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The Thesis explores the motives and conditions under which the US, China, and Russia are likely to cooperate on arms control in cyberspace in order to improve both their national and international security. It is stated that hostile states will be in favor of negotiating a limitation of cyber capabilities to reduce escalation and avoid the damage caused by a potential conflict. The analysis is based on defensive realism theory, which explains the conditions leading to "negative cooperation" among potential adversaries. Three variables are identified which help to analyze the potential of cooperation in cyberspace: a) motives; b) the distinction between defensive and offensive cyber capabilities; c) information. The research shows that the risk of a cyberspace conflict escalating between the US, China and Russia encouraged them to seek cooperation. However, only few cooperation precedents could be described as successful. The same principles and conditions are valid for both cyber and military disarmament regimes. Two types of conditions necessary for effective cyber disarmament are identified. The first refers to external conditions such as the increased confrontation, the use of offensive cyber capabilities and applying of exhaustion strategy. The second refers to internal condition – this is a lack of trust between states which deepens the security dilemma in cyberspace. While evaluating the potential of cyber disarmament regime, worth mentioning that conditions which lead to "negative cooperation" create the ground for the disarmament regime in cyberspace.

The Thesis explores the motives and conditions under which the US, China, and Russia are likely to cooperate on arms control in cyberspace in order to improve both their national and international security. It is stated that hostile states will be in favor of negotiating a limitation of cyber capabilities to reduce escalation and avoid the damage caused by a potential conflict. The analysis is based on defensive realism theory, which explains the conditions leading to "negative cooperation" among potential adversaries. Three variables are identified which help to analyze the potential of cooperation in cyberspace: a) motives; b) the distinction between defensive and offensive cyber capabilities; c) information. The research shows that the risk of a cyberspace conflict escalating between the US, China and Russia encouraged them to seek cooperation. However, only few cooperation precedents could be described as successful. The same principles and conditions are valid for both cyber and military disarmament regimes. Two types of conditions necessary for effective cyber disarmament are identified. The first refers to external conditions such as the increased confrontation, the use of offensive cyber capabilities and applying of exhaustion strategy. The second refers to internal condition – this is a lack of trust between states which deepens the security dilemma in cyberspace. While evaluating the potential of cyber disarmament regime, worth mentioning that conditions which lead to "negative cooperation" create the ground for the disarmament regime in cyberspace.

The Thesis explores the motives and conditions under which the US, China, and Russia are likely to cooperate on arms control in cyberspace in order to improve both their national and international security. It is stated that hostile states will be in favor of negotiating a limitation of cyber capabilities to reduce escalation and avoid the damage caused by a potential conflict. The analysis is based on defensive realism theory, which explains the conditions leading to "negative cooperation" among potential adversaries. Three variables are identified which help to analyze the potential of cooperation in cyberspace: a) motives; b) the distinction between defensive and offensive cyber capabilities; c) information. The research shows that the risk of a cyberspace conflict escalating between the US, China and Russia encouraged them to seek cooperation. However, only few cooperation precedents could be described as successful. The same principles and conditions are valid for both cyber and military disarmament regimes. Two types of conditions necessary for effective cyber disarmament are identified. The first refers to external conditions such as the increased confrontation, the use of offensive cyber capabilities and applying of exhaustion strategy. The second refers to internal condition – this is a lack of trust between states which deepens the security dilemma in cyberspace. While evaluating the potential of cyber disarmament regime, worth mentioning that conditions which lead to "negative cooperation" create the ground for the disarmament regime in cyberspace.

The Thesis explores the motives and conditions under which the US, China, and Russia are likely to cooperate on arms control in cyberspace in order to improve both their national and international security. It is stated that hostile states will be in favor of negotiating a limitation of cyber capabilities to reduce escalation and avoid the damage caused by a potential conflict. The analysis is based on defensive realism theory, which explains the conditions leading to "negative cooperation" among potential adversaries. Three variables are identified which help to analyze the potential of cooperation in cyberspace: a) motives; b) the distinction between defensive and offensive cyber capabilities; c) information. The research shows that the risk of a cyberspace conflict escalating between the US, China and Russia encouraged them to seek cooperation. However, only few cooperation precedents could be described as successful. The same principles and conditions are valid for both cyber and military disarmament regimes. Two types of conditions necessary for effective cyber disarmament are identified. The first refers to external conditions such as the increased confrontation, the use of offensive cyber capabilities and applying of exhaustion strategy. The second refers to internal condition – this is a lack of trust between states which deepens the security dilemma in cyberspace. While evaluating the potential of cyber disarmament regime, worth mentioning that conditions which lead to "negative cooperation" create the ground for the disarmament regime in cyberspace.

The Thesis explores the motives and conditions under which the US, China, and Russia are likely to cooperate on arms control in cyberspace in order to improve both their national and international security. It is stated that hostile states will be in favor of negotiating a limitation of cyber capabilities to reduce escalation and avoid the damage caused by a potential conflict. The analysis is based on defensive realism theory, which explains the conditions leading to "negative cooperation" among potential adversaries. Three variables are identified which help to analyze the potential of cooperation in cyberspace: a) motives; b) the distinction between defensive and offensive cyber capabilities; c) information. The research shows that the risk of a cyberspace conflict escalating between the US, China and Russia encouraged them to seek cooperation. However, only few cooperation precedents could be described as successful. The same principles and conditions are valid for both cyber and military disarmament regimes. Two types of conditions necessary for effective cyber disarmament are identified. The first refers to external conditions such as the increased confrontation, the use of offensive cyber capabilities and applying of exhaustion strategy. The second refers to internal condition – this is a lack of trust between states which deepens the security dilemma in cyberspace. While evaluating the potential of cyber disarmament regime, worth mentioning that conditions which lead to "negative cooperation" create the ground for the disarmament regime in cyberspace.

The Thesis explores the motives and conditions under which the US, China, and Russia are likely to cooperate on arms control in cyberspace in order to improve both their national and international security. It is stated that hostile states will be in favor of negotiating a limitation of cyber capabilities to reduce escalation and avoid the damage caused by a potential conflict. The analysis is based on defensive realism theory, which explains the conditions leading to "negative cooperation" among potential adversaries. Three variables are identified which help to analyze the potential of cooperation in cyberspace: a) motives; b) the distinction between defensive and offensive cyber capabilities; c) information. The research shows that the risk of a cyberspace conflict escalating between the US, China and Russia encouraged them to seek cooperation. However, only few cooperation precedents could be described as successful. The same principles and conditions are valid for both cyber and military disarmament regimes. Two types of conditions necessary for effective cyber disarmament are identified. The first refers to external conditions such as the increased confrontation, the use of offensive cyber capabilities and applying of exhaustion strategy. The second refers to internal condition – this is a lack of trust between states which deepens the security dilemma in cyberspace. While evaluating the potential of cyber disarmament regime, worth mentioning that conditions which lead to "negative cooperation" create the ground for the disarmament regime in cyberspace.

The Thesis explores the motives and conditions under which the US, China, and Russia are likely to cooperate on arms control in cyberspace in order to improve both their national and international security. It is stated that hostile states will be in favor of negotiating a limitation of cyber capabilities to reduce escalation and avoid the damage caused by a potential conflict. The analysis is based on defensive realism theory, which explains the conditions leading to "negative cooperation" among potential adversaries. Three variables are identified which help to analyze the potential of cooperation in cyberspace: a) motives; b) the distinction between defensive and offensive cyber capabilities; c) information. The research shows that the risk of a cyberspace conflict escalating between the US, China and Russia encouraged them to seek cooperation. However, only few cooperation precedents could be described as successful. The same principles and conditions are valid for both cyber and military disarmament regimes. Two types of conditions necessary for effective cyber disarmament are identified. The first refers to external conditions such as the increased confrontation, the use of offensive cyber capabilities and applying of exhaustion strategy. The second refers to internal condition – this is a lack of trust between states which deepens the security dilemma in cyberspace. While evaluating the potential of cyber disarmament regime, worth mentioning that conditions which lead to "negative cooperation" create the ground for the disarmament regime in cyberspace.

