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Call for Papers for a Conference in Lisbon, Portugal, on September 11–13, 2024. Deadline: April 10, 2024

Guest post by Brandon Bolte On April 15, the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF) surprised many Western observers…

[…] and Managing Editor of Europp, Chris Gilson also explain why they believe that blogging is one of the most important things that […]

Comedian Shane Mauss on the democratization of mushrooms, LSD, cannabis, DMT, and ketamine

For decades, the EU has declared that it aims to support democratization in its southern neighborhood. Yet, the EU's cooperation with repressive rulers in other policy fields, such as energy, migration, security, and trade, contradicts the EU's own democracy support objectives. European policymakers have apparently not learnt from the pre-2011 period. As we argue in our project SHAPEDEM-EU, the EU must embark on a journey of un-, de- and re-learning, and it must avoid contradicting practices in different policy fields. This can be done by introducing a democracy learning loop.
Author information





Michelle Pace



Michelle Pace ist Professorin für Global Studies an der Roskilde Universität in Dänemark. Ihre Forschung fokussiert sich auf die Schnittstellen von European Studies, Middle East Studies, Critical Migration Studies, Democratization Studies and Conflict Studies. Sie ist die führende dänische Partnerin des Horizon Europe Projekts SHAPEDEM-EU. // Michelle Pace is Professor in Global Studies at Roskilde University, Denmark. Her research focuses on the intersection between European Studies, Middle East Studies, Critical Migration Studies, Democratization Studies and Conflict Studies. She is the Danish Lead partner of the Horizon Europe project SHAPEDEM-EU.

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Der Beitrag EU Democracy Support in the Southern Neighborhood: How the EU Contradicts its own Practices erschien zuerst auf PRIF BLOG.

Tbilisi is hoping to progress toward European integration while resisting genuine reform. In deliberating Georgia's possible EU membership, Brussels faces an uncomfortable choice between geopolitical calculus and adherence to its own democratization criteria.

The democratization of drone technology means that adversaries are now able to conduct attacks with near impunity. The Houthis' recent drone attacks in the Red Sea show that America's current approach to countering them is not working. A holistic, offensive strategy is needed.

The negative effects of the 1993 conflict prevailed over the benefits from the end of a confrontation. Its outcomes raised a major barrier to the democratization of Russia and paved the way for the use of violence as a means of preserving power. This conflict contributed to the maximization of presidential power and to the weakening of checks and balances in the constitution, which included significant authoritarian potential. The political order established in Russia after the 1993 conflict largely determined the subsequent trajectory of Russian political evolution and its drift towards a personalist authoritarian regime.

Although the US has often prided itself of the status of sole interlocutor in the Middle East "conflict", it has equally gained the reputation of an interested and biased mediator. In parallel, the European Community or EC – now European Union, EU – claimed to have a 'more balanced' approach on the Middle East file, which in turn garnered Palestinians' trust. But during the current escalation, the EU has been woefully disunited. This blog argues that a more unified European voice can only come about by "walking the talk" of an Israel-Palestine policy/peace agreement based on purported basic European values.
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Anna Khakee



Anna Khakee ist Associate Professor für internationale Beziehungen an der Universität von Malta und Direktorin des EMA (European MA in Human Rights and Democratisation). Zu den Forschungsinteressen von Prof. Khakee gehören Demokratisierung/Demokratieförderung und humanitäre Maßnahmen. // Anna Khakee is Associate Professor in International Relations at the University of Malta and EMA (European MA in Human Rights and Democratisation) Director. Prof. Khakee's research interests include democratization/democracy promotion and humanitarian action.

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Der Beitrag The EU and the Israel-Palestine Test erschien zuerst auf PRIF BLOG.

Much has already been written about the emergence of "fast fashion": clothing retailers that are able to translate trends seen on the world's fashion runways... to a store near you in a matter of weeks. The success stories of Sweden's H&M and Spain's Mango have become the stuff of business legend in upending the fashion industry in recent decades. It was probably only a matter of time that onetime suppliers in China would become the firms at the cutting edge of evolving to customer's whims and desires that move so quickly. Younger women should be familiar with China-based online retailer Shein. Reflecting the democratization of fashion brought by the online world, it's not the big fashion houses that set today's trends but rather posts on the likes of Instagram and Pinterest. In keeping with the times, Shein is almost entirely an Internet selling pure play instead of having bricks-and-mortar stores still like H&M or Zara. Rest of the World writes more about this emerging business success story:Shein eventually expanded to offer apparel for women, men, and
children, as well as everything from home goods to pet supplies, but its
core business remains selling clothes targeted at women in their teens
and 20s — a generation who grew up exploring their personal style on
platforms like Instagram and Pinterest. 



