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The authors analyze the links between Russias disappointing growth performance in the second half of the 1990s, its costly and unsuccessful stabilization, the macroeconomic meltdown of 1998, and the spectacular rise of non-payments. Non-payments flourished in an environment of fundamental inconsistency between a macroeconomic policy geared at sharp disinflation, and a microeconomic policy of bailing enterprises out through soft budget constraints. Heavy untargeted implicit subsidies flowing through the non-payments system (amounting to 10 percent of GDP annually) have stifled growth, contributed to the August 1998 meltdown, through their impact on public debt, and have made at best a questionable contribution to equity. Dismantling this system must be a top priority, along with promoting enterprise restructuring and growth (by hardening budget constraints) and medium-term macroeconomic stability (by reducing the size of subsidies). Getting the government out of the non-payments system means settling all appropriately controlled budgetary expenditures on time, and in cash, and eschewing spending arrears, thereby setting an example for enterprises, and laying the groundwork for eliminating tax offsets at all levels of government, and insisting on cash tax payments. To stop energy-related subsidies, would require not only that the government pay its own energy bills on time, and in cash, but also that the energy monopolies be empowered to disconnect non-paying clients. This will enable the government to insist that the energy monopolies in turn pay their own taxes in full, and on time.

Most researchers examining poverty and multilateral trade liberalization have had to examine average, or per capita effects, suggesting that if per capita real income rises, poverty will fall. This inference can be misleading. Combining results from a new international cross-section consumption analysis with earnings data from household surveys, this article analyzes the implications of multilateral trade liberalization for poverty in Indonesia. It finds that the aggregate reduction in Indonesia's national poverty headcount following global trade liberalization masks a more complex set of impacts across groups. In the short run the poverty headcount rises slightly for self-employed agricultural households, as agricultural profits fail to keep up with increases in consumer prices. In the long run the poverty headcount falls for all earnings strata, as increased demand for unskilled workers lifts incomes for the formerly self-employed, some of whom move into the wage labor market. A decomposition of the poverty changes in Indonesia associated with different countries' trade policies finds that reform in other countries leads to a reduction in poverty in Indonesia but that liberalization of Indonesia's trade policies leads to an increase. The method used here can be readily extended to any of the other 13 countries in the sample.

Inward investment from foreign manufacturing firms has been sought as a remedy to regional industrial problems in the UK. Foreign manufacturing offers the prospect of industrial diversification, new jobs and incomes, and can also represent a stimulus to new ideas and practices in domestic industries. The potential for production externalities from the foreign to the domestic sector has been investigated in a number of empirical studies. The wider potential for foreign manufacturing to become a driver of regional competitive advantage is expected to be linked to a number of factors including underlying investment motives, subsidiary age and type, subsidiary size, degree of value added within the plant, type of plant/degree of autonomy, nationality of ownership, entry mode, industry sector, and the structure of the host/regional economy. An additional and inter-linked factor with the above is the extent to which foreign plants are embedded through their purchasing linkages into their respective local economies. The degree of embeddedness determines the indirect employment and output supported by foreign firm activities in regional economies, and is a general indicator of the extent to which foreign firms contribute towards regional growth. Previous research has work has highlighted the comparatively low levels of linkage that exist between inward investing sectors and local supply bases. For example, Turok (1993, 1997) demonstrated the Scottish electronics industry (including large numbers of inward investors) purchased just 12% of material inputs in Scotland, and that (with reference to Input-Output tables for Scotland) output based multipliers for the electronics sector still revealed a poor quality of linkages into the local economy. In Northern Ireland, Crone and Roper (1999) reported that weak supply linkages between foreign and regional firms had restricted the potential of positive production externalities. In Wales, Roberts (1996) considered the backward (and forward) linkages created by foreign manufacturing sectors in the local economy using 1994 Input-Output tables for Wales. Overall, this research found that, on average, less than 17% of non-wage spending of foreign manufacturing firms occurred in the Welsh economy (see also Gillespie, 