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Examines whether NATO can perform multilateral peace operations reliably and effectively; argues that member countries will be reluctant to use force to manage or settle disputes that occur outside their territories. The Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) proposal, and IFOR/SFOR peacekeeping operations in Bosnia.

While governing data as an organizational asset has clear benefits, mobilizing an organization to implement data governance remains elusive for practitioners. On that account, this paper examines why governing data is difficult in local government organizations. Based on a literature review and an empirical case study, we establish the inherent challenges and build on the notion of collective action to theorize the problem of data governance. Following an engaged scholarship approach, we collect empirical material through six group interviews with 34 representatives from 13 different Danish municipalities. We extend existing data governance research with our problem triangle that identifies and explicates the complex relations between six distinct challenges: value, collaboration, capabilities, overview, practices, and politics. We demonstrate the value in theorizing data governance as a collective action problem and argue for the necessity of ensuring researchers and practitioners achieve a common understanding of the inherent challenges, as a first step towards developing data governance solutions that are viable in practice.

This paper juxtaposes two important political solutions to the collective action problem in the context of a common set of core assumptions. Once the core assumptions have been discussed, the distinction between the consumption and the production problems associated with public goods provision is elaborated. These assumptions and this distinction are applied to a comparison between a theory of individualistic anarchy, and a theory of competitive political entrepreneurs. Revisions of both are required to enable them to be placed within this framework. While the two theories are neither exclusive nor exhaustive they can, between them, be used to understand public goods provision in a number of different circumstances.

Fiscal consolidation confronts federal states with a collective action problem, especially in federations with a tightly coupled fiscal regime such as Belgium. However, the Belgian federation has successfully solved this collective action problem even though it lacks the political institutions that the literature on dynamic federalism has identified as the main mechanisms through which federal states achieve cooperation across levels of government. This article argues that the regionalization of the party system, on the one hand, and the rationalization of the deficit problem by the High Council of Finance, on the other, are crucial to understand how Belgium was able to solve the collective action problem despite its tightly coupled fiscal regime and particularly high levels of deficits and debts. The article thus emphasizes the importance of compromise and consensus in reducing deficits and debts in federal states.

Abstract
Bribery for access to public goods and services remains a widespread and seemingly innocuous practice which disproportionately targets the poor and helps keep them poor. Furthermore, its aggregate effects erode the legitimacy of government institutions and their capacity to fairly administer public goods and services as well as protection under the law. Drawing on original evidence using social norms methodology, this research tests underlying beliefs and expectations which sustain persistent forms of bribery and draws attention to the presence of pluralistic ignorance and consequent collective action problems. With examples focused on bribery in traffic law enforcement, healthcare, and education—three critical areas where bribery is often identified as an entrenched practice—this article contributes new evidence of: (a) the presence of pluralistic ignorance, a common social comparison error, surrounding bribery behavior; (b) differing social evaluations of bribe-solicitation; and finally, (c) how this context might exacerbate collective action problems. This empirical case study of Nigeria shows that even though more people are likely to be directly affected by bribery during routine interactions with public officials and institutions and many believe this practice is wrong, most people incorrectly believe that others in their community tolerate or even accept bribery behavior.

With an increased awareness of the detrimental effects of corruption on development, strategies to fight it are now a top priority in policy circles. Yet, in countries ridden with systemic corruption, few successes have resulted from the investment. On the basis of an interview study conducted in Kenya and Uganda—two arguably typically thoroughly corrupt countries—we argue that part of an explanation to why anticorruption reforms in countries plagued by widespread corruption fail is that they are based on a theoretical mischaracterization of the problem of systemic corruption. More specifically, the analysis reveals that while contemporary anticorruption reforms are based on a conceptualization of corruption as a principal–agent problem, in thoroughly corrupt settings, corruption rather resembles a collective action problem. This, in turn, leads to a breakdown of any anticorruption reform that builds on the principal–agent framework, taking the existence of noncorruptible so‐called principals for granted.

With an increased awareness of the detrimental effects of corruption on development, strategies to fight it are now a top priority in policy circles. Yet, in countries ridden with systemic corruption, few successes have resulted from the investment. On the basis of an interview study conducted in Kenya and Uganda-two arguably typically thoroughly corrupt countries-we argue that part of an explanation to why anticorruption reforms in countries plagued by widespread corruption fail is that they are based on a theoretical mischaracterization of the problem of systemic corruption. More specifically, the analysis reveals that while contemporary anticorruption reforms are based on a conceptualization of corruption as a principal-agent problem, in thoroughly corrupt settings, corruption rather resembles a collective action problem. This, in turn, leads to a breakdown of any anticorruption reform that builds on the principal-agent framework, taking the existence of noncorruptible so-called principals for granted. Adapted from the source document.

Industry lobbying is traditionally thought of as a non-excludable good subject to collective action problems that are most easily solved by concentrated industries. However, there is very little empirical support for this hypothesis. In this paper, we address a major shortcoming of existing work on the topic: Its near-exclusive reliance on data from the US. Using comparative firm-level survey data from up to 74 countries, we construct an industry-level indicator of concentration and test its effect on firms' lobbying activity. Using multilevel Extreme Bounds Analysis and Bayesian Variable Selection techniques to account for model uncertainty, we find no evidence that industry concentration is a predictor of lobbying activity. We discuss the implications of these non-findings for the literature and outline possible avenues for further research.