Its clothes aren't intended for Chinese customers, but are destined
for export. In May, the company became the most popular shopping app in
the U.S. on both Android and iOS, and, the same month, topped the iOS rankings in over 50 other countries. It's the second most popular fashion website worldwide.By 2020, Shein's sales had risen to $10 billion, a 250% jump from the year before, according to Bloomberg. In June, the company accounted for 28% of all fast fashion sales in the U.S. — almost as much as both H&M and Zara combined. The same month, a report circulated that Shein was worth over $47 billion, making it one of the tech industry's most valuable private startups.Think of Shein more as an Amazon-a-like instead of comparing it to the established fast fashion names in terms of its business model: At the heart of these issues is Shein's aggressive business model.
Comparisons to fast-fashion giants like H&M miss the point: it's
more like Amazon, operating a sprawling online marketplace that brings
together around 6,000 Chinese clothing factories. It
unites them with proprietary internal management software that collects
near-instant feedback about which items are hits or misses, allowing
Shein to order new inventory virtually on demand. Designs are
commissioned through the software; some original, others picked from the
factories' existing products. A polished advertising operation is
layered over the top, run from Shein's head offices in Guangzhou.Ethical concerns with work conditions in Chinese garment factories aside, Shein's advantage is being able to call on PRC suppliers to shift even more quickly than European fast fashion firms:For years, European brands like Zara and H&M have embodied fast
fashion, shortening the route from runway to storefront from months to
weeks. But Shein isn't chasing runway trends — rather, it often knocks
off items seen on TikTok and Instagram, where hype cycles move
significantly faster. Whereas Zara typically asks manufacturers to turn
around minimum orders of 2,000 items in 30 days, Shein asks for as few
as 100 products in as little as 10 days. "They want factories to be much
more nimble," said Lu.If speed is Shein's competitive advantage, it must adapt to even quicker cycles going forward. Or, will someone even speedier supplant Shein just as it has H&M and Zara (which outran department stores before them)? Something else I thought the article could have shed more light on is how Shein is working around supply chain snags like the US-China trade war, intermittent COVID-19 lockdowns in the PRC, and rising shipping costs.

 

Hundreds
of millions of Indian citizens have begun to vote and they will keep doing it
for six weeks. Indian democratic elections are the most massive human
mobilizations in the world —more than any other election, war, pilgrimage,
migration movement, or world fair. There are more than one million polling
stations and even a team of elephants to carry voting machines to the Himalaya.
Unlike in many other democracies, electoral turnout in India is higher among
the poor than among the rich, among the less educated than among the graduates,
in the villages than in the cities. Since the last elections, five years ago,
women vote (a little) more than men.

The
success of democracy in India has dismissed the pessimistic auguries after the
independence and the first election in 1952. But India is not an isolated case.
Let's see the numbers. A little more than half of the world's population lives
in democracy. Let's consider that "rich" countries are those above the world
average per capita income (in purchasing power, around $ 18,000 per year), and
"poor" are those below that threshold. About half of the world population
living in democracy lives in relatively poor countries (including India, but
also Indonesia, South Africa, and others), while about half of the population
living in dictatorships lives in relatively rich countries (including China,
but also S. Arabia, Russia, and others).

Some
traditional sociologists have been puzzled by the India case because it does
not fit the classical doctrine that economic development must precede democracy:
from Seymour Lipset to Adam Przeworski, who has "repeatedly predict India as a
dictatorship" before 2030. Yet, India is not an exception or an anomaly. The
earliest modern democracies, such as Norway, Switzerland, the United Kingdom,
or the United States, had also enforced broad male suffrage for competitive
elections in the nineteenth century when they were fairly poor, as poor as
India was in the mid-twentieth century or as is now.