2000). Finally, Brand, Hill and Munday (2000), explored in a regional Input-Output framework, the direct and indirect economic contribution of foreign owned and domestic manufacturing to the economies of Wales, Scotland and the West Midlands. The study demonstrated that foreign owned manufacturing in these regions purchased less locally than domestic firms. As a result in most of the industry sectors explored the output supported in other regional industries was generally greater in the domestic than in the foreign owned case. The analysis also explored how far each job created in foreign and domestically owned manufacturing contributed to regional value added. The superior productivity of the foreign sector meant that it generally contributed more per employee to regional value added than its domestic counterpart. The analysis of the impact of foreign (and in some cases domestic) manufacturing on local economies within an Input-Output framework has largely been based on cross-sectional information. The present paper attempts to develop a more dynamic perspective by considering structural changes over time. The objective of this paper is to explore the role of foreign manufacturing in changing the pattern of industry linkages in Wales and Scotland – two regions which have attracted comparatively high shares of new UK foreign inward investment. These two regions also make for a valuable comparative study with some analysts suggesting that there are important differences in the underlying quality of inward investment between the two regions (Hood, 1991). The paper uses information from the Scottish Input-Output tables 1973 and 1996 (see Fraser of Allander, 1973, and Scottish Executive, 1999), and Welsh Input-Output tables 1968 and 1996 (see Ireson and Tomkins, 1978; and Hill and Roberts, 2001) to examine the changing structure of these regional economies over time. The focus of the paper is comparing manufacturing sectors where there have been high and low levels of foreign investment. The influence of foreign manufacturing is considered in the context of changes in the export orientation, import propensity and indirect employment and output effects of selected industry sectors. The wider context of the paper is continuing concern in the UK on the more dynamic impacts of foreign manufacturing industry in improving the economic prospects for UK regions, and the validity of the 'inward investment' model of development. The second section of the paper reviews the development of foreign manufacturing in the Welsh and Scottish economies, and critically analyses previous research that has explored the role of the foreign sector in these regions within an Input-Output model framework. The third section examines how foreign manufacturing might be expected to impact differently from the domestic sector in terms of impact on the structure of the regional economy over time. For example, in terms of its higher productivity, and different import and export propensities. The fourth section describes the Input-Output tables that are available for Wales and Scotland, and more specifically, discusses issues of comparability of tables of different vintages. The methodology used to reconcile the industry sectors in the table is discussed. The fifth section examines the nature of structural changes in the two economies, including an analysis of local trading propensities, together with estimates of multiplier effects of selected industries characterised by high and low levels of foreign direct investment (in the period 1968-1996 for Wales, and 1973-1996 for Scotland). The final section contains conclusions. References Hill, S. & A. Roberts (2001), Input-Output Tables for Wales 1996. Cardiff: South East Wales Economic Forum. Hood, N. (1991), Inward Investment and the Scottish Economy, Royal Bank of Scotland Review, 169, pp. 17-32. Brand S., Hill, S. & M. Munday (2000), Assessing the Impacts of Foreign Manufacturing on Regional Economies: The Cases of Wales, Scotland and West Midlands. Regional Studies 34, pp. 343-55. Crone, M. & S. Roper (1999), Knowledge Transfers from Multinational Plants in Northern Ireland, paper given to Regional Science Association European Congress, University College Dublin, August 23rd-27th. Fraser of Allander Institute, University of Strathclyde, The Scottish Council Research Institute Limited and IBM UK Scientific Centre (1978), Input-Output Tables for Scotland 1973. Scottish Academic Press, Edinburgh. Gillespie, G. (2000), Modelling the System-wide Impact of Foreign Direct Investment in Scotland: An Ownership-Disaggregated Regional Computable General Equilibrium Analysis, Ph.D thesis, University of Strathclyde. Ireson, R. & C. Tomkins (1978), Inter-Regional Input-Output Tables for Wales and the Rest of the UK 1968. HMSO, London. Roberts, A. (1996), The Economic Impact of Foreign Manufacturing Investment in Wales. Unpublished Ph.D, University of Wales, Cardiff. Scottish Executive (1999), Input-Output Tables and Multipliers for Scotland 1996. Government Statistical Service, Edinburgh. Turok, I. (1993), Inward Investment and Local Linkages: How Deeply Embedded is 'Silicon Glen? Regional Studies 27, pp. 401-17. Turok, I. (1997), Linkages in the Scottish Electronics Industry: Further Evidence, Regional Studies 31, pp. 705-711.

