A JCAHA journal article on the historical background of Asian trading patterns in Southern Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe.) ; Between the rhetoric of the British South Africa Company's motto and the perceptive social comment of Kipling lies the dilemma of the minority trading group and its host community. In Africa the problem has been exacerbated by the fact that the rulers and the ruled have belonged to different races forming in effect separate societies. Until the 1960s the minority trading groups have had, in effect, to deal with two host communities, one of which controlled the legal and regulative process while the other constituted the internal market for goods and services. Nevertheless minority groups belonging neither to the dominant political group nor the subordinate majority group succeeded in dominating the distributive and retail trade in much of sub- Saharan Africa. For example, in 1965 85 per cent of general merchants in Liberia were Lebanese, while in the same year in Uganda 70 per cent were Asians. ^ The Tables in the Appendix to this article indicate that this pattern was not the case in Rhodesia, where even if the Jewish and Hellenic populations are excluded, the larger proportion of trade remained in the hands of the predominantly British settler elite. This difference arose from the historical influences which brought British control to Central Africa and established the differential pattern of white settlement.
The thirty-five handbook chapters confront four major themes in the politics of food: property, technology, justice and knowledge. Ronald Herring's editorial introduction asks how food is political, highlighting contention around the role of market, state and information in societal decisions. The first section of the handbook then examines technology, science and knowledge in food production. What is known - and disputed - about malnutrition, poverty and food security? The second section addresses ethics, rights and distributive justice: agrarian reform, gender inequality, entitlements and subsidies, and the social vision of the alternative food movement. The third section looks to intersections of agriculture and nature: wild foods, livestock, agro-ecological approaches to sustainability, and climate change and genetic engineering. The fourth section addresses food values and culture: political consumerism, labeling and certification, the science and cultural politics of food safety, values driving regulation of genetically modified foods and potential coexistence of GMOs, and organic and conventional crops. The fifth and final section looks at frontiers of global contentions: rival transnational advocacy networks, social movements for organic farming, the who and why of international land grabbing, junctures of cosmopolitan and local food narratives, the "supermarket revolution" and the international agrifood industry in low-income countries, and politics of knowledge in agricultural futures.--INSIDE FLAP
AbstractMethodological nationalism is the assumption that nation-states are the relevant units for analyzing social phenomena. Most of the social sciences recognized it as a source of bias, but not the ethics of immigration. Is this field biased by methodological nationalism—and if so, to what extent? This article takes nationalism as an implicit bias and provides a method to assess its depth. The method consists in comparing principles that ethicists commonly discuss when immigration is not at stake with principles advocated in the ethics of immigration. To interpret the results, a distinction between mild and heavy bias is established. When a basic principle in ethics is underdiscussed or absent from the ethics of immigration, the field is 'mildly biased'. When its negation is commonly advocated, the field is 'heavily biased'. Here, the method is illustrated with two principles: equal opportunity and reparation. They are common in theories of distributive justice and of corrective justice, respectively. But in the ethics of immigration, scholars often argue for the opposite. Instead of equal opportunity, they implicitly support discrimination based on national origin; instead of sanctions or amnesty for the offenders, scholars plead amnesty for those who they otherwise regard as victims. These preliminary results suggest that the field is heavily biased: methodological nationalism seems to turn ethics into its opposite.
This paper is an examination of the fact that persons in the oil rich region of Nigeria take unfair advantage of their default prior appropriation of land due to degenerative policy making systems inherent in our crude oil management. The study argue that as a result of these degenerative policy making principles Nigeria's revenue allocation remains unfair, because it breeds inequalities and injustices by default through these degenerative policy-making principles, and the co relational interplay between territoriality and appropriation of natural resources ought to be philosophically reviewed to ensure equity and justice in wealth distribution in a multinational polity such as Nigeria. Using the reconstructive method, the paper examines John Lock's principle of self-ownership, as been efficient but defective since it allows for an a priori procedural determination of distributive justice. And Rawlsian difference principle, this exposes its negative characterization of risk minimization. Using the same method it examines the policy making system of Nigeria. This showed strong indications towards degenerating the political economy of Nigeria to an exploitative proportion. The study concludes that the Dworkin's equality of resources theory will serve as the propensity of generating a platform of equality of opportunity for all and at the same time ensures a personal sense of responsibility serve as panacea to the Nigerian political economy.