For
about forty years after independence, when the government was dominated by the
Indian National Congress party, initially led by Jawaharlal Nehru, the
centralized and closed Indian economy grew at an often-mocked annual rate of
1%. But since the early 1990s, when it has liberalized and opened to new
technologies and globalization, India has enjoyed significant benefits from
open trade and capital inflows. Against all expectations, the Indian per capita
income at purchasing power has multiplied by five in thirty years. Precisely
because India was late in adopting more sophisticated institutions and
policies, it has been able to adapt more readily to the global economy. In
contrast to developed countries with old technologies and onerous preexisting
social arrangements, India has not had to dismantle former industrial and
bureaucratic structures that might have obstructed innovation.

Consequently,
the Indian citizens declare to prefer democracy to an authoritarian regime in a
proportion of four to one. In the most recent international poll by the Pew
Research Center, 72% of Indian citizens declare to be satisfied with the way
democracy works in their country --only after Sweden and in contrast with, for
example, 33% in the United States. (Pew Research Center's Global Attitudes
& Trends, 2024).

The Congress
Party, always led by Nehru's descendants Gandhi family, and the current incumbent
People's Party (BJP) led by Prime Minister Narendra Modi, have alternated in
government seven times. The electoral system is a copy of the colonial British
tradition of single-member districts by simple plurality rule, which permits a
party with less than 40% of votes to get an absolute majority of seats in the lower
chamber of parliament. Yet, while numerous minor parties run independently, the
two larger parties run in very broad electoral coalitions: in the current
election, the incumbent BJP has formed a National Democratic Alliance with 12 mostly
state-based or ethnic parties, while the opposition Congress is running in an
India National Development Inclusive Alliance (to fit the acronym INDIA) with
23 parties, including several on the far left. Their participation in federal
politics also works as a factor of Indian union.

After
the end of the Cold War, the old Indian foreign policy of "non-alignment" was
initially replaced with one of "strategic autonomy." India remains outside the
United Nations Security Council, despite having become a nuclear power, and
outside the Group of Seven despite being the fourth democratic economy in size.
Nevertheless, India has become more dynamic in supporting the democratization
of its neighboring countries in South Asia, which is still a poorly integrated
region. It is also the oldest and most stable democracy of the so-called BRICS
group, now enlarged to nine members, and it has recently increased its
relations and deals with the United States and the European Union in a world of
fluctuating international coalitions. From a global and historical perspective,
democracy in India is already one of the most remarkable contemporary achievements
of humankind.

 Also in Spanish and Catalan in La Vanguardia:https://www.lavanguardia.com/opinion/20240429/9605408/mayor-fiesta-democratica-mundo.html

    It may look as if Greece has beaten the record of political instability by calling a snap election only five weeks after the previous one. But the recent developments are, on the contrary, rather an instance of economic and political recovery and restored stability within the European Union. Greece was the
most damaged European country by the Great Recession generated nearly fifteen
years ago. Unemployment skyrocketed, per capita GDP decreased to 55% of the
previous level, emigration of young and qualified workers was massive.

In 2015, a
Memorandum of Understanding put under the control of the EU, the ECB, and the
IMF virtually all Greek policies on taxes, pensions, health care, control of
the banks, labor market, competition, energy, administration, justice against
corruption, and several others to be implemented "over many years". Greece
eluded a declaration of bankruptcy by accepting the EU's bailout and the reduction
of its autonomy to the election of the domestic rulers that would implement the
decisions of the European Empire.

Now, Greece has
repaid part of its debt ahead of schedule, it is being upgraded to welcome
foreign investments, and grows at an almost double rate than the European average.

There are some
similarities between Greece and Spain, including a long delay to recover the
levels of per capita GDP previous to the Recession and the low rates of
employed people out of the total population. But there are also significant
differences regarding the ways they democratized in the 1970s, in particular regarding
the party system and the types of leadership for the resolution of crises. I
warn the reader that, in the following, I am using "center" and "extreme" as geometric
relative positions along a political space, not as ideological references.

In Greece, the
military was removed from the government and democracy was restored under the
leadership of the center-right led by Konstantinos Karamanlis, a former prime
minister before the dictatorship who returned from exile and later on was also president
of the Republic. Since then, his party, New Democracy, now led by Kyriakos
Mitsotakis, has been in government more than half of the time, was back four
years ago, and has been reelected now.

In time, the
extreme left, organized as Syriza, appeared as an alternative to face the
crisis. Its government, led by Alexis Tsipras, called a referendum for "no" to
the EU bailout, which might have triggered Grexit, but then it canceled its
result.

On the other
extreme of the Mediterranean, in Portugal, the other country democratized in
the 1970s, the process was kind of symmetric. The initiative was pushed by
extreme left military officers of the Armed Forces Movement, which provided
several prime ministers and presidents, with the help of the Communist Party. This
left room for the main alternative to be located on the center-right, around a
member of the European People's Party that is as moderate as it calls itself
Social-Democrat.

The case of
Spain was different from both Greece and Portugal. The main actors in the first
stages of democratization were neither the center-right nor the extreme left. It
was the ex-Francoist right, which ended up as the People's Party, eventually alternating
in government with the center-left Socialist Party. In contrast with the other
two countries, the center-right failed once and again: Christian-democracy, Liberal
Union, Union of Democratic Center, Democratic and Social Center, Reformist
Party, Citizens. Currently, the Spanish People's Party is the most rightist
member of the European People's Party, according to eupoliticalbarometer.com,
to which the even more extreme Vox is annexed.

Certainly,
Greece is relatively less difficult to be governed than Spain because it is a
smaller country (one-fourth in population and one-sixth in GDP). It does not
have a vacate meseta or centrifugal peripheries. It suffered a much briefer
dictatorship, for only seven years. More than 50%of its citizens can speak
English, more than double the proportion of the paltry 22% in Spain, the lowest
in Europe.

Of course, all Greek
prime ministers have been English speakers, able to actively participate,
negotiate, and have some say at the European Council, as well as at the summits
of NATO and other organizations of paramount importance for the country's
governance (as have been all Portuguese prime ministers too). In contrast, only
two of the seven Spanish heads of government have been able to sustain a
conversation in English: the current one, Pedro Sanchez, and the brief Leopoldo
Calvo Sotelo. (I do not include Aznar because I have seen him in a one-hour
meeting in English).

In short: Greece's
economy was crushed by the Troika because it was a small and relatively poor
country. But its politics has achieved a more stable situation that is helping
its economic recovery.

Spain, in
contrast, is dickering. Europe cannot afford Spain's economic collapse because it
is too big to fail, and the subsequent restrictive effects on trade, foreign
investments, and emigration to other countries would be too disruptive. So, Spain,
which has about 10% of the EU's population, is allocated more than 20% of the EU's
Recovery Instrument (Next Generation EU). This is not a badge of pride, but
rather the opposite.

A consequence of
this overprotection is that, unlike in Greece, the Spanish politicians can
continue arguing more about where and to whom the funds are distributed than
about what they should be invested in, fighting among themselves, getting by,
and muddling through.