Since pension schemes-along with health care and education-absorb the largest amount of social expenditure in all countries, their reform has a potentially major impact both on the fiscal situation of the state and on the life chances of citizens who stand to win or lose from new arrangements. This makes pension reform a highly controversial issue; and, except for the addition of new programmes and benefits, major restructuring of existing pension systems has been extremely rare in advanced industrial democracies. It was also rare in Latin America before the 1980s and 1990s. But there has been a great deal of experimentation within the region during the past decade. This paper examines the larger economic, social and political context of Latin American pension reform and compares experiences in different countries of the region with options available in Western European societies during the same period. The authors argue that the type of pension reform undertaken in Latin America has been an integral part of the structural adjustment programmes pursued by Latin American governments, under the guidance of international financial institutions (IFIs). Although there was a range of possible remedies to the problems of pension systems in different Latin American countries, neo-liberal reformers and the international financial institutions preferred privatization over all others. They claimed that privatization would be superior to other kinds of reform in ensuring the financial viability of pension systems, making them more efficient, establishing a closer link between contributions and benefits and promoting the development of capital markets-thus increasing savings and investment. And they were able to push through some of their suggestions for reform in spite of considerable opposition from pensioners, trade unions and opposition political parties. Interestingly enough, their pressure proved least effective in the more democratic countries of the region. In Costa Rica, for example, citizens preferred to reform the public system-eliminating the last pockets of privilege for public sector workers and ensuring that new levels of contribution would be adequate to provide minimum benefits for the aged and infirm. In Uruguay, citizens forced a public referendum, through which they rejected a proposal for privatization. At a later stage, they did permit the introduction of private investment accounts, but not at the cost of eliminating the public programme. In Argentina and Peru, after the legislature refused to authorize partial privatization, this was eventually pushed through by presidential decree. Only in Chile and Mexico has there been a complete shift to private pension funds-but, in both cases, influential sectors of the elite, including the military, have been allowed to keep their previous, publicly managed group funds. Looking at the only privatized pension system in existence long enough to allow for some assessment of its consequences-that of Chile-the authors find that many of the claims made by supporters of privatization are not substantiated by the evidence. The first discrepancy between neo-liberal predictions and the reality of Chilean pension reform has to do with efficiency. All previous claims to the contrary, private individual accounts have proven more expensive to manage than collective claims. In fact, according to the Inter-American Development Bank, by the mid-1990s administration of the Chilean system was the most expensive in Latin America. The second disproved claim involves yield. When administrative costs are discounted, privately held and administered pension funds in Chile show an average annual real return of 5.1 per cent between 1982 and 1998. Furthermore high fees and commissions-charged at a flat rate on all accounts-have proven highly regressive. When levied against a relatively modest retirement account, for example, these standard fees reduced the amount available to the account holder by approximately 18 per cent. When applied to the deposit of an individual investing 10 times more, the reduction was slightly less than 1 per cent. The third discrepancy involves competition. Although it was assumed that efficiency within the private pension fund industry would be associated with renewed competitiveness-while the public pension system represented monopoly-the private sector has in fact become highly concentrated. The three largest pension fund administrators in Chile handle 70 per cent of the insured. And to reduce advertising costs, public regulators are limiting the number of transfers among companies that any individual can make. A fourth unfulfilled promise of privatization in Chile has to do with expansion of coverage. It was assumed that the existence of private accounts would increase incentives for people to take part in the pension sc heme, but in fact this has not happened. Coverage and compliance rates have remained virtually constant. A fifth major claim was that the conversion of the public pension system into privately held and administered accounts would strengthen capital markets, savings and investment. But a number of studies have recently concluded that, at best, this effect has been marginal. And finally, the dimension of gender equity within a fully privatized pension scheme is being subjected to increasing scrutiny. Women typically earn less money and work fewer years than men. Therefore, since pension benefits in private systems are strictly determined by the overall amount of money contributed to them, women are likely to receive considerably lower benefits. Public pension systems, in contrast, have the possibility of introducing credits for childcare that reduce this disadvantage. Sweden is an example of countries that have embarked on