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Political theorists disagree about the extent to which issues of feasibility, stability, institutional design and human nature can be bracketed in analysing the concept of justice. At one end of the spectrum some argue that no analysis of justice can be adequate in the absence of an account of how it could be implemented, whereas at the other end there are those who argue that principles of justice are logically independent of issues of feasibility. Influenced by the work of John Rawls, many theorists occupy the middle ground, maintaining that analyses of justice must be realistic, that is, realizable under the best of foreseeable conditions. Against Rawls and others, this article argues that feasibility does not constrain what can count as an adequate principle of justice but nevertheless maintains that there are limits on such principles that derive in part from human nature, which divergent theories of justice must respect. It also distinguishes between different levels of analysis, some of which are governed by feasibility constraints.

We review studies of the impact of credit constraints on the accumulation of human capital. Evidence suggests that credit constraints have recently become important for schooling and other aspects of households' behavior. We highlight the importance of early childhood investments, since their response largely determines the impact of credit constraints on the overall lifetime acquisition of human capital. We also review the intergenerational literature and examine the macroeconomic impacts of credit constraints on social mobility and the income distribution. A common limitation across all areas of the human capital literature is the imposition of ad hoc constraints on credit. We propose a more careful treatment of the structure of government student loan programs and the incentive problems underlying private credit. We show that endogenizing constraints on credit for human capital helps explain observed borrowing, schooling, and default patterns and offers new insights about the design of government policy.

AbstractThis article shows how simple systems of linear equations with {0,1} variables can be aggregated into a single linear equation whose {0,1} solutions are identical to the solutions of the original system. Structures of the original systems are exploited to keep the aggregator's integer coefficients from becoming unnecessarily large. The results have potential application in integer programming and information theory, especially for problems that contain assignment‐type constraints along with other constraints. Several unresolved questions of a number‐theoretic nature are mentioned at the conclusion of the article.

Abstract
This paper analyses the various effects of threats and offers on freedom. Both threats and offers are related to social power. Threats are part of coercion and they are constraints. We try to say why this is so. Offers are more problematic. We identify soft and hard offers, or offers that can be refused and those that cannot. Hard offers have several interesting features, especially in relation to individual preference orders and sets of action alternatives. This paper studies problems which are implicit in Thomas Wartenberg's study of the various forms of social power in this issue of Analyse & Kritik.

A model of affirmative action constraints is defined, according to which economic, political, & administrative/labor pool constraints have impact on a state's ability to attract minority employees in state & local government. Estimation of this model with 1975 Equal Employment Opportunity Commission data indicates that political constraints are least important. The impacts of twelve environmental variables on both this measure (minority penetration) & the Gini index of inequality (minority stratification) at the same bureaucratic level are assessed. Minority penetration is likely to be increased only through long-run economic factors, while minority stratification is likely to be attainable more rapidly & with fewer economic constraints. 2 Tables. W. H. Stoddard.

Floor constraints are a prominent feature of many matching markets, such as medical residency, teacher assignment, and military cadet matching. We develop a theory of matching markets under floor constraints. We introduce a stability notion, which we call floor respecting stability, for markets in which (hard) floor constraints must be respected. A matching is floor respecting stable if there is no coalition of doctors and hospitals that can propose an alternative matching that is feasible and an improvement for its members. Our stability notion imposes the additional condition that a coalition cannot reassign a doctor outside the coalition to another hospital (although she can be fired). This condition is necessary to guarantee the existence of stable matchings. We provide a mechanism that is strategy-proof for doctors and implements a floor respecting stable matching.