The Biden administration has reimposed economic sanctions on Venezuela's oil industry in response to President Nicolás Maduro's attempts to hold onto power by blocking candidates who want to run against him in the July elections.Maduro's government is clearly violating the conditions of the 2023 Barbados Agreement that it made with the Venezuelan opposition alliance Plataforma Unitaria Democrática in October and that stipulates that the government create conditions for free and fair elections. The U.S. conditioned its easing of oil sanctions on the Maduro government's compliance with this agreement. Experts say reimposing sanctions, however, is the wrong move. U.S. sanctions have already helped to cripple the ailing Venezuelan economy and exacerbated the country's humanitarian crisis. General License 44, which lifted the sanctions, has not been in place long enough to alleviate the strain on the economy or deter Maduro's regime, Michael Galant of the Center for Economic and Policy Research told RS. Analysts argue that the Biden administration should instead undertake a multilateral effort to facilitate negotiations among Venezuelan political leaders so that Venezuelans can take further steps towards democratization as they head into a pivotal election year. Re-imposing sanctions will just be a step backward.The sword hanging over Venezuela's headThe U.S. has imposed targeted sanctions on Venezuela since 2005. But the Trump administration expanded them beginning in 2017 as part of a "maximum pressure" campaign against the Maduro government for alleged corruption and human rights abuses.
Trump's sanctions prohibited oil sales between the U.S. and Venezuelan oil companies. Given Venezuela's dependence on producing and exporting oil, the sanctions drove Venezuela's economy toward collapse, Galant said.
"There were already significant economic challenges, but there are very clear inflection points in Venezuela's oil output at the moment that additional sanctions are imposed," he said.
The impact on Venezuelan society and economy has been disastrous. Shortages of basic goods and a climbing cost of living have plunged much of the population into poverty and drove more than seven million citizens to emigrate, most of them to neighboring countries and the United States.
The Biden administration eased these sanctions after the so-called Barbados Agreement between the government and the opposition coalition was signed. But while reimposing sanctions could have drastic consequences on Venezuela's economy and people, Galant adds that the waiver's impact should not be overstated, as the relief it has provided has always been limited. Years of sanctions have deterred foreign investment in Venezuela and hampered the country's capacity to produce oil.
"There's always been this sword hanging over [Venezuela's] head, the fact that sanctions could be reimposed at any time," he said.
Certain kinds of sanctions can be effective in holding specific individuals, including government officials, accountable for corrupt practices and human rights abuses, said Carolina Jiménez Sandoval, president of the Washington Office on Latin America (WOLA). But these differ from sanctions on the entire oil sector, sanctions that affect Venezuelan society as a whole, but have failed to deter Maduro's regime from committing human rights abuses and engaging in corruption.
Reimposing all sanctions means returning to a status quo that doesn't work, Jiménez Sandoval said. "That means you need to craft something different."
An electoral year in Venezuela provides a window of opportunity for the U.S. to proceed with a new strategy, she said, adding that it should be one that does not return to economic coercion in hopes that Maduro will change and that instead focuses on facilitating opportunities for Venezuelans to exercise their vote freely and fairly in July. A window of opportunityA primary election last October suggests Venezuelans are ready for major change, with an overwhelming majority of the more than two million participants voting for the opposition leader María Carina Machado. But a new opposition candidate will need to take Machado's place after Venezuela's highest court upheld a decision to bar her from running in the July general elections, alleging she committed fraud and supported U.S. sanctions.
The question now is whether the opposition can unite behind a single candidate, said Miguel Tinker Salas, a professor at Pomona College and non-resident fellow at the Quincy Institute. The opposition has been divided for years, making it difficult for the population to rally around a single challenger to Maduro.
Given Washington's close ties to the opposition, the Biden administration may be able to play a role in facilitating negotiations among the various factions to settle on one candidate who can rally the support of all, according to Jiménez Sandoval. "Because [the U.S.] has been their ally, it also has leverage over them," she said.Selecting candidates thus far has largely been confined to the political elite in Venezuela, says David Smilde, a senior fellow at WOLA who teaches at Tulane University. He takes a similar view that the U.S. can take advantage of its influence with the opposition. But he also advocates incorporating civil society into those negotiation processes to move Venezuela in the direction of a more democratic society.
These efforts have also involved Venezuela's neighbors. Colombian President Gustavo Petro, whose country has been most affected by the outflow of migrants from Venezuela, met with Maduro before sitting down opposition candidate Manuel Rosales in Caracas just last week, the same day that the U.S. officials sat down with members of Maduro's administration in Mexico to discuss possible democratic reforms.
Reports indicate that Rosales has been "approved" by Maduro to run against him and that the meeting with Petro had Maduro's blessing too. However, Tinker Salas says the culmination of diplomatic pressure from other Latin American countries carries significant weight nonetheless.
"It has become clear that the entire region has high stakes when it comes to bringing democracy back to Venezuela," Jiménez Sandoval said, noting concerns that the U.S. and other leaders in the region have over increased migration of Venezuelans and more recently, whether Venezuela will escalate its claims to the disputed oil-rich Essequibo region in Guyana by engaging in armed conflict.
Tinker Salas adds, however, that the issue of Essequibo has long been raised by Venezuelan politicians hoping to harness nationalist sentiment to garner more political support. Maduro's recent moves on the issue, experts say, is mostly likely politically motivated, as opposed to being a real threat of invasion.
The effects of the political crisis in Venezuela are not confined to within its borders, and how political actors in and outside of Venezuela and Venezuelan civil society will come together by July election remains to be seen. But Galant insists that Washington's path forward should be one that focuses on facilitating diplomacy rather than proceeding with more sanctions, highlighting the importance of the humanitarian emergency above all.
"That outweighs the other questions. That needs to be what is held at the core of any discussion of broad economic sanctions, is understanding that this is harming millions of people," he said.