this course. In the latter part of the paper, Huber and Stephens widen their comparative framework to include recent pension reforms in advanced industrial countries. There, where economic crisis was not as severe and where pressure from international financial institutions was not significant, much broader options for reform were available. In fact, although long-established systems were under stress, no developed country opted for complete privatization. Complex measures were taken to strengthen the funding base of national pension systems, including changes in investment procedures and changes in rules for calculating pension benefits. Reforms also increased retirement age, as well as the number of years required to qualify for a full pension. But even the most thoroughgoing reforms retained a central role for public schemes in ensuring old-age benefits. In conclusion, the authors consider steps that can be taken to craft pension reforms with more desirable results than those obtained to date in Latin America. They recommend measures that address the problem of an aging population by increasing the ability of each generation to pay for its own pensions-rather than relying primarily on the contributions of preceding generations of insured workers. Pension payments should be invested in a variety of financial instruments and benefits must ultimately be related to the yields obtained. Such a strategy does not require introduction of privately managed, individually held, investment funds. On the contrary, risk is lessened by relying instead on collectively managed funds, in which accounts can either be identified with individuals or-more equitably-with generations of contributors. Reformed public pension systems should also contain minimum 'citizenship pensions' that guarantee subsistence income in old age to all individuals as a matter of right. Such a measure, financed from general tax revenue rather than from personal contributions, is not beyond the means of medium income countries in Latin America and the Caribbean. In fact, some Nordic countries introduced citizenship pensions when their GNP per capita was lower than that of most Latin American countries today.

Driven by unrelenting technological and market forces, telecommunications is today one of the world's dynamic economic sector. Until not long ago a relatively obscure territory of interest mainly to engineers, telecommunications today seem to be everybody's proper playing field. Large and small businesses, user groups, investment banks, policy makers, development organizations, legislators, economists, political scientists, consumers, students and lawyers, among others, are now also actively and visibly involved in telecommunications. Traditionally, telecommunications was regarded as a relatively straightforward public utility. Economies of scale, political and military sensitivities, and large externalities made telecommunications a typical public service believed to be a natural monopoly. In this environment, telecommunications development focused mainly on extending standard service, building basic networks, and improving the performance of the operating entities. The main issues were technological, and management of telecommunications enterprises was largely oriented toward engineering.Research in the 1960s and 1970s documented the importance of telecommunications as infrastructure for economic and social development. It was shown that telecommunication services are used in connection with a wide range of economic production and distribution activities, delivery of social services and government administration.They also contribute to the quality of life and social, political and security objectives. Where available, telecommunications benefit a broad cross-section of the urban and rural population by income, education and occupation. These features result in high social and private returns from telecommunications investment, as well as in a considerable financial resource mobilization capacity.Information is regarded today as a fundamental factor of production, alongside capital and labor. The information economy accounted one-third to one half of gross domestic product (GDP) and of employment in Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries in the 1980s and is expected to reach 60 % for the European Union (EU) in the year 2000. Information also accounts for substantial proportion of GDP in the newly industrialized economies and the modern sectors of developing countries.This increasing information intensity of economic activity, coupled with the globalization of capital flows, trade, manufacturing and other activities, resulted in strong demand for better, more varied, and less costly communication and information services. Demand growth has been challenged with rapid changes in telecommunications technology fueled by advances in microelectronics, software and optics. These changes have greatly reduced the cost of information transmission and processing. It changed the cost structures of telecommunications and many other industries, made possible new ways of meeting a wider range of communication needs at lower cost, reduced user dependence on established operating entities and increasingly integrated information and telecommunications technologies and services. Obviously these interrelated market and technological processes show no signs of decreasing or abating.In this context, telecommunications is now widely considered a strategic investment to maintain and to develop competitive advantage at all levels including national, regional and firm. Telecommunications constitute the core of, and provide the infrastructure for the information economy as a whole. Telecommunications facilitates market entry, improve