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The paper reports partial findings of a research project into Croatian ethnonationalism (Croatian: narodnjastvo) as a religion (in the sense of a human invention of the sacred). The practical problems are as follows: ethnonationalism as a religion, which implies inter alia that an ethnic community (Croatian: narod) has the potential and/or capability to develop into, and ought to become, the substratum of a (nation-)state; consequences of ethnonationalism, which include the unattainability of ethnic democracy, ethnic economy and ethnic maturity; conditions of Croatian ethnonationalism, primarily the Catholic Church as a condition in 1961-71, and also before and after the period, especially since 1990. Theoretical problems, i.e. inadequacies in scholarly knowledge of the practical problems, include the following: firstly, Croatian Constitutional Court jurisprudence on ethnic and religious communities; secondly, systematic history of law and state in Croatia and Yugoslavia 1945-90; thirdly, transformation of both communism and catholicism into ethnonationalism; fourthly and fifthly, social structure and representation/agency. To attain the general goal of the research project, which is the use of reason in public affairs, the research is carried out within the theoretical and methodological framework of an integral theory of law and state which includes a modified Lasswell and McDougal's policy analysis expanded by historical institutionalism and critical theory. The subject-matter are the following features of Catholicism as an institutionalized religion, especially in Croatia 1961-71: (1) law, i.e. (1.1) sources of law; (1.2) internal law (organs, members, means); (1.3) external law (relations with the state and non-Catholics); (2) the Church and economy; (3) the Church and nation; (4) Catholicism on theory and practice. The hypotheses (which are ideal-types and as such cannot be either verified or falsified conclusively) are that ethnonationalism in Croatia is a consequence of, inter alia, the following beliefs maintained by the Catholic Church in Croatia in the 1960s and to a significant degree later on: 1. the only acceptable relationship between the Church and the state is the partnership of two legally equal public orders over the same subjects within which the Church has the exclusive power to regulate matrimonial and other family relations, and the power to control education in public schools; 2. peasant family is the basic organic human community; 3. the subjects to the ecclesiastical -- originally feudal -- power tied in fact to land make the ethnic community (Croatian: narod), which is united with the clergy into the Christian community (Croatian: krscanski narod); 4. since fundamental truths are accessible by theology only, and practice is an application of theory, practical knowledge, especially on the appropriate relationship between the Church and the state, is valid only if in accord with Church teaching. The evidence presented in the paper supports to a significant degree the hypotheses. The research findings contribute to the solution of all the theoretical problems, providing major contributions to the second and the third: the most probable reason why the Catholic Church in Croatia was rather silent in the Yugoslav and Croatian Spring 1961-71 and quite vocal since the 1990 is the Croatian Church's allegiance in matters of Church and state more to the First than to the Second Vatican council (which abandoned the Church's "divine" right to be co-sovereign with the state, exposing the "right" as a human invention of the sacred); the Church's ethnonationalism, which facilitates the political partnership of the Church and the state and ensures the dominant position of the clergy within the Church, has coincided with the interest of Yugoslav communists to retain their might and power by a metamorphosis, with the Church's assistance honoured by a concordat, into Croatian ethnonationalists, who, as newly born capitalists, have appropriated the greater part of the former socialist property and continue appropriating the greater part of present public goods. Adapted from the source document.

The conflict in Northern Ireland, whose modern phase began in 1969, is highly complex, & it is impossible to unequivocally define it. On the one hand, it is an internal conflict with the elements of ethnic, religious, & civil strife, & on the other, this is a conflict with a critical international dimension. There have been various definitions of the conflict in Northern Ireland, but one thing is certain: this is undoubtedly one of the most prolonged & bloodiest conflicts in modern Europe, in which 3,600 people have lost their lives, & 47,000 have been injured. This conflict is an amalgam of past & present events, processes, & relations from aspects of four types of relationships: between the Catholics (nationalists/republicans) & the Protestants (unionists/loyalists) in Northern Ireland itself; the London-Belfast relationship; London-Dublin & Dublin-Belfast. The analysis of this conflict shows that from the perspective of conflict theory it is one of a kind. No such theory explains this conflict completely; as a matter of fact, the conflict in Northern Ireland is covered by elements of several conflict theories. The analysis also shows that the conflict in Northern Ireland can be solved only by political means. However, due to the complexity of this conflict it is not possible to reach a single solution that would satisfy the maximalist demands of all the parties. This conflict can be resolved by means of a political compromise that would create a framework for action of all the conflicting parties, the framework that would be an end in itself, ie, a way of life & not an instrument for the realization of the original (opposing) ultimate goals of those involved in the conflict. 3 Tables, 107 References. Adapted from the source document.

