COIN - COIN Instruction
In: Marine corps gazette: the Marine Corps Association newsletter, Volume 96, Issue 6, p. 24-27
ISSN: 0025-3170
608 results
Sort by:
In: Marine corps gazette: the Marine Corps Association newsletter, Volume 96, Issue 6, p. 24-27
ISSN: 0025-3170
In: Marine corps gazette: the Marine Corps Association newsletter, Volume 93, Issue 4, p. 10-20
ISSN: 0025-3170
In: Marine corps gazette: the Marine Corps Association newsletter, Volume 95, Issue 2, p. 46-49
ISSN: 0025-3170
In: Marine corps gazette: the Marine Corps Association newsletter, Volume 93, Issue 4
ISSN: 0025-3170
In: Marine corps gazette: the Marine Corps Association newsletter, Volume 95, Issue 7, p. 25-29
ISSN: 0025-3170
In: Peace & change: a journal of peace research, Volume 35, Issue 1, p. 146-164
ISSN: 0149-0508
In: Marine corps gazette: the Marine Corps Association newsletter, Volume 95, Issue 10, p. 19-24
ISSN: 0025-3170
In: Marine corps gazette: the Marine Corps Association newsletter, Volume 93, Issue 2, p. 28-32
ISSN: 0025-3170
In: Marine corps gazette: the Marine Corps Association newsletter, Volume 95, Issue 6, p. 56-63
ISSN: 0025-3170
In: Peace & change: PC ; a journal of peace research, Volume 35, Issue 1, p. 146-163
ISSN: 1468-0130
In: Europäische Sicherheit & Technik: ES & T ; europäische Sicherheit, Strategie & Technik, Volume 61, Issue 12, p. 23-26
ISSN: 2193-746X
COIN (Counter Insurgency) ist eine von umfassender Informationsgewinnung und -verarbeitung abhängige Operation. Information Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) haben deshalb nachvollziehbar im COIN-Einsatz an Bedeutung gewonnen. Aufklärungsziele sind die Netzwerke der Aufständischen, deren soziale Beziehungen und Verstecke. (Europäische Sicherheit & Technik / SWP)
World Affairs Online
Proceedings 25th International Symposium, DISC 2011, Rome, Italy, September 20-22, 2011. ; The ability to collectively toss a common coin among n parties in the presence of faults is an important primitive in the arsenal of randomized distributed protocols. In the case of dishonest majority, it was shown to be impossible to achieve less than 1 r bias in O(r) rounds (Cleve STOC '86). In the case of honest majority, in contrast, unconditionally secure O(1)-round protocols for generating common unbiased coins follow from general completeness theorems on multi-party secure protocols in the secure channels model (e.g., BGW, CCD STOC '88). However, in the O(1)-round protocols with honest majority, parties generate and hold secret values which are assumed to be perfectly hidden from malicious parties: an assumption which is crucial to proving the resulting common coin is unbiased. This assumption unfortunately does not seem to hold in practice, as attackers can launch side-channel attacks on the local state of honest parties and leak information on their secrets. In this work, we present an O(1)-round protocol for collectively generating an unbiased common coin, in the presence of leakage on the local state of the honest parties. We tolerate t ≤ ( 1 3 − )n computationallyunbounded Byzantine faults and in addition a Ω(1)-fraction leakage on each (honest) party's secret state. Our results hold in the memory leakage model (of Akavia, Goldwasser, Vaikuntanathan '08) adapted to the distributed setting. Additional contributions of our work are the tools we introduce to achieve the collective coin toss: a procedure for disjoint committee election, and leakage-resilient verifiable secret sharing. ; National Defense Science and Engineering Graduate Fellowship ; National Science Foundation (U.S.) (CCF-1018064)
BASE
In: Orbis: FPRI's journal of world affairs, Volume 56, Issue 2, p. 215-232
ISSN: 0030-4387
In: Marine corps gazette: the Marine Corps Association newsletter, Volume 94, Issue 10, p. 80-86
ISSN: 0025-3170