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The EU is bound to respect the national identities of Member States. States might, at occasions, define their national identities in ways that breach inclusive constitutional values (e.g. equality) protected under TEU Article 2. The assumption behind the recognition of diverse constitutional identities is the peaceful coexistence of both, which is challenged by illiberal national developments. Instead, we see a zero-sum game between the constitutional recognition of exclusive values (e.g. dominant ethnicity or religion) and inclusive constitutional values; every gain by the proponents of emergent authoritarianism translates to a loss on the side of constitutional democracy. While exclusive norms appear in virtually every constitutional system, a critical mass of exclusive values can lead to the hollowing out of a democratic order, both on the national and on the supranational level. To try to draw the line where this shift happens, we are relying on the limits of toleration, and recognition, of exclusive norms and identity elements of minority communities in liberal theories of multiculturalism (e.g. Raz, Taylor, Kymlicka). We think that the case of illiberal minorities raise structurally similar theoretical questions, insights, and experiences than the dilemma defined above, the challenge of illiberal Member States undermining EU fundamental values.

Nowadays, the optimal usage of exhausting natural resources is a serious economic, social and political question. For this reason, in this paper we examine how the optimal sustainable use and allocation of these resources can be achieved in a sustainable way using different game theoretic models. As the proper solution needs the cooperation of national economies, the optimization driven by own interest should be completely changed. In this examination, we use the tools of cooperative game theory to describe ecomomies' strategic behaviour and their interactions. Moreover, we describe different well-known game theoretic solution concepts (e.g. Core, Shaply-value, Nucleolus) with special focus on their required fairness properties. The fairness properties, detailed in this paper, can ensure stable and acceptable allocations for the player at individual and coalitional level as well. Besides the theoretical descriptions, we give some practical example related to games defined on different water supply management problems (e. g. urban water management, irrigation problems, hydro power licensing etc.).

Zwei gegensätzliche Rechtsauffassungen - der Rechtsmoralismus und die wirtschaftliche Rechtsauffassung von Richard Posner - werden dargestellt und die Folgen der einzelnen Rechtsauffassungen für die Strafrechtsdogmatik werden analysiert.

Valamennyi tagállamra azonos szabályok vonatkoztak az európai integráció Maastricht előtti unitárius szerkezetében. Többsebességű integráció lehetséges a Gazdasági és Monetáris Unió rendszerében: különféle kormányzási modellek, bonyolult intézményi feltételek állnak fenn. Milyen változásokat hozhatna az "európai gazdasági kormányzás", illetve a "teljes" gazdasági unió kiépítése az EU intézményi szerkezetében? Hogyan alakulna e körülmények között az euróövezetbe tartozó, illetve az abból kimaradó tagállamok helyzete? Milyen eltérések lehetnek az egyes tagállamok között az uniós szabályok alkalmazásában? Milyen szerepet tölthet be a megerősített együttműködés a tagállamok szűkebb csoportjának mélyebb integrációjában? Hogyan alakulhat a mediterrán periféria, illetve a közép- és kelet-európai "új tagállamok" pozíciója? Többek között a fenti kérdésekre is választ kapunk a kötetben. = All member states were subject to the same rules in the pre-Maastricht unitary structure of European integration. Multi-speed integration is possible in the Economic and Monetary Union system: different governance models, complex institutional conditions. What changes could the construction of a "European economic governance" or a " full" economic union bring to the institutional structure of the EU? How would the situation of Member States in and out of the euro area evolve under these circumstances? What differences might there be between Member States in the application of EU rules? What role could enhanced cooperation play in the deeper integration of a narrower group of Member States? How might the position of the Mediterranean periphery and the "new Member States" of Central and Eastern Europe evolve? Among other things, these questions are answered in this volume.