At present, when we are once again faced with the question: quo vadis Bosnia and Herzegovina, towards new integration or towards further disintegration? -- it is undoubtedly useful to show how and when the process was initiated of its administrative-territorial division and its connecting with the neighbour states in the 20th century; in this case, with Dalmatia in 1929 within the Littoral Banovina, and with the Banovina of Croatia ten years later. This paper provides a detailed account of the size of territory and population with regard to various denominations on the level of 8, i.e. 13 districts which comprised 38, i.e. 70 municipalities of BiH. The population data based on the 1931 census, the last carried out in the Kingdom of Yugoslavia, are the starting point of an attempt to establish the ratio between the Catholic majority and the Islam and Orthodox minorities. In the period of the Littoral Banovina, the Catholic population in the Bosnian-Herzegovinian districts had the absolute majority of 63%, and in the Banovina of Croatia -- 53%. Beside the Catholics, the same counties were inhabited by minorities of Islam and Orthodox denominations, which were in the majority in some municipalities and districts. In Dalmatian districts of the Littoral Banovina, 84% of the population were Catholics, while the percentage in BiH districts was 63%, which means that the percentage on the level of the Banovina as a whole was 75%. Consequently, many were right to perceive and proclaim that the Littoral Banovina was Catholic by denomination, and Croatian by ethnicity, although this became a fact only when it joined the Banovina of Croatia together with the Sava Banovina. Adapted from the source document.

The author analyzes Rawls's concept of the overlapping consensus in the light of the recently published set of instructions of the Vatican's Congregation for the doctrine of the faith about the participation of Catholics in political life. Rawls introduces the idea of the overlapping consensus as an institutional mechanism aimed at avoiding imposing a comprehensive moral, philosophical, or religious doctrine on all citizens & thus preserving the pluralism of values of contemporary liberal-democratic societies. By comparing the basic outlines of Rawls's theory of political liberalism with the set of instructions of the Catholic Church about the participation of its flock in political life, signed by Cardinal Ratzinger, the author challenges the viability of this concept of Rawls's, as well as the possibility of reconciling the liberal notion of the citizen with the Catholic ideal of the participation of believers in the political life of their communities. 6 References. Adapted from the source document.

The author points to the fact that Christianity & democracy have been at the center of the European cultural heritage. If democracy, in keeping with the American Declaration of Independence & the French Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen, is defined as a political system aiming to protect human rights in a society, it can be demonstrated that this goes hand in hand with the social & political keynotes of Catholicism. It is Catholicism that dwells on human free will & the responsibility for choosing between good & evil. It also stresses man's concomitant participation in the activities of secular & religious communities -- the state & the Church -- which are strictly separated. It ensues that the Church cannot be a partisan of any political party, including those built around Catholics' secular activities. The Church also opposes the reduction of democracy to mere multiparty power squabbling. 3 References. Adapted from the source document.

The author reminds us that only after the Second Vatican Council did Catholicism change its reserved stance regarding contemporary politics & economy by starting to advocate a more positive political involvement of Catholic laity. However, it can be said that the political activism of Catholics confined to Christian-Democratic parties came to grief. This has been not solely the consequence of the ethical decadence of Christian Democratic politicians but also of increased secularization, which calls for a variety of forms of political activism on the part of Christians. Regarding the structuring of economy, the author goes along with the widespread belief in the superiority of capitalism over a totalitarian communist economy. At the same time, however, Christianity cannot accept "rampant capitalism" nor accept profit as the sole measure of good economic management, but must voice its views for social & humanistic correctives. Adapted from the source document.

The author points to the fact that Christianity & democracy have been at the center of the European cultural heritage. If democracy, in keeping with the American Declaration of Independence & the French Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen, is defined as a political system aiming to protect human rights in a society, it can be demonstrated that this goes hand in hand with the social & political keynotes of Catholicism. It is Catholicism that dwells on human free will & the responsibility for choosing between good & evil. It also stresses man's concomitant participation in the activities of secular & religious communities -- the state & the Church -- which are strictly separated. It ensues that the Church cannot be a partisan of any political party, including those built around Catholics' secular activities. The Church also opposes the reduction of democracy to mere multiparty power squabbling. 3 References. Adapted from the source document.

