural, & structural reasons are advanced as to why the two legislatures have reacted so differently to comparable environmental stimuli. 6 Tables. Modified HA.

THE CONTOURS OF A THEORY OF STATUS POLITICS ARE SKETCHED. POLITICAL PARTICIPATION IS 1ST CONSIDERED IN TERMS OF THE PLAY & COUNTERPLAY OF 3 GROUPS OF FACTORS: (1) PSYCHOLOGICAL FACTORS THAT DETERMINE THE AMBITION TO PARTICIPATE, (2) INDIVIDUAL POLITICAL RESOURCES, & (3) INSTITUTIONAL FACTORS. SECONDLY, A THEORY OF POLITICAL STRIVING IS CONSTRUCTED. EMPHASIS IS PUT ON THE RELATIONS BETWEEN POLITICAL AMBITION & THE OPPORTUNITY STRUCTURE OF THE POLITY. POLITICAL POSITIONS ARE DISCUSSED IN TERMS OF DEMAND & SUPPLY, & INDIVIDUAL POLITICAL RESOURCES ARE INTERPRETED AS A NECESSARY CONDITION OF THE INCUMBENCY OF POLITICAL POSITIONS. A MODEL CONTAINING 6 RELATIONS IS PRESENTED. 3RD IS THE INTRODUCTION OF INCENTIVES. THE THEORY OF POLITICAL STRIVING ASSUMES POLITICAL AMBITION TO VARY ACCORDING TO CHANGES IN THE LEVEL OF RESOURCES & THE SUPPLY OF POLITICAL POSITIONS, BUT THE THEORY OF POLITICAL INCENTIVES ADDS THE ELEMENT OF SATISFACTIONS CONNECTED WITH POLITICAL PARTICIPATION. INCENTIVES ARE VIEWED AS EMOTIONAL NEEDS, SUCH AS STATUS, WHICH ARE SATISFIED BY MEANS OF POLITICAL PARTICIPATION. THE POSSIBILITY OF EXTENDING THE MODEL OF POLITICAL STRIVING IN THE DIRECTION OF STATUS IS ANALYZED. STATUS & PROGRAM ARE ASSUMED TO BE POLAR TYPES OF INCENTIVES. THE 3 VARIABLES OF THE MODEL ARE (A) POLITICAL AMBITION BASED ON EMOTIONAL NEED OF SOCIAL PRESTIGE, (B) POLITICAL RESOURCES THAT ARE PARTICULARLY SUITED FOR SUCCESSFUL PARTICIPATION IN STATUS POLITICS, & (C) STATUS POSITIONS IN THE OPPORTUNITY STRUCTURE. THE SUPPLY OF POLITICAL POSITIONS HAS CONSIDERABLY INCREASED IN HOLLAND IN RECENT YEARS. RESEARCHING WHETHER THIS IS BECAUSE OF A TREND TOWARDS STATUS POLITICS IS A DELICATE MATTER BECAUSE OF TABOOS & POLITICIANS' DEFENSE MECHANISMS. 4 FIGURES. MODIFIED HA.