AbstractCorporate social responsibility (CSR) has become a prominent subject due to its major implication for the practitioners in the corporate arena. Based on the theory of engagement, theory of social exchange, and theory of social identity, a conceptual framework was established in this study to evaluate the employee engagement (EE), and organizational commitment (OC) as a resultant of CSR initiatives. The study further examined the impact of distributive justice (DJ), procedural justice (PJ), and job satisfaction (JS) as mediating variables, and the influence of collectivism (COL) as a moderating variable between CSR initiatives and OC and EE. Data from 989 employees of the Pakistani pharmaceutical industry was collected and analyzed using the structural equation modeling and exploratory and confirmatory inferential models. Results demonstrate that CSR initiatives have a significant positive impact on OC and EE. Similarly, the mediation of JS, PJ, and DJ was established between the exogenous and the endogenous variables. Finally, the COL has a significant impact as a moderating variable between CSR initiatives, and OC and EE. The conclusions obtained in this study provide significantly practical and theoretical implications for managers of involved firms to improve employee behavior, mold employee attitude, and enhance organizational performance via CSR strategy, especially for firms located in countries along the route of belt and road initiative.
PurposeThe purpose of this paper is to focus on the specific relationship between temporary agency workers (TAWs) and their employing temporary work agencies in Germany that is characterized – in contrast to other European countries – by agencies' central role in employment and the prevalence of permanent contracts. The study addresses a research gap in understanding the mediating role of perceived organizational support (POS) provided by temporary work agencies in the relationship between employment-specific antecedents and TAWs' subjective well-being (SWB).Design/methodology/approachBased on a sample of 350 TAWs in Germany, the mediating role of POS provided by agencies is analyzed using structural equation modeling.FindingsThe authors show that procedural justice, performance feedback and social network availability positively relate to POS while perceived job insecurity shows the expected negative influence and distributive justice has no impact on POS. POS, in turn, positively relates to SWB. The partially mediating effect of POS between employment-specific antecedents and SWB is also confirmed.Research limitations/implicationsThe study is based on cross-sectional data and self-reported measures; this may limit causal inferences.Practical implicationsThe results highlight the importance of agencies creating POS and reducing perceived job insecurity for improving TAWs' SWB.Originality/valueThe study contributes to previous POS research by focusing on the agencies' role and by showing the mediating effect of POS on TAWs' SWB in Germany.
THE LITERATURE OF SOCIALISM RARELY DISCUSSES THE QUESTION OF THE PROPER DISTRIBUTION OF EARNED INCOME. 4 KINDS OF CRITERIA ARE USED IN ANSWERING THE QUESTION OF PROPERLY DISTRIBUTED INCOME: (1) NEED-- WHICH MAY LACK EGALITARIAN IMPLICATIONS BECAUSE IT IS AN ELASTIC CONCEPT, (2) UTILITY--TO INDUCE WORKERS TO MAKE AN EFFORT, THEY SHOULD BE GIVEN A MONETARY INCENTIVE, (3) PROCESS--ALL PARTIES REQUIRE EXCHANGE, & REGARD IT AS MUTUALLY BENEFICIAL, & (4) DESERT--THAT A CERTAIN ACTION DESERVES A CERTAIN SORT OF TREATMENT. DESERT AS A CRITERION HAS OFTEN BEEN ATTACKED, BUT IT IS WORTHWHILE TO CONSIDER 4 CRITERIA OF DESERT: ABILITY, EFFORT, CONTRIBUTION, & COMPENSATION. THE CONCEPT OF COMPENSATION IS DIFFERENT FROM CONCEPTS OF RENUMERATION. ONLY MONETARY COMPENSATION APPEARS SUBSTANTIAL ENOUGH TO OFFSET UNATTRACTIVE WORK. HOWEVER, MOST HIGHER-PAID JOBS ARE MORE ATTRACTIVE & PLEASANT THAN LOWER-PAID ONES; THESE NONEQUALIZING DIFFERENCES PRESENT NORMATIVE PROBLEMS. ECONOMIC RENT CAN BE DESCRIBED AS THAT WHICH IS NECESSARY TO INDUCE A WORKER TO TAKE A CERTAIN JOB. IF PAY LEVELS SHOULD BE COMPENSATORY, THEN THE PROBLEM OF DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE CONCERNING INCOME BECOMES A PROBLEM OF COMPENSATORY JUSTICE. THE GUIDING PRINCIPLE SHOULD BE THAT WORKERS ARE RECOMPENSED SO THAT WHEN THE NATURE OF THE WORK & THE AMOUNT OF PAY ARE CONSIDERED TOGETHER, ALL WORKERS ARE TREATED EQUALLY. R. LENT.
