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Recently, a molecular tumor profile analyzed at our medical institution evoked an uncommon communications hub in one of the molecular pathway networks. The patient was a multiyear survivor of pancreatic cancer, and the oncologist requested molecular analyses that would assist in treatment decisions. The hub was noticed because of its topological similarity to optimal terrorist networks that are resilient against attack. Although the hub's topology could have been simply a methodological artifact, its presence did support the consulting pathologist's recommendation that the oncologist refrain from overstimulating the patient's active immune system. In addition, the terrorism/cancer analogy sparked investigation into environments that neutralize covert networks; this led to novel hypotheses about cancer prevention and control for further research. Despite parallels between the "war on cancer" and the "war on terrorism," there has been very little crossover work between biomedical researchers and researchers in military intelligence. Here is an example of how analytical methods based on infrastructure similarities between molecular interaction pathways and terrorism networks support preclinical research and medical decision making for diseases that have progressed beyond standard-of-care treatments.

Counterterrorism decisions have been an intense area of research in recent years. Both decision analysis and game theory have been used to model such decisions, and more recently approaches have been developed that combine the techniques of the two disciplines. However, each of these approaches assumes that the attacker is maximizing its utility. Experimental research shows that human beings do not make decisions by maximizing expected utility without aid, but instead deviate in specific ways such as loss aversion or likelihood insensitivity. In this article, we modify existing methods for counterterrorism decisions. We keep expected utility as the defender's paradigm to seek for the rational decision, but we use prospect theory to solve for the attacker's decision to descriptively model the attacker's loss aversion and likelihood insensitivity. We study the effects of this approach in a critical decision, whether to screen containers entering the United States for radioactive materials. We find that the defender's optimal decision is sensitive to the attacker's levels of loss aversion and likelihood insensitivity, meaning that understanding such descriptive decision effects is important in making such decisions.

Foreword David D. McKiernan, General (Retired), U.S. Army Chapter One: Introduction: The Threat Finance Cell J. Edward Conway Chapter Two: Intelligence Analysis: An Operator's Perspective Colonel Clayton O. Sheffield, U.S. Army Chapter Three: Where Counterinsurgency Meets Counter Threat Finance Brian A. Gordon Chapter Four: From People to Processes: Collecting Intelligence That Matters David M. Blum & Brian A. Gordon Chapter Five: Al-Qa'ida in Iraq's Financial Ledgers Benjamin Bahney and Howard J. Shatz Chapter Six: Cost Accounting: Auditing the Taliban in Helmand Province, Afghanistan Brian A

Terrorism in East Africa has remained a concern of the United States since 1998, when al Qaeda bombed U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania. As part of its efforts to address this threat, State launched PREACT in 2009 as a program for long-term engagement and capacity building in East Africa. PREACT-which focuses on countering terrorist threats, including al Shabaab, an al Qaeda affiliate based in Somalia-is managed by State's Bureau of African Affairs and provides assistance in a region composed of 12 partner countries. This book examines PREACT, including the role it plays in U.S. counterterr