The Thesis explores the motives and conditions under which the US, China, and Russia are likely to cooperate on arms control in cyberspace in order to improve both their national and international security. It is stated that hostile states will be in favor of negotiating a limitation of cyber capabilities to reduce escalation and avoid the damage caused by a potential conflict. The analysis is based on defensive realism theory, which explains the conditions leading to "negative cooperation" among potential adversaries. Three variables are identified which help to analyze the potential of cooperation in cyberspace: a) motives; b) the distinction between defensive and offensive cyber capabilities; c) information. The research shows that the risk of a cyberspace conflict escalating between the US, China and Russia encouraged them to seek cooperation. However, only few cooperation precedents could be described as successful. The same principles and conditions are valid for both cyber and military disarmament regimes. Two types of conditions necessary for effective cyber disarmament are identified. The first refers to external conditions such as the increased confrontation, the use of offensive cyber capabilities and applying of exhaustion strategy. The second refers to internal condition – this is a lack of trust between states which deepens the security dilemma in cyberspace. While evaluating the potential of cyber disarmament regime, worth mentioning that conditions which lead to "negative cooperation" create the ground for the disarmament regime in cyberspace.

Offensive cyber capabilities (OCCs) are the combination of people, technologies, and organizational attributes that jointly enable offensive cyber operations: the adversarial manipulation of digital services or networks. Most works on OCCs focus on their (de-)escalatory potential in terms of diplomatic tension, instability, or power. This article argues for a re-orientation toward the normatively prior question of their relative violence. It asks: how are OCCs integrated into violent state capacities and what are the consequences? The article proposes three logics of integration by which OCCs are included in violent state actions, in both repressive and interstate situations. These logics—substitution, support, and complement—weigh the benefits of using OCCs against an adversary instead of, as part of, and in addition to other means of violence, respectively. The article argues that the violence of OCCs depends on two things: first, whether one adopts a narrowly physical or a more expansive definition of violence and, second, which logic of integration governs their use. On a narrow definition of violence, substitutive and supportive uses of OCCs are less likely to be violent than conventional alternatives, and complementary uses of OCCs are not violent at all. On a wider definition, both substitutive and supportive uses of OCCs can lead to more violence than conventional alternatives, while complementary uses of OCCs are highly likely to increase violence overall. Acknowledging the different logics of integration for OCCs, and understanding their violent effects, has important analytical and policy benefits for global security studies.

Abstract
Offensive cyber capabilities (OCCs) are the combination of people, technologies, and organizational attributes that jointly enable offensive cyber operations: the adversarial manipulation of digital services or networks. Most works on OCCs focus on their (de-)escalatory potential in terms of diplomatic tension, instability, or power. This article argues for a re-orientation toward the normatively prior question of their relative violence. It asks: how are OCCs integrated into violent state capacities and what are the consequences? The article proposes three logics of integration by which OCCs are included in violent state actions, in both repressive and interstate situations. These logics—substitution, support, and complement—weigh the benefits of using OCCs against an adversary instead of, as part of, and in addition to other means of violence, respectively. The article argues that the violence of OCCs depends on two things: first, whether one adopts a narrowly physical or a more expansive definition of violence and, second, which logic of integration governs their use. On a narrow definition of violence, substitutive and supportive uses of OCCs are less likely to be violent than conventional alternatives, and complementary uses of OCCs are not violent at all. On a wider definition, both substitutive and supportive uses of OCCs can lead to more violence than conventional alternatives, while complementary uses of OCCs are highly likely to increase violence overall. Acknowledging the different logics of integration for OCCs, and understanding their violent effects, has important analytical and policy benefits for global security studies.