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Each of us makes a number of decisions, from the less important to those with
far-reaching consequences. As members of different groups, we are also actors
of group decision making. In order to make a rational decision, a
choice-making procedure must satisfy a number of assumptions (conditions) of
rationality. In addition, when it comes to group decisions, those procedures
should also be ?fair.? However, it is not possible to define a procedure of
choice-making that would transform individual orders of alternatives based on
preferences of perfectly rational individuals into a single social order and
still meet conditions of rationality and ethics. The theory of deliberative
democracy appeared in response to the impossibility of Social Choice theory.
The basic assumption of deliberative democracy is that individuals adjust
their preferences taking into account interests of the community. They are
open for discussion with other group members and are willing to change their
attitudes in order to achieve common interests. Ideally, group members come
to an agreement during public discussion (deliberation). Still, this concept
cannot completely over?come all the difficulties posed by the theory of
social choice. Specifically, there is no solution for strategic and
manipulative behavior of individuals. Also, the concept of deliberative
democracy faces certain problems particular to this approach, such as, to
name but a few, problems with the establishment of equality of participants
in the debate and their motivation, as well as problems with the organization
of public hearings.

Decision Making is a case study of the decision to raise the Bank Rate by 2% (to 7%) on 19 September 1957. Reconsiders selected aspects of the original study in the light of files recently released in the Public Record Office and of other publications since the book was published. (Abstract amended)

How do terrorists & terrorist groups make decisions, & what influence do terrorist decision-making styles have on the course of a terrorist campaign? Efforts to answer these questions have centered on three sets of theories. In order of generality, these are (a) strategic theories, in which the decision to employ terrorism & related forms of political violence is considered to be an instrumental choice; (b) organizational theories, in which the sources of violence are found in the internal dynamics of the terrorist group itself; & (c) psychological theories, in which the decision to employ terrorism is explained within the framework of individual psychology. Most observers agree that these lines of inquiry are not mutually exclusive, but each offers a distinctive approach to terrorist decision making. This essay examines each of these theoretical approaches in turn. It concludes with a brief discussion of the decision-making constraints that help shape terrorist life cycles. 1 Figure, 224 References. Adapted from the source document.

IN A SENSE UNINTENDED BY THE AUTHORS, THESE TWO CLOSELY RELATED BOOKS PRESENT A STORY WITHIN A STORY. BOTH RATIONAL DECISION MAKING AND DECISIONS IN CRISIS ARE STRIKING EFFORTS TO UNDERSTAND THE DECISION-MAKING SUBSTANCE AND PROCESS OF A KEY ACTOR IN THE MIDDLE EAST IMBROGHO-ISRAEL. IN ADDITION, THE AUTHORS STRIVE TO EVALUATE THE QUALITY OF THE DECISION MAKING CHOICES AGAINST CURRENT INSIGHTS OFFERED BY NATIONAL AND OTHER DECISION-MAKING FRAMEWORKS. AS WELL, THOSE ANALYSES REVEAL IMPORTANT ELEMENTS OF DECISION-MAKING CHOICE BY THE AUTHORS THEMSELVES. THEY THUS SHOW THE STATE OF THE ART AS IT EXISTS, AND THEY PROVIDE CLUES OF WHERE THE FIELD MUST MOVE IN THE FUTURE. WHILE THESE ARE CLOSELY RELATED BOOKS, THEY ARE NOT IDENTICAL. NEITHER METHODOLOGICALLY NOR SUBSTANTIVELY DO THEY COVER THE SAME GROUND. INDEED, ONE OF THE MOST TROUBLING ASPECTS OF READING BOTH STUDIES, AT LEAST THE RESPECTIVE COVERAGE OF THE 1967 CRISIS, IS THAT FREQUENTLY ONE WONDERS IF HE IS READING ABOUT THE SAME CRISIS AT ALL. THIS IS EVEN MORE DISTURBING WHEN ONE TAKES INTO ACCOUNT THAT DATA AND ADVICE WERE OFFERED WILLINGLY BY MICHAEL BRECHEN TO THE AUTHORS OF THE OTHER STUDY. FOR INSTANCE, BRECHER FINDS THE HOLOCAUST SYNDROME A SIGNIFICANT INFLUENCE ON THE ATTITUDINAL PRISM OF MAJOR ACTORS IN 1967, YET STEIN AND TANTER FAIL EVEN TO MENTION IT AS A FACTOR IN THEIR BOUNDED RATIONALITY PRESENTATION.

A synthesis of the work of three noted authors provides a framework for collaborative decisions built on the foundation of decision analysis. A Nobel Prize winner provides a psychological foundation for the framework, an authority on harnessing the collective wisdom of organizations argues for the necessity of a mechanism for the aggregation of the decision makers' understandings, and a former senior executive for a Fortune 500 company describes a series of structured dialogues that supports the aggregation of understandings. The resulting collaborative decision process aggregates, rather than compromises, the understandings of decision makers. It makes explicit the aggregation of individuals' understandings of the frame of the decision to be made, the alternatives to be considered, the sources of value and risk, and, finally, the reasons for the resulting collaborative choice. In collaborative decision making, we do not strive for an optimum, a compromise, or a satisficing solution. Rather, collaborative decision making results in a significantly more valuable choice than the alternatives envisioned by any of the decision makers through the aggregation understandings. Though the collaborative choice was not envisioned by the decision makers, each feels ownership of it and explicitly agrees to implement it.