Suchergebnisse

Why does party identification motivate citizens to participate in politics? From a theoretical standpoint, it is in a partisan's self-interest to free ride on the efforts of others. Yet, mere identification with a party is enough to motivate many people to overcome this structural hurdle. We theorize that, by virtue of aligning one's self with a party, individuals become more likely to react to their political environment with anger and enthusiasm rather than fear. Anger and enthusiasm are associated with approach and continuation of current behavior, while fear triggers behavior reconsideration. In short, party identification stimulates participation via anger and enthusiasm. On the other hand, fear produces thought but not much action. We find support for our model using data from the American National Election Studies (ANES) and an original laboratory experiment. Adapted from the source document.

Abstract: This paper examines the Northern Prawn Fishery of Australia as an illustration of the consistent failures of systems of open ("market"?) access to common property goods. The dilemmas of collective action explain both why those occurred and substantially why subsequent regulatory intervention has not succeeded either in its stated objectives. It is argued, unfashionably, that the endemic nature of these collective action dilemmas in the fishery means that in 1987 the regulatory schema proposed by the government (the allocative coercion option?) would have provided superior outcomes to allocations based on self‐regulation by the industry.