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Constructivismabout practical judgments, as I understand it, is the notion that our true normative judgments represent a normative reality, while denying that that reality is independent of our exer-cise of moral and practical judgment. The Kantian strain of practical constructivism (through Kant himself, John Rawls, Christine Korsgaard, and others) has been so influential that it is tempting to identify the constructivist approach in practical domains with the Kantian development of the out-look. In this essay I explore a somewhat different variety of practical constructivism, which I callAristotelian Constructivism. My aim is to establish conceptual space for this form of constructivism by indicating both in what ways it agrees with its Kantian counterparts and in what ways it differs. I argue that Aristotelian Constructivism is on one sense more faithful to the constructivist enterprise than the Kantian varieties, in that its understanding of both the establishment of practical truthandthe vindication of the theory itself is constructivist.

"Realism and constructivism, two key contemporary theoretical approaches to the study of international relations, are commonly taught as mutually exclusive ways of understanding the subject. Realist Constructivism explores the common ground between the two, and demonstrates that, rather than being in simple opposition, they have areas of both tension and overlap. There is indeed space to engage in a realist constructivism. But at the same time, there are important distinctions between them, and there remains a need for a constructivism that is not realist, and a realism that is not constructivist. Samuel Barkin argues more broadly for a different way of thinking about theories of international relations, that focuses on the corresponding elements within various approaches rather than on a small set of mutually exclusive paradigms. Realist Constructivism provides an interesting new way for scholars and students to think about international relations theory"--Provided by publisher

The paper proposes to expand the constructivist view from empirical analysis to pragmatic advice. Its main thesis is: The fact that methods and concepts in the production of knowledge and standards for justifying truth claims are culturally bound does not preclude these bonds from being observed and also controlled and adjusted. Knowledge work imports scientific methods and concepts into virtually all segments of society. Whether knowledge is well manufactured and trustworthy is no longer the sole concern of scientific communities but of clients, stakeholder groups, political bodies, and other actors. The paper begins with reconsidering the symmetry principle of the Strong Programme from a methodological point of view. It argues that excluding justified beliefs from the realm of independent variables is unwarranted. Even if it is impossible to introduce truth as a cause, it is possible to accept justifications of beliefs as causes. In a second line of analysis, this paper explores that the concept of cultural relativity of knowledge has an internal instability. Every lesson in cultural relativism is a lesson in designing cognitive strategies to transcend it. The better the social construction of scientific knowledge is understood and even causally explained, the better reflexive abstraction opens up possibilities to operate with this causality and loosen or tighten the cultural bonds. Examples demonstrate that crossing established boundaries and aiming at higher degrees of cultural independency are as meaningful as value based restrictions to smaller domains. It is in this context that constructivism has a future as a frame for deliberative forms of knowledge construction and justification.

International audience ; Pragmatic constructivism is characterized in a particular epistemology based on the quest for parametric objectivity. In Peter Knoepfel's public policy analysis, this theoretical perspective relates to the study of the construction of marks of objectivity (that is, the measures contained in or inferred by a policy: problems, criteria, procedures, mechanisms, norms) which, according to him, make up the substance of policies. The place granted to the concepts of 'actors', 'resources' and 'institutional rules' in the proposed analytical framework is a clear illustration of this (Knoepfel, Larrue & Varone, 2006). However, this quest is unlikely to be successful if there is no empirical endeavour to explain the interactions between the three concepts. This is why Peter Knoepfel has constantly formulated the equation between actors, resources and rules, in operationalizable terms – in both his research work carried out in close proximity to public action (through various mandates) and in his teaching in Switzerland and abroad. The policy analysis defended by him is constantly shaped by a pragmatic perspective. The aim is to gain insight into concrete (observable) practices, through which actors produce a shared normative signification, particularly in terms of an hypothesis on problem causation (who or what is 'guilty' or 'objectively responsible' for the collective problem to be resolved?) and an hypothesis on state intervention (how can the collective problem be alleviated or resolved?). This pragmatism is located in a constant effort at methodological operationalization, which is systematically aimed at exploring the explanation for this trilogy (actors, resources, rules) and its interactions as a pragmatic concept. Peter Knoepfel always expects the explanation of a policy to cite factors that are important. For him the idea of importance (as for the pragmatists, Hilary Putnam (1990) in particular) is always dependent on the reason for asking the question why? In this instance, why ...

International audience ; Pragmatic constructivism is characterized in a particular epistemology based on the quest for parametric objectivity. In Peter Knoepfel's public policy analysis, this theoretical perspective relates to the study of the construction of marks of objectivity (that is, the measures contained in or inferred by a policy: problems, criteria, procedures, mechanisms, norms) which, according to him, make up the substance of policies. The place granted to the concepts of 'actors', 'resources' and 'institutional rules' in the proposed analytical framework is a clear illustration of this (Knoepfel, Larrue & Varone, 2006). However, this quest is unlikely to be successful if there is no empirical endeavour to explain the interactions between the three concepts. This is why Peter Knoepfel has constantly formulated the equation between actors, resources and rules, in operationalizable terms – in both his research work carried out in close proximity to public action (through various mandates) and in his teaching in Switzerland and abroad. The policy analysis defended by him is constantly shaped by a pragmatic perspective. The aim is to gain insight into concrete (observable) practices, through which actors produce a shared normative signification, particularly in terms of an hypothesis on problem causation (who or what is 'guilty' or 'objectively responsible' for the collective problem to be resolved?) and an hypothesis on state intervention (how can the collective problem be alleviated or resolved?). This pragmatism is located in a constant effort at methodological operationalization, which is systematically aimed at exploring the explanation for this trilogy (actors, resources, rules) and its interactions as a pragmatic concept. Peter Knoepfel always expects the explanation of a policy to cite factors that are important. For him the idea of importance (as for the pragmatists, Hilary Putnam (1990) in particular) is always dependent on the reason for asking the question why? In this instance, why ...

Norms, Reasons and Constructivism. Constructivism and Objectivity. Varieties of Constructivism. Constructivism and Its Premises. Re-Defining Constructivism. ; Norms, Reasons and Constructivism. Constructivism and Objectivity. Varieties of Constructivism. Constructivism and Its Premises. Re-Defining Constructivism. ; LUISS PhD Thesis

The author of this chapter defines the tension within Oakeshott's philosophy on socio-political construction & deconstructs his conceptualization of constructivism & relativism in relationship to truth. Although Oakeshott's philosophy can relate to a strong constructivism, his anti-rationalism & conceptualization of truth preclude his acceptance of the "rational" constructivist political agenda. Various philosophers' views on truth (Hacking, McCullagh, Sellars, Goldman) are applied as problematizations of Oakeshott's worldview. Oakeshott's ambiguous relativism is recognized to have a misplaced skepticism & inconsistent relativism (Podoksik) emanating from the irreducible pluralism based on the distinct spheres of knowledge generated by separate domains of modes. The severe critiques of the sociological arenas of politics, education & science exemplify this misplacement. The irreducible plurality of his modes (science, history) require different methods of inquiry to produce knowledge, thus forbidding cross disciplinary commonalities leading to an assumption of coherentism that should direct Oakeshott to relativism. But, reciprocal relations between conceptual creativity & nature are excluded by his separation of modal knowledge. 60 References. J. Harwell