Since the end of the Cold War, the U.S. has meted out economic punishment both as a means of coercion and a moral warfare tool, rendering it a de facto accompaniment in the naming and shaming of various foes of the United States. The largest sanctions of all have been imposed on Russia in response to the invasion of Ukraine. Unfortunately, this case has also become the greatest example of the failure of sanctions to achieve their desired results. Together with the failure of the Ukrainian counter-offensive, this has contributed to the growing belief that this war may end in stalemate, or even Russian victory.By 2021, the U.S. had already imposed over 8,000 sanctions on individuals and companies globally, targeting regional sectors in a range of countries. In the last two years, this number has seen an astronomical increase. According to a Columbia University database, the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) holds comprehensive sanctions on six countries and three regions. Targeted export sanctions extend to 19 countries including Belarus, Afghanistan, Libya, Sudan, and Zimbabwe, prohibiting under U.S. law any financial and commercial relations with designated companies or individuals. On multitudinous occasions, these U.S.-led sanction regimes have been found to inflict asymmetrical burdens on impoverished foreign citizens, hinder democratization, and in the most serious cases exacerbate humanitarian crises in violation of international law.In the days following Russia's invasion of Ukraine in late February 2022, President Biden introduced a series of allies-coordinated sanction packages targeting Russia's weapons industry, technology exports, foreign assets, banks, energy companies, and wealthy businessmen. Western states then went on to completely isolate Russia from the global financial market. In these measures lay a hope that such a severe sanctions regime would not only impede Russia's warmaking capabilities but cripple support from political elites so drastically that Putin's technocratic regime would collapse. Nearly two years into the war, Biden's introduction of new sanction packages every other month since February 2022 has not toppled the Russian regime or led it to agree to Western demands for a withdrawal from Ukraine. Russia's increased allocation of national GDP to defense, which is predicted to reach an all time high of 6%, stands as proof of this unpleasant truth. James Galbraith of the Institute for New Economic Thinking remarks that most Western studies on the Russian economy today begin with the question of how badly it is doing. This framework — focused on finding pain in the Russian economy and highly reliant on confirmation bias — forgoes the intellectual distance necessary to accurately pinpoint the roots of sanctions failure.There is no doubt that Russia's economy is feeling the impact of sanctions and faces a rather bleak future. Its aviation and car manufacturing sectors were particularly affected with a decline of 80% due to inaccessible components. The collapse of Western direct investment, combined with capital flight and severe brain drain, foreshadows decades of economic struggle for Russia's future generations.Still, this is nowhere near the outcome promised by U.S. officials. Claims that the Russian economy is about to collapse seem to stem from a need to reassure voters who are suffering from collateral sanctions damage, be it rising energy prices or deteriorating living standards.The most widely discussed reasons for the failure of Russia sanctions focus on issues in their enforcement: Their bypassing by southern states in complex supply chains, the loopholes of dual-use goods exports, and companies' reluctance to completely halt business with the Russian market. It is also clear that Western planners greatly underestimated the worldwide willingness (including by Western partners like India) to reject sanctions and continue buying Russian energy. Most recently, a POGO report found that even the U.S. Department of Defense has remained a loyal client of Russian oil.However, one can also credit Russian economic planning for cushioning the blow of sanctions. At the very outset of the war, the government and the Central Bank promptly reacted with a combination of restrictions on the free flow of capital and a 20% increase in interest rates. In only two months after the invasion, banks saw 90% of initially withdrawn funds returned to Russian accounts. After 20 months, a war economy has replaced Russia's pre-war export diversification and technological innovation priorities. Moscow's GDP shows a resilient growth of 2.2% this year, with the IMF only recently altering its prediction for the year 2024 from 2.8% to 1.1%. Despite severe capital flight, Russia's current account surplus grew to $16.6 billion in the third quarter of this year, reflective of a large increase in foreign trade despite Western sanctions regimes. There are, however, questions about the reliability of official figures, especially given that Russian trade statistics were made private for over a year, resuming only in March 2023. In line with Fortress Russia economics, the government recently imposed new measures compelling Russian exporters in energy, metals, and agriculture to convert their foreign currency earnings into rubles, and released new duties on non-oil exporters. Overall, anti-dollar strategies and currency swaps have pushed Russia closer to countries such as China, Iran, and Turkey, some of which share the aim of curbing American financial influence. This illustrates another danger in U.S. sanctions: Far from strengthening U.S. global power, they are in fact spurring other countries to reduce their economic dependence on the U.S.It appears therefore that the West may have to rethink its sanctions policy. As each side of the conflict begins to fathom the possibility of a non-military resolution, Western states must also face the difficult truth that sanctions (and Russia's frozen sovereign debt) could become be a necessary sacrifice in negotiations if Russia is to be brought to make peace. Indisputably, timing would be of key importance to what is perhaps still at present an unimaginable step for most U.S. officials. If proposed prematurely, an initiative to ease sanctions on Russia would also risk backfiring politically, which is why it should be broached in entirely confidential talks with Russia. Sanctions relief should come only as part of a settlement, and should be accompanied by firm and binding guarantees that the sanctions would be automatically reimposed in the event of fresh Russian aggression.The failure of sanctions against Russia echoes a long series of such failures, against Cuba (for sixty years), Iran, Iraq, North Korea, and elsewhere. While they may have some utility as bargaining leverage in negotiations, this only applies — as in the case of Russia — if the United States is prepared to lift them in return for agreement. What is more, sanction-setting betrays a pattern of stickiness: Once legislated by Congress, U.S. sanctions have historically tended to become permanent.It is high time that the United States recognized the clear lessons of modern history and modified its approach to the intermittently useful — albeit deeply flawed — strategy of economic coercion.

