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InPolitical Liberalism, John Rawls employs a distinctive method of "political constructivism" to establish his well-known principles of justice, arguing that his principles are suited to bridge the ineradicable pluralism of liberal societies and so to ground an "overlapping consensus." Setting aside the question of whether Rawls's method supports his principles, I argue that he does not adequately defend reliance on this particular method rather than alternatives. If the goal of Rawls's "political" philosophy is to derive principles that are able to overcome liberal pluralism, then another and simpler method should be employed. The "method of convergence" would develop liberal principles directly from the convergence of comprehensive views in existing societies, and so give rise to quite different moral principles.

AbstractTaking the complexity and diversity of Islamic law (fiqh) as a point of departure, this article examines a series of positions advanced by Muslim jurists on the relationship between law and astronomy. Focusing primarily on the question of the appropriateness of relying on astronomical calculations to determine the months of the hijri calendar, it considers three epistemological stances modeled by these positions: correspondence, constructivism, and representation. Taken together, these interventions constitute a minoritarian strain within the fiqh literature that exploited the practices, structures, and methods of reasoning of the Hanafi and Shafi'i legal schools (madhhabs) to argue in favor of the employment of astronomical calculations for ritual purposes. Though these were anomalous positions at variance from the dominant evidentiary regime that privileged perception over calculation, the view from the margins they afford provide a helpful window onto the nature of legal reasoning in Sunni Islam, revealing the importance of not only proximate social triggers to change, but also the relevance of more enduring features of madhhab reasoning—the school's role as a historical repository of jurists' opinions, the propensity to recruit the authority and argumentation of preceding departures, and the expectation to proceed with the majority regime in mind.

This article connects J. S. Mill's democratic theory and practice with the contemporary debate surrounding representative constructivism and argues that Mill's advocacy of female suffrage affords an empirical example of the mobilization power of representative constructivism. Studying this concrete example of constructivism alongside Mill's theory of political representation clarifies that constructivism is democratic to the extent it seeks to make citizens themselves appropriate and contest the claims that their representatives construct on their behalf.

This article explores the concept of "human security" as an academic & fledgling policy movement that seeks to place the individual -- or people collectively -- as the referent of security. It does this against a background of evolving transnational norms relating to security & governance, & the development of scientific understanding that challenges orthodox conceptions of security. It suggests that human security is not a coherent or objective school of thought. Rather, there are different, & sometimes competing, conceptions of human security that may reflect different sociological/cultural & geostrategic orientations. The article argues that the emergence of the concept of human security -- as a broad, multifaceted, & evolving conception of security -- reflects the impact of values & norms on international relations. It also embraces a range of alliances, actors, & agendas that have taken us beyond the traditional scope of international politics & diplomacy. As a demonstration of change in international relations, of evolving identities & interests, this is best explained with reference to "social constructivist" thought, in contradistinction with the structural realist mainstream of international relations. In a constructivist vein, the article suggests that empirical research is already building a case in support of human security thinking that is, slowly, being acknowledged by decisionmakers, against the logic of realist determinism. 46 References. Adapted from the source document.

Epistemology, as I understand it, is a branch of philosophy especially concerned with general questions about how we can know various things or at least justify our beliefs about them. It questions what counts as evidence and what are reasonable sources of doubt. Traditionally, episte-mology focuses on pervasive and apparently basic assumptions covering a wide range of claims to knowledge or justified belief rather than very specific, practical puzzles. For example, traditional epistemologists ask "How do we know there are material objects?" and not "How do you know which are the female beetles?" Similarly,moralepistemology, as I understand it, is concerned with general questions about how we can know or justify our beliefs about moral matters. Its focus, again, is on quite general, pervasive, and apparently basic assumptions about what counts as evidence, what are reasonable sources of doubt, and what are the appropriate procedures for justifying particular moral claims.

Constructivism is regarded as increasingly important in International Relations. More often than not the approach is related to the issue of identity. Constructivism and identity are, however, in a dangerous liaison. This article argues that Alexander Wendt's constructivism needs identity as a central concept but that this very concept threatens to undermine the possibility of his constructivism. It is further suggested that this problem has some relevance to other constructivist approaches positioned in the middle ground between rationalist and reflectivist theorizing. The argument is illustrated with a consideration of the debates around the redefinition of the role of the Federal Republic of Germany to include the possibility of German military involvement abroad.