This paper is a continuation & an extension of the longitudinal monitoring & analysis of the party dynamics, social structure & certain political features of the representatives in the Croatian Parliament (Sabor). The goal of the research was to discern the patterns of political recruitment of the parliamentary elite by means of a comparative analysis of social & political characteristics of the representatives in all five compositions of the Parliament & -- in the last, fifth composition -- by comparing the representatives' political party affiliations & their parliamentary experience. It has turned out that the representatives are mostly male (average age 49 years), of urban provenience & residence, Croats, Catholics, diploma-holders (largely in social sciences & humanities), & politicians with a remarkable managerial & political experience gained primarily through their work in political parties. The conclusion is that in Croatia the trends regarding the patterns of political recruitment of the parliamentary elite are in line with those in developed democratic systems. Tables, References. Adapted from the source document.

This paper is a continuation & an extension of the longitudinal monitoring & analysis of the party dynamics, social structure & certain political features of the representatives in the Croatian Parliament (Sabor). The goal of the research was to discern the patterns of political recruitment of the parliamentary elite by means of a comparative analysis of social & political characteristics of the representatives in all five compositions of the Parliament & -- in the last, fifth composition -- by comparing the representatives' political party affiliations & their parliamentary experience. It has turned out that the representatives are mostly male (average age 49 years), of urban provenience & residence, Croats, Catholics, diploma-holders (largely in social sciences & humanities), & politicians with a remarkable managerial & political experience gained primarily through their work in political parties. The conclusion is that in Croatia the trends regarding the patterns of political recruitment of the parliamentary elite are in line with those in developed democratic systems. Tables, References. Adapted from the source document.

The paper deals with the evolution of the Catholic social & political movement & Christian democratic parties since the end of the 19th century. The origins of Catholic political involvement lie in the need to counter the challenges of capitalism, socialism, & liberal democracy. Its original platform was Pope Leo XIII's encyclical Rerum novarum. Christian democracy as a party option dates back to the emergence of the Popular Party (Partito popolare), first under the leadership of Romulo Murri, & after WWI by Luigi Sturzo, followed by the Christian democracy (Democrazia christiana) of Alcide de Gasperi & his successors. The political party that brings together Italian Catholics was at first totally independent of the Vatican. During Pius XII's papacy after WWII, it came under the Vatican's thumb. After John XXIII (1959-1963), the principle of the separation of the Church & politics, which was adhered to by all later popes, was stressed. The present-day crisis of Christian democracy is the outcome of the falling away from Christian social principles in the conduct of politics. Adapted from the source document.

The paper deals with the evolution of the Catholic social & political movement & Christian democratic parties since the end of the 19th century. The origins of Catholic political involvement lie in the need to counter the challenges of capitalism, socialism, & liberal democracy. Its original platform was Pope Leo XIII's encyclical Rerum novarum. Christian democracy as a party option dates back to the emergence of the Popular Party (Partito popolare), first under the leadership of Romulo Murri, & after WWI by Luigi Sturzo, followed by the Christian democracy (Democrazia christiana) of Alcide de Gasperi & his successors. The political party that brings together Italian Catholics was at first totally independent of the Vatican. During Pius XII's papacy after WWII, it came under the Vatican's thumb. After John XXIII (1959-1963), the principle of the separation of the Church & politics, which was adhered to by all later popes, was stressed. The present-day crisis of Christian democracy is the outcome of the falling away from Christian social principles in the conduct of politics. Adapted from the source document.

The author points up the proverbial complexity of Yugoslavia & the inadequacy of its political structure, made up of six republics, five peoples, four languages, three religions, two alphabets, & one party. That is why the subjective orientations of its peoples went counter to its existence, leading to its disintegration following the first multiparty elections. Serbs & Montenegrins were its partisans & due, to a lack of democratic political culture, they launched the war for the preservation of Yugoslavia. The properties of the political culture of the peoples living on its territory had acted as trip-wires for that war, & defined its form, course, & intensity. The aggressors belong to the Eastern civilizational sphere, speak the Serbian language, write in the Cyrillic alphabet, are culturally tribally oriented, want to live in Yugoslavia & Greater Serbia (which would be socialist), & are adherents of repressive types of political culture. The victims belong to the Western civilizational sphere, are Catholics & Muslims, speak Croatian (Croato-Serbian), write in the Latin alphabet, are culturally communally oriented, & favor the participatory political culture. During the Serbian & Montenegrian aggression, two civil wars erupted in Bosnia & Herzegovina: (1) between the Muslims & the Croats & (2) between the Muslims. The participants of this war all swear their allegiance to the state of Bosnia & Herzegovina, but differ in their visions of its political structure. The Muslims wish for a unitarian state of Bosnia & Herzegovina, the Croats want it to be a federal state, & the Serbs are against any separate state of Bosnia & Herzegovina. 7 Tables, 15 References. Adapted from the source document.