Cover -- Half Title -- Title Page -- Copyright Page -- Table of Contents -- Notes on Contributors -- Acknowledgements -- Introduction -- PART I ETHICAL TRADITIONS AND NORMATIVE PERSPECTIVES -- 1 The Origins of Realism Revisited -- 2 Liberalism -- 3 Cosmopolitanism Past and Present -- 4 Critical Theory, Marxism and International Ethics -- 5 Feminist Ethics in World Politics -- 6 Poststructuralism -- PART II THE ETHICS OF WAR AND PEACE -- 7 Just War Theory and the Ethics of War and Peace -- 8 Humanitarian Intervention -- 9 From State Security to Human Security? -- 10 Ethics and Weapons of Mass Destruction -- 11 Pacifism and International Relations -- PART III THE ETHICS AND POLITICS OF HUMAN RIGHTS -- 12 Human Rights Universalism -- 13 Genocide: Ethical and Normative Perspectives -- 14 Gender and Human Rights -- 15 Children's Human Rights and the Politics of Childhood -- 16 Human Rights and Democracy -- 17 Transitional Justice: From the Local to the International -- PART IV DIMENSIONS OF INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE -- 18 Poverty, Inequality and Global Distributive Justice -- 19 Political Exclusion of Refugees in the Ethics of International Relations -- 20 Human Rights, Human Needs, Human Development, Human Security -- 21 Environmental Justice: National and International Dimensions -- 22 Multinational Corporations and Global Responsibilities -- 23 Nationalism, Self-Determination and Secession -- PART V THE ETHICS OF A GLOBAL SOCIETY -- 24 The Ethics of Global Governance and Global Governance of Ethics -- 25 Understanding and Analysing Social Movements and Alternative Globalization -- 26 Dialogue and International Ethics: Religion, Cultural Diversity and Universalism -- 27 The Transformation of Political Community and Conceptions of Global Citizenship
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El concepto de justicia ambiental pone de relieve y demuestra la conexión entre, por una parte, el severo deterioro del entorno natural y, por otra parte, el reparto desigual de sus consecuencias negativas y de las políticas y leyes medioambientales diseñadas para afrontarlo. En las sociedades contemporáneas, los grupos sociales más desfavorecidos socialmente (por su condición socio-económica, origen étnico o cultural, u otras características), así como las regiones del mundo que han contado históricamente con menos oportunidades para el desarrollo, resultan así ser una vez más los 'perdedores', y queda ante todo en evidencia la carencia de principios democráticos e inclusivos en los procesos de toma de decisión tanto en el ámbito local como internacional. Palabras clave: Justicia ambiental, racismo medioambiental, movimiento de justicia ambiental, justicia distributiva, equidad medioambiental, sostenibilidad, desarrollo sostenible, sociedad del riesgo, ambientalismo global. Abstract: The concept of environmental justice emphasizes and demonstrates the connection between both the severe deterioration of the natural environment, and the unequal distribution of the negative consequences of environmental laws and policies designed to address it. In contemporary societies, the socially disadvantaged social groups (either by their socio-economic, cultural, or ethnic origin, or other characteristics) as well as the regions of the world that historically have had fewer development opportunities, are thus once again the 'losers'. All this makes clear the lack of democratic and inclusive principles in the decision-making processes both locally and internationally. Keywords: Environmental justice, environmental racism, environmental justice movement, distributive justice, environmental equity
With abundant resources and growing markets, the African continent is once again at the centre of a new 'great game of courtship' between the established and rising powers. However, compared with previous decades, African countries are no longer passive players in international relations. This article explores Africa's recent negotiating behaviour in relation to a selected set of actors that animate the current shifting global economic order: rising powers, established powers and international organizations. Despite potential sources of bargaining leverage, most African countries (with some notable exceptions) are still reactive to the bilateral overtures of Brazil, China