It's been a tumultuous two weeks in Venezuela. First, the Biden administration and the Maduro government signed a deal exchanging democratic guarantees for sanctions relief on oil, natural gas, and gold mining — some of Venezuela's largest industries. With the sanctions lifted, Maduro allowed the opposition's primary election to go ahead. María Corina Machado, a classical liberal who calls herself the "Iron Lady of Venezuela" and went through the same Yale program as Russian dissident Alexei Navalny, won the election with an astounding 93 percent of the vote. Venezuelans overwhelmingly showed up to vote, doubling the expected turnout of 1 million ballots. Maduro quickly declared the election illegitimate and labeled Machado a puppet of U.S. interests, going directly against the sanctions relief deal.The U.S. and Machado have expressed little intention beyond rhetoric to reinstate sanctions. After all, the U.S. is in desperate need of oil, and Venezuela has plenty to offer. Unless the U.S. can establish direct incentives for Maduro and his regime to make democratic reforms, a peaceful path to democratization is highly unlikely. If anything, Maduro has shown his willingness to keep sanctions on to push for specific geopolitical demands while maintaining his domestic anti-U.S. message. In 2021, Maduro suspended all negotiations with the U.S. over the imprisonment of Colombian financier Alex Saab. Despite that, the U.S. went ahead with some sanctions relief soon after. Maduro has created an alternative economy for Venezuela, where illicit markets make up for over one fifth of all of the country's GDP. With oil revenues currently standing at $9.3 billion annually, sanctions relief would only lead to "a moderate increase in Venezuelan oil production," according to Dr. Francisco Monaldi of the Baker Institute. Alternatively, the Maduro regime has increasingly looked to other economic opportunities to ensure its permanency. After being pushed out of the international financial system, Venezuela has grown its commercial, financial, diplomatic, political, and security relationship with other sanctioned regimes, including Iran, China, Russia, Nicaragua, and Cuba, which have themselves contested the results of the opposition election and reiterated support for Maduro. More states with a nominally anti-Western posture, such as Bolivia, South Africa, Turkey, and Ethiopia, are also providing some support given that some of their interests align with Maduro's. These relationships lead to a circle of mutual assistance wherein the leaders' political survival is ensured through a permanent flow of commerce and cash between these regimes.These states now have a vested interest in preventing an adversary to their interests from entering the Palacio de Miraflores, and Maduro knows it. Sanctions are much less harmful to the regime than they were years ago. Maduro's calculation is simple: Whether he decides to hold a fully democratic election against Machado, a sham election like in 2018, or to fully overtake the country through military force, Maduro will have sufficient support on his side. Credible polls show Maduro has the backingt of 58 percent of voting intentions (compared to Machado's 23 percent), with many in the resistance, particularly those with the financial capability to organize contestation efforts, having already left the country. Whether the U.S. foreign policy establishment likes it or not, Maduro, like his predecessor Hugo Chávez, will use any foreign pressure the U.S. decides to undertake to his political advantage. If sanctions are lifted, Maduro will keep attacking the opposition while boasting about his negotiating genius. If sanctions are put back on, Maduro will parade as a martyr again to his crowd of adoring supporters, meanwhile using the tried-and-tested alternative global order offered by sanctioned regimes to ensure the regime's security.Some left-wing governments in the region are also offering rhetorical and material support to Maduro, heightening the regional cost of regime change. With this deal and other domestic political wins — including slashing the poverty rate by a quarter in two years, regaining international recognition, and raising oil production — Maduro's support will likely consolidate. The regime also has the added benefit of violent support from the colectivos (pro-Maduro thugs who intimidate the opposition), the military and intelligence services, drug cartels, the state media apparatus, and a number of foreign governments. On the off-chance that Maduro ultimately loses the election, these interests might collectively ensure that a peaceful transition of power is impossible without significant military involvement from the West — cooperation that the West is likely unwilling or unable to offer. Maduro's rise to power demonstrates how difficult he will be to unseat. Illiberal and dictatorial regimes do not simply relinquish power under popular and external pressure, and Maduro has proven his ability to disregard opposition in favor of his interests. To foster democratic reforms, regime change must start from within the regime itself.In the non-Western world, some dictatorships have survived domestic and foreign coup attempts, debilitating sanctions, continuous opposition, and meager political support. If those conditions were sufficient for a transition to popular rule, democracy would have blossomed in countries with dictatorships facing heavy internal and external pressure, like Belarus, Myanmar, Bangladesh, and Egypt. In these cases, we can see how immense pressure, instead of spurring democratic reforms, can lead to further repression from the regime. Unfortunately, it may take a conflict for Maduro to leave power, and such a conflict would leave thousands or millions dead and displaced, with only a failed state in its wake. However, there is a better, less bloody option. Instead of imposing foreign military power over Maduro's regime, Western allies can privately encourage democratic ideals within the regime itself by creating incentives and providing the regime a nonviolent alternative.There is precedent for this. During the Cold War, authoritarian dictators ruled with support from either the West or the rest. Right-wing dictatorships in Latin America enjoyed the support of the U.S. In Brazil, Chile, and Paraguay, there were intense debates among the military government about how and when the military would cede power back to the people. Ultimately, due to the prevalent view that holding onto power too harshly and lengthily could result in a failed state, the countries all held elections on their own accord a few years later, with the military progressively regaining a relatively apolitical role in their countries.After long attempts at reform from various political and military groups outside the countries, the Central Intelligence Agency and its allies, which helped put many of these dictatorships in power in the first place, encouraged democratic reforms through private pressure and dialogue by ensuring the regime leaders would not face persecution.To prevent a return to dictatorship or conflict, Western powers or the new democratic regimes offered some protection to political and military leaders associated with dictatorship. Without some kind of civil or internationalized conflict, it is ultimately up to the regimes themselves to decide when democracy is restored, and they will only do so if they believe they will still hold some power and their interests protected. Unless his own security is guaranteed, Maduro will have no impulse to leave power. Reform won't happen until the regime, or Maduro himself, is willing to change. Dear RS readers: It has been an extraordinary year and our editing team has been working overtime to make sure that we are covering the current conflicts with quality, fresh analysis that doesn't cleave to the mainstream orthodoxy or take official Washington and the commentariat at face value. Our staff reporters, experts, and outside writers offer top-notch, independent work, daily. Please consider making a tax-exempt, year-end contribution to Responsible Statecraft so that we can continue this quality coverage — which you will find nowhere else — into 2024. Happy Holidays!