The following links lead to the full text from the respective local libraries:
Alternatively, you can try to access the desired document yourself via your local library catalog.
If you have access problems, please contact us.
Search results
Filter
Format
Type
Language
More Languages
Time Range
24781 results
Sort by:
Checking availability at your location
This journal is also available at your library: |
electronic
print
Checking availability at your location
This journal is also available at your library: |
electronic
print
Checking availability at your location
This journal is also available at your library: |
electronic
print
Checking availability at your location
This book is also available at your library:
Article(electronic)#52021
Contest Copycats: Adversarial Duplication of Effort in Contests
In: Working Paper of the Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance No. 2021-17
Checking availability at your location
This article is also available at your library: |
electronic
print
SSRN
Open Access#62021
Success in contests
First published online: 07 May 2021 ; Models of two contestants exerting effort to win a prize are very common and widely used in political economy. The contest success function plays as fundamental a role in the theory of contests as does the production function in the theory of the firm, yet beyond the existence of equilibrium few general results are known. This paper seeks to remedy that gap. ; This article recieve funding from the EUI Research Council and MIUR PRIN 20103S5RN3 for financial support. This article was published Open Access with the support from the EUI Library through the CRUI - Springer Transformative Agreement (2020-2024)
BASE
Checking availability at your location
This article is also available at your library: |
electronic
print
SSRN
Article(electronic)#82010
Dynamic Contests
In: WZB Markets and Politics Working Paper No. SP II 2010-10
Checking availability at your location
This article is also available at your library: |
electronic
print
SSRN
Working paper
Checking availability at your location
This article is also available at your library: |
electronic
print
SSRN
Working paper
Checking availability at your location
This article is also available at your library: |
electronic
print
SSRN
Checking availability at your location
This article is also available at your library: |
electronic
print
SSRN
Working paper
Checking availability at your location
This article is also available at your library: |
electronic
print
SSRN
Working paper
Article(electronic)#132021
Contest Divisioning
Checking availability at your location
This article is also available at your library: |
electronic
print
SSRN
Article(print)#142003
Sequential Contests
In: Public choice, Volume 116, Issue 1-2, p. 1-18
ISSN: 0048-5829
We compare expected rent-seeking expenditures & efficiency of simultaneous versus sequential rent-seeking contests. We find that when two risk neutral ex ante identical agents are competing, sequential contests are ex ante Pareto superior to simultaneous contests. We then endogenize the timing decision of rent-seeking expenditures & show that with ex ante identical contestants, all subgame perfect equilibria of this game are sequential contests. 1 Table, 2 Figures, 1 Appendix, 13 References. Adapted from the source document.
Checking availability at your location
This article is also available at your library: |
electronic
print
Article(print)#151997
Delegation in Contests
In: European journal of political economy, Volume 13, Issue 2, p. 281
ISSN: 0176-2680
Checking availability at your location
This article is also available at your library: |
electronic
print