and India and unable to set the terms of engagement. Nonetheless, the rise of these new powers provides alternative negotiating partners (and potentially more developmental outcomes) to the established powers. By comparison, at the multilateral level the African Group has been far more active and assertive in contesting global governance in the pursuit of greater distributive justice, particularly in the climate, trade and security regimes. This has taken place largely through the adroit use of distributive bargaining and tactics, supplemented by normative-based strategies highlighting Africa's underdevelopment. The central argument of the article is that African countries require judicious negotiating strategies, improved deliberative capacities and coalitions with local/continental/global civil society and business networks in order to ameliorate their weaker bargaining power and reshape the terms of their engagement with their international partners, particularly the rising powers. (International Affairs (Oxford) / SWP)
The main goal of this dissertation is to present an interpretation of what it should mean for a society to fulfil the ideals of freedom and equality. I argue that society should equalise levels of individual freedom. I defend this thesis in three stages, which are associated to the three parts of the dissertation. Part (A) is devoted to the elaboration of a new conception of freedom. The objective is to rehabilitate the intuitive idea that associates individual freedom with the ability to do or be what one wants. In chapter 1, I engage with the analytical literature on freedom and develop a conception of freedom according to which individuals are free overall to the extent that they have the specific freedoms they authentically prefer, where a specific freedom is defined by the probability that the agent will realise a phenomenon. The extent of one's freedom is thus made to depend on how reality relates to what one authentically wants it to be. In chapter 2, I offer a method for the measurement of freedom so conceived. According to this method, a person's level of overall freedom is obtained by multiplying the physical extent of her actual specific freedoms by the evaluative extent to which these actual specific freedoms correspond to her authentically preferred ones. In part (B), I defend the claim that a strictly and continuously equal distribution of this individual freedom is the best embodiment of moral equality. Firstly, in chapter 3, I argue that freedom is a better egalitarian currency than welfare, resources, capabilities and pluralist alternatives because freedom's anti-perfectionism, anti-fetishism and flexibility make it an optimal tool for the pursuit of any life plan. Freedom supports equally moral persons regardless of the ends they require, the means they need or the relative value they assign to these means. Secondly, in chapter 4, I defend strict and continuous equality as a distributive criterion over time. I show that efficiency-based and responsibility-based arguments in favour of inequalities are incompatible with the equal respect owed to moral persons. As long as individuals qualify as moral persons, they are owed equal respect and hence equal amounts of overall freedom. Thirdly, I address the famous claim according to which freedom and equality are conflicting ideals. I argue that this claim either stems from mistaking a conceptual distinction between a currency and a distributive criterion as a conflict of ideals, or expresses deeper disagreement over the meaning of freedom or the role of aggregative considerations in moral distributions. In any case, the claim is seriously weakened if not entirely destroyed. Parts (A) and (B) form the ideal theory of Equal Freedom. In part (C), which is constituted by chapter 5, I try to show how this ideal theory can guide us in nonideal circumstances. Firstly, I suggest a model to understand the relation between ideal and nonideal theory. I argue that nonideal theory is best understood as involving the maximisation of the realisation of the ideal under feasibility constraints and moral constraints imposed by the very nature of the ideal. Secondly, I apply this model to Equal Freedom. The main result is a radically egalitarian balance between concerns for feasibility, relative and absolute