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Abstract: Democratic Innovations in Central and Eastern EuropeAccording to Elisabeth Bakke's (University of Olso) review of Democratic Innovations in Central and Eastern Europe, Sergiu Gherghina, Joakim Ekman and Olena Podolian have edited a book on 'democratic innovations' in more or less democratic countries in Central and Eastern Europe. Bakke finds that, while several of the contributions are well written and interesting, 'democratic' may not be a particularly precise label in a context where, as it turns out, the 'innovations' do not contribute much to increasing either participation or democracy.

Abstract: Russia's Defence Policy and Military Presence in the Caucasus and Central AsiaThese two reports, Security in the Caucasus. Russian policy and military posture and Security in the Caucasus. Russian policy and military posture, analyse and discuss Russia's security policy and military posture after 2014 in two regions often described as part of Russia's 'near abroad', the Caucasus and Central Asia. The reports find that although both regions are considered as within Russia's 'sphere of influence', the Russian military structure and policy varies significantly. While geared towards crisis management of potential conflicts in Central Asia, the frozen conflicts in the South Caucasus have made Russia set up for regional war.

Abstract in English: Is Russia Losing the Arctic?Filippa Sofia Braarud reviews Is Russia Losing the Arctic?, written by Vyacheslav Zilanov and translated into Norwegian by Svetlana Petrovna Jakobsen and Reidar Jakobsen. In this book, Zilanov, having served as the Deputy Minister of Fisheries in the Soviet Union as well as being a central figure in the decades-long fisheries negotiations between Norway and Russia/the USSR, shares historical insight, personal anecdotes and his own critical assessments of the delimitation agreements that were signed between Russia and her Arctic neighbours.

The article analyses representations of history in today's Russia as part of the ideology for expressing central political concepts underlying the Putinist regime. Mainstream interpretations of history build on a populist vision of Russia as a community with a stable, unchangeable core of identity. In this ideological context, history serves as the canvas on which the 'authentic' Russian identity manifests itself. The present research article examines representations of history by focusing on the concepts of 'historical sovereignty', 'unity of history', and the role of elites in history. It finds that regime ideology in today's Russia relies on a sizable infrastructure that involves producing historical knowledge for the purpose of securitizing history and making it an instrumental element in the populist (conservative-communitarian) ideology. Sources for this study come from the network exhibition 'Russia – My History', contextualized through content analysis of the key producers of ideology in Putin's Russia.

Abstract: Security and Vulnerability After Armenia's Velvet Revolution: Elite Perceptions on Gender Equality, Human Rights and Conflict ResolutionThe Velvet Revolution in spring 2018 and the snap elections that followed in December 2018 shook Armenia. This article examines the country's new political elite and other central social elites, and their affective and evaluative beliefs with respect to human security, drawing on an elite survey conducted in 2017 and 2019, complemented by in-depth interviews. The aim is to shed light on whether Armenia's elite-level political culture is headed for progressive change concerning the rights of disadvantaged groups, primarily women and sexual minorities – an expectation among the young and educated in Yerevan. This study finds that, as regards reducing vulnerability and increasing the security and freedom of choice for those traditionally disadvantaged in Armenian society, the values and judgments of the new elites have remained basically traditional.

Moderne ortodokse kirker har blivit både inaktuell och ohyggligt aktuell i och med den ryska invasionen av Ukraina 24 februari 2022, då frågor om olika ortodoxa samhörigheter kommit i fokus. Volymen består nio kapitel och behandlar nästan samtliga stora ortodoxa kyrkor i världen och många centrala frågor som nationalism, jurisdiktion, teologi och gudstjänstutövning. Boken är pålitlig när det gäller fakta, författarna är eminent kunniga, men den kan ibland bli en smula svårläst i all sin faktarikedom.
The volume has become both outdated and eerily topical after the Russian invasion of Ukraine on 24 February 2022, as issues concerning various Eastern Orthodox affiliations have come into focus. This nine-chapter volume deals with almost all major Orthodox Churches in the world, and takes up such central questions such as nationalism, jurisdiction, theology and worship. The book is a reliable source of information, and the authors are eminently competent, but the sheer mass of facts presented can make it somewhat difficult to read.

Abstract: Russia's operationalization of a sphere of interest in the South CaucasusA central foreign policy objective of Russia is to maintain an exclusive sphere of interest in its post-Soviet neighbourhood. This article analyses how Russia employs a combination of political and military instruments in operationalizing its perceived sphere of interest in the still conflict-ridden South Caucasus. Russia is the only external power in the region to have military bases there, and is the only one seemingly ready to undertake military action. At present, Russia appears satisfied with the status quo in the South Caucasus. The unresolved conflicts in Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Nagorno-Karabakh are therefore unlikely to be resolved in the near future. Unresolved conflicts suit Russia's objectives. Russian military bases in Georgia and Armenia provide Moscow with both a key lever against Tbilisi and Yerevan and a structural advantage for potential Russian military operations in the region. Russia's military posture in the Caucasus is relevant to the potential for large-scale conflict in the Southern war theatre, including the wider Middle East, and not just local conflicts in the Caucasus.

Abstract: Who is responsible for the protection of human rights in Kosovo?Human rights are central in the international community's missions in Kosovo. Moreover, Kosovo's 2008 Constitution lists eight directly applicable human rights instruments, along with detailed instructions on how they are to be interpreted in line with developments at the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR). And yet, human rights protection is lacking in the region. Potential violations attributable to the local authorities can be adjudicated, but only through the national courts, which raises questions of independence and impartiality. Meanwhile, NATO's Kosovo Force (KFOR) and the European Union's Rule of Law Programme (EULEX) enjoy immunity against prosecution by the domestic courts while still wielding some executive and judicial power. EULEX has an internal human rights panel, modelled on the less-than-successful panel established to hold the UN's Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) accountable, while KFOR has no similar judicial body. This article maps which options individuals have for addressing human rights violations in Kosovo and where the system still has its weaknesses. Additionally, it traces how the jurisdictions have changed in the past 15 years and proposes a way forward to fill the lacunae that remains.

Abstract: A Chinese Railway to the Arctic? The Story of Belkomur – so FarThe further development of the Northern Sea Route, including the associated logistical chains and infrastructure, enjoys high priority in Russia, and inadequate south–north transportation capacity is recognized as a problem. China has shown increasing interest in Arctic shipping over the past ten years. The construction of a railway from the Urals, with connections to China, to a deep-water port with access to the Arctic Ocean appeared attractive, both as a strategic opportunity for China and as a natural area for Chinese engagement in Russia, given announcements of the close partnership and common interests between the two countries. Since 2012 various Chinese companies have shown interest in investing, and the conclusion of a concession agreement has been announced several times. The Russian federal authorities have voiced support, without committing budget funding. Increasingly, however, critical remarks have been heard from the federal government, although regional support remains strong. As of mid-2021 no firm agreement had been signed, and the project was put on hold. Reviewing the history of the project since Chinese companies were first engaged, this article offers insights on Russian regional authorities' scope for manoeuvre and the relationship between central and regional power. It also reveals Russian misinterpretations of Chinese interest in the project.

Abstract: East is East and West is West? Comparing Party System Stability in Europe 2008–2019This article compares trends in party system stability in Central/ Eastern Europe (CEE) and Western Europe, to see if recent studies indicating that the two regions have become more similar hold when the results of outcomes of several post-financial-crisis elections are taken into consideration. Further, it enquires into the underlying causes of electoral volatility and whether they differ between the two regions. In all, 82 parliamentary elections in 25 EU countries 2008–2019 are analyzed as regards electoral volatility (Pedersen's Index) and support for new parties ('volatility type A'). The results show that, when the most likely confounding variables are controlled for, a significant difference between the two regions remains, but also that there is a converging trend on both indicators. Moreover, whereas electoral volatility in the West is driven by the level of corruption together with the effective number of parties, unemployment and economic growth as well as the number of effective parties are the main factors explaining the same phenomenon in CEE. There is also evidence that volatility in CEE, unlike in Western Europe, is also driven by a path-dependent logic, where previous volatility scores explain subsequent ones. That finding may have implications for the prospects of future party system stabilization.

March 2018 – and then what? The issue of political succession in Putin's Russia
As president of Russia and a prominent political leader, Vladimir Putin has consistently endeavoredto legitimize his rule by appealing to central political myths and taken-for-granted truths inRussian society. In rhetoric and official communication, he emerges as the guarantor of domesticorder and stability, the protector of traditional values, and a staunch advocate of Russia'sstatus and position as a great power in a world often depicted as hostile. What is being communicatedhere, and apparently finds resonance among broad segments of public opinion, is thaton all these parameters Putin is uniquely qualified to lead Russia. Four times in the course of18 years, Putin has been elected president in the first round of elections, and throughout thisperiod he has received high rankings in regular monthly opinion polls. However, his legitimationstrategies have been so firmly linked to the persona of Putin that we may speak of an emergingdilemma with his fourth presidency. Who could fill his shoes as his successor? The articleanalyzes this dilemma, taking its point of departure in Weber's seminal theorizing on types oflegitimate authority and the routinization of charisma. It discusses the evident dearth of crediblesuccessor candidates, and concludes by discussing possible actions for dealing with or postponingthe issue of succession.