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In this reconsideration of the case against consequentialism the author has now taken the opportunity to supplement the original work with three susbtantial subsequently published essays in which he responds to criticism of the book and further develops various of its themes and arguments

THE GENERAL TOPIC OF THIS ARTICLE IS THE STRUCTURE OF A NON-CONSEQUENTIALIST MORAL THEORY. THE AUTHOR CONSIDERS THE JUSTIFICATION OF OPTIONS, FOCUSING ON THEIR REPRESENTATION OF THE IDEA THAT PERSONS ARE END-IN-THEMSELVES, IN THE SENSE THAT THEY HAVE A POINT EVEN IF THEY DO NOT BRING ABOUT GREATER GOOD. HE THEN CONSIDERS THE FORM AND JUSTIFICATION OF CONSTRAINTS AND SHOWS HOW THEY ARE CONSISTENT WITH THE PRESENCE OF OPTIONS IN A MORAL SYSTEM. HE ALSO EXAMINES TWO PROMINENT PROPOSALS FOR CHARACTERIZING CONSTRAINTS, THE HARM-NOT AID DISTINCTION AND THE INTENTION-FORESIGHT DISTINCTION. IT IS SUGGESTED THAT THE CONSTRAINT BE UNDERSTOOD AS VICTIM--RATHER THAN AGENT INFORCED.

Introduction / Brad Hooker, Elinor Mason, and Dale E. Miller -- 1. Between act and rule: the consequentialism of G.E. Moore / William H. Shaw -- 2. The educational equivalence of act and rule utilitarianism / Sanford S. Levy -- 3. Defending rule utilitarianism / Jonathan Riley -- 4. Values, obligations, and saving lives / D.W. Haslett -- 5. The moral opacity of utilitarianism / David Lyons -- 6. Global consequentialism / Philip Pettit and Michael Smith -- 7. Evaluative focal points / Shelly Kagan -- 8. Hooker's use and abuse of reflective equilibrium / Dale E. Miller -- 9. Consequentialism and the subversion of pluralism / Alan Thomas -- 10. Why rule consequentialism is not superior to Ross-style pluralism / Phillip Montague -- 11. Ruling out rule consequentialism / Tim Mulgan -- 12. Reflective equilibrium and rule consequentialism / Brad Hooker -- 13. Rule consequentialism and the value of friendship / Madison Powers -- Notes on contributors -- Index.

How should we live? What do we owe to other people? In Goodness and Advice, the eminent philosopher Judith Jarvis Thomson explores how we should go about answering such fundamental questions. In doing so, she makes major advances in moral philosophy, pointing to some deep problems for influential moral theories and describing the structure of a new and much more promising theory. Thomson begins by lamenting the prevalence of the idea that there is an unbridgeable gap between fact and value--that to say something is good, for example, is not to state a fact, but to do something more like exp

The thesis of this book is to develop a theory of value covering all kinds of values, based on my unified utilitarian theory. It is unique and is different from all traditional and existing theories of value. Like the views of most psychologists and decision-scientists, value is asserted to be subjective in nature because value exists only for a subject. Value and value judgment are considered statistical in nature in three dimensions, namely in the dimensions of subject, object, and judge. This theory covers a modified von Neumann-Morgenstern utility theory as an integral part. The three conceptions of utility held by philosophers, economicsts, and decision-scientists are unified. The traditional and conventional classification of value into intrinsic and instrumental, which may lead to confusion, misunderstanding, and circularity, is not used. Instead, a classification based on the classification of good things in life according to the principle of exchangeability and replaceability is emphasized and used. A decision-theoretic approach is taken for the study of actions in life. All the actions in a person's life are for the pursuit of values, and all the values pursued are related, directly or indirectly, closely or remotely, to a life plan. Thus, this utilitarian general theory of value eventually leads to a philosophy of life, which is also consequential, teleological, and utilitarian

AbstractIt is argued that there are no moral or legal rights that may never rightly be overridden no matter what the consequences. There are human rights which are inalienable while still being rightly overrideable in certain circumstances. Even rights-based constructivist accounts of human rights do not provide a grounding for morality that escapes consequentialist critique. But the proper form of consequentialism is a weak form of consequentialism which is distinguished from utilitarian consequentialism.

Driver challenges Aristotle's classical theory of virtue, arguing that it fails to take into account virtues which do seem to involve ignorance or epistemic defect. She argues that we should abandon the highly intellectualist view of virtue and instead adopt a consequentialist perspective which holds that virtue is simply a character trait which systematically produces good consequences