levels of overall freedom. Thirdly, I discuss in more detail policy strategies and proposals to equalise freedom in nonideal circumstances. As an example, I assess the desirability and feasibility of a 'right to be heard', which is an enforceable right given to employees that provides them with a capacity to alter their workplace environment in accordance with their life plans. This evaluation concludes my defence of Equal Freedom as the core of a theory of social justice. ; Le principal objectif de cette thèse est de présenter une interprétation de ce que devrait être une société qui réalise les idéaux de liberté et d'égalité. J'y défends l'idée selon laquelle une telle société devrait égaliser la liberté individuelle. Cette défense s'articule en trois moments, qui correspondent aux trois parties de la thèse. La partie (A) est consacrée à l'élaboration d'une nouvelle conception de la liberté. Il s'agit de réhabiliter l'intuition qui associe la liberté individuelle à la capacité de faire ou d'être ce que l'on veut. Dans le chapitre 1, je me sers de la littérature analytique portant sur la liberté pour développer une conception de la liberté selon laquelle les individus sont libres dans la mesure où ils possèdent les libertés spécifiques qu'ils préfèrent authentiquement, considérant qu'une liberté spécifique se définit par la probabilité qu'un agent réalisera un phénomène. L'étendue de la liberté d'une personne dépend donc du degré de correspondance entre la réalité et ses préférences authentiques portant sur la réalité. Dans le chapitre 2, je propose une méthode pour mesurer cette liberté. Selon cette méthode, le niveau de liberté globale d'une personne s'obtient en multipliant l'étendue physique de ses libertés spécifiques actuelles par le degré de correspondance entre la valeur de ces libertés spécifiques et celle des libertés qu'elle préfère authentiquement. Dans la partie (B), je défends l'idée qu'une égalisation stricte et continue de cette liberté individuelle est la meilleure interprétation de l'égalité morale. Premièrement, dans le chapitre 3, je suggère que la liberté est une meilleure unité de comparaison pour l'égalitarisme que le bien-être, les ressources, les capabilités et les alternatives pluralistes car son anti-perfectionnisme, son anti-fétichisme et sa flexibilité en font un outil optimal pour la poursuite de tout plan de vie. La liberté offre en effet un soutien égal aux personnes morales sans égard aux fins qu'elles poursuivent, aux moyens qu'elles requièrent ou à la valeur relative qu'elles accordent à ces moyens. Deuxièmement, au chapitre 4, je propose l'égalité stricte et continue comme critère s'appliquant aux distributions ayant une dimension temporelle. Je montre que les arguments qui justifient des inégalités en se fondant sur des considérations d'efficacité ou de responsabilité sont incompatibles avec l'égal respect qui est dû aux personnes morales. Tant et aussi longtemps que des individus se qualifient comme personnes morales, on leur doit un égal respect et par conséquent, des quantités égales de liberté globale. Troisièmement, je traite de la fameuse idée selon laquelle la liberté et l'égalité sont des idéaux qui s'opposent. Je soutiens que cette idée découle soit d'une méprise concernant la distinction conceptuelle entre une unité de comparaison et un critère distributif, ou d'un désaccord plus profond portant sur le sens de la liberté ou le rôle de considérations agrégatives dans la détermination des distributions morales. Dans tous les cas, cette idée en sort sérieusement affaiblie sinon complètement anéantie. Les parties (A) et (B) constituent la théorie idéale d'Égale liberté. Dans la partie (C), qui est formée du chapitre 5, je tente de montrer comment cette théorie idéale peut nous guider dans des circonstances non-idéales. Premièrement, je suggère un modèle pour comprendre la relation entre la théorie idéale et la théorie non-idéale. Je soutiens que la théorie non-idéale doit être comprise comme impliquant la maximisation de la réalisation de l'idéal moyennant le respect des contraintes de faisabilité ainsi que des contraintes morales imposées par la nature même de l'idéal. Deuxièmement, j'applique ce modèle à l'idéal d'Égale liberté. Le résultat principal de cette application est un équilibre radicalement égalitaire entre l'importