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The author analyzes the genesis & the scenarios of the Kosovo crisis resolution, as well as the possible political reverberations of the NATO military intervention. The premise is that the Kosovo crisis is only a continuation of the break-up of the former Yugoslavia; Kosovo has for centuries been a separate entity largely populated by Albanians; the policy of Serbian nationalism has permanently discriminated against the Albanian population; & prior to the recent air strikes against Yugoslavia, Serbia had systematically led an ethnic-cleansing campaign on Kosovo. Although the author recognizes that support for the NATO military action can hardly be found in the tenets of the UN Charter, he argues that it can nevertheless be justified by international law. He points out that NATO's military campaign enjoyed the broad support of the people of NATO member countries, but that it has made a rift in the European Left. The new Left was in the forefront of the action, while the old, dogmatic, & sectarian Left found itself in the ranks of its most vocal opponents. The author claims that Milosevic, with his overall politics, & particularly his policy on Kosovo, had propelled the West into an action from which it could not extricate itself. He concludes that the consequences of Belgrade's defeat will be (1) the collapse of Milosevic's regime (the beginning of his end); (2) the final incapacitation of Milosevic's politics to create new conflicts; (3) the protectorate over Kosovo & its autonomy, with a factual independence from Serbia; (4) the independence of Montenegro; (5) Reinforcing the Dayton policy in Bosnia & Herzegovina (eliminating centrifugal tendencies); (6) the organized participation of the West in the transitional processes in this region (the pact on the stability of southeast Europe); & (7) bolstering the democratic & weakening the undemocratic tendencies in the region. Adapted from the source document.