customer service, and reduce costs, and increase productivity. They are an integral part of financial services, commodities markets, media, transportation, and the travel industry, and provide vital links among manufacturers, wholesalers, and retailers.Moreover, industrial and commercial competitive advantage is now not only influenced by availability of telecommunications facilities, but also by choice of network alternatives and control to reconfigure and manage networks in line with corporate objectives. Countries and firms that lack access to modern telecommunication and information systems cannot effectively participate in the global economy and politics. This applies to the least developed countries of Africa and Asia as much as to middle income countries, such as those in Latin America, East Asia, and Central and Eastern Europe that aspire to become industrial countries in the next decade. In that respect, this study is going to focus on the world's one of the most leading entity, European Union (EU)'s telecommunications status, Information Society and its vast project TEN (Trans European Networks) regarding its impacts on the interdependence between the European states in a broad sense, from politics, economics to social living.While doing it, after the introduction, the general developments of telecommunications in Europe will be mentioned by overlooking the regulatory progress in EU in part 2. With the beginning of part 3, the fundamental framework called Information Society (IS) is going to be explained by stressing on the aims and principles of this new era. However, beside its tremendous effects, living and working in IS brings up major questions. Basically, the two opposite ideas are in the minds of the people; on the one hand some says the new technologies and IS creates new fields of job and will bring profound dynamism to the every field of the life and on the other hand some says the new technologies and IS destroy more jobs than it creates, also it will create big gap between rich and poor regions, including people. However, the aim of this work is not to decide which is true or not, but to indicate two sides of the coin as clear as possible which will be done in part 4. In part 5, the way of Europe through IS will be stressed on the necessary suggestions of Commission. With the beginning of part 6 the very important IS project of EU, Trans European Networks (TENs) which is a very extended project, another words it is an advanced infrastructure which will pull Europe together to create a strong economy and better quality of life will be defined in part 6. Part 6 also highlights the main framework of TENs as "TENs for Telecommunications" and "TEN related IS Projects" of EU.After a general idea given by part 6 about TENs, part 7 will be dealt with "Community Support Program for Trans European Telecommunication Networks". The idea here is to comprehend the telecommunication related services and necessary applications in order to see their effect on IS through its expansion in Europe. Even though this work does not have a comparative character, lastly, in part 8 the situation of Turkey, regarding telecommunications and IS will be described. As it is mentioned the idea here is not to compare Turkey's situation with the EU countries', but it is important to give a general opinion where Turkey is. The new era is on its way. One way or another information and telecommunication is expanding into people's life if we like it or not. So that it is substantial to understand the situation of telecommunications and the Information Society in order to see our future more clearly. From now on the economical power is not sufficient if you do not have the power of information. The countries or in other words, societies which can combine economic and information power together with highly widespread telecommunication infrastructures, will be successful in the changing world. Here in this work the ultimate aim is not to discuss the technical or judicial side of telecommunications and information society, but to emphasize the importance of this new trend for countries' future.

Since 1793, the affirmative grant of authority to federal courts in Article III of the Constitution to hear and decide cases or controversies has been interpreted to prohibit these courts from giving advisory opinions. In that year, United States Supreme Court Chief Justice Jay, Justice Cushing, and District Judge Duane rejected a provision in a 1792 act of Congress that would have required the Supreme Court to settle federal pension claims of widows and orphans subject to the approval of the Secretary of War. The basis for the position taken by the Chief Justice was "that neither the legislative nor the executive branches can constitutionally assign to the judicial branch any duties but such as are properly judicial, to be performed in a judicial manner." The Supreme Court has acknowledged this limitation on federal judicial power repeatedly since that date in its decisions, including the recent case of Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, in which the Court faulted the en banc Ninth Circuit Court for failing to recognize "federal courts' lack of authority to act in friendly or feigned proceedings." Yet, despite the universality and age of this fundamental principle of federal jurisprudence, federal courts, including the Supreme Court, do not always honor it.

This article addresses tort legislation considered during the 1990 Session of the Virginia General Assembly. This article also reviews significant cases involving torts and products liability decided from January 1, 1989, through May 31, 1990, by the Supreme Court of Virginia, The United States Supreme Court, and the federal courts sitting in Virginia.