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Abstract: At the end of the Cold War, semipresidentialism became the modal constitution of the postcommunist world. In Russia and other post-Soviet states, however, this system of government has impeded consolidation. Semipresidentialism combines a popularly elected head of state with a prime minister responsible to the legislature; though this framework seemed to promise the best of all constitutional worlds, when put into practice in many countries during their transitions, the framework began to pose serious design dilemmas and facilitate democratic backsliding rather than consolidation.

The year 1997 was critical for Thailand. A severe economic crisis hit in July calling into question years of economic growth and increasing prosperity. A few months later Thailand adopted a new Constitution that aimed at reforming the political system, and at making corruption and vote buying less prevalent. While this article shows that the economic turmoil was a prime catalyst for political change, it was not as simple as saying that public outcry over the economic crisis forced conservative parliamentarians into voting to accept the proposed constitution. While public outcry did matter, what is vitally important is that elite political leaders, the heads of the major parties, ministers, and generals, were renegotiating their alliances and ties both with one another, and with various groups in society that were pushing for change. Elite resignation to political pressure and policy shifts among the top leaders is what ultimately allows for the passage of the constitution and for Prime Minister Chavalit's departure. This article takes a closer look at Thai politics and tries to answer the following questions: Did the economic crisis lead to (meaningful) political reform and why or why not? Since the codification of the 1997 constitution has Thai politics become more democratic? It is my analysis that the consolidation of democracy was in reach in 1997 but today has slipped further from Thai citizens' grasp. The explanations, or the independent variables for both the successful reforms of the political system in 1997 and the backsliding away from democratization, are largely the same. When both internal and external pressures prod democracy along, reforms take place. When pressures are pushing in different directions democratic reforms become threatened. Internal pressures include the military, civil society, and the behavior and power of political and economic elites; and external ones are the IMF, national security concerns, and globalization in general. When conditions or variables change, and when elite priorities or preferences shift, as this article will show, we can see the results in Thai politics.

It is commonly assumed that socio-economic conditions strongly influence political attitudes. Since democratic rule is based on the consent of the ruled, a secure and stable democracy cannot be established and maintained without broad-based popular endorsement, which is especially important for nascent post-communist democracies. Painful economic difficulties may engender deep anti-system sentiments at the mass level, encouraging anti-regime activism at the elite level. From this perspective, democratic legitimacy is a function of regime performance. But the Bulgarian evidence fails to validate the hypothesis that system legitimacy depends on regime effectiveness or that socio-economic conditions determine mass-level political attitudes. In spite of the economic fiasco, Bulgaria's democratic regime remains capable of commanding popular support. While the economic performance deficit of catastrophic proportions has become a source of widespread popular dissatisfaction threatening regime stability, it has not led to democratic backsliding or collapse.

Will autocracies dependent on the export of oil become democratic? To some, the answer seems evident. "The trend is clear," President Bush said in March 2005. "In the Middle East and throughout the world, freedom is on the march." Unfortunately, at least in the near term, the opposite is true. Not only is the worldwide spread of democracy stagnating in general, but a number of countries that had once demonstrated some progress are seriously backsliding. By my calculations, about a third of these backsliders are oil-exporters, perhaps most notably Russia. And not a single oil-exporter currently classified by Freedom House as "not free" or "partly free" shows signs of changing its status to democracy. This does not mean that oil-exporting countries cannot become democratic (witness, for example, Norway or Trinidad-Tobago), but it does indicate that oil dependence may pose special problems for democratization.

Abstract: An uneasy relationship between military and civilian power hangs like a cloud over the future of democratic reform in Pakistan. Praetorianism has been a deeply-ingrained feature in Pakistani politics since the country's birth, making depoliticization of the military a nettlesome task for any civilian government, particularly given that the military's "prerogatives" comprise the defense sector, internal security, legal system, and even foreign relations and nuclear weapons. With the ever-present threat of terrorism and the public insecurity and unrest terrorist acts provoke, authoritarian backsliding remains a sobering possibility.

Recent backsliding in such countries as Bolivia, Venezuela, Georgia and Russia has raised concerns about the viability of democracy in the developing world. Understanding why fledgling democracies sometimes fail is essential for determining what the international community might do to help such states stay on track toward political stability. In particular, public officials in both the industrial and developing worlds should adopt the policy mix (including foreign-aid policies) best suited to democratic consolidation, with a focus on ensuring that government leaders, who might otherwise abuse their power, are constrained by effective checks and balances. (Survival / SWP)

The populist backlash in Central and Eastern Europe reveals the absence in the new democracies of checks and balances and of truly independent media to serve as a counterweight to creeping authoritarianism. It also shows the return of dormant strands in the region's political culture and thus its potential vulnerability to the authoritarian temptation. These developments are contributing to widespread estrangement from the postenlargement EU in the older member states. If current trends continue, with new members backsliding on democratic practice while pursuing a strident defense of "national interests," we could see internal EU ties loosen to the point where the Union becomes little more than an enhanced free-trade zone.

The populist backlash in Central and Eastern Europe reveals the absence in the new democracies of checks and balances and of truly independent media to serve as a counterweight to creeping authoritarianism. It also shows the return of dormant strands in the region's political culture and thus its potential vulnerability to the authoritarian temptation. These developments are contributing to widespread estrangement from the postenlargement EU in the older member states. If current trends continue, with new members backsliding on democratic practice while pursuing a strident defense of "national interests," we could see internal EU ties loosen to the point where the Union becomes little more than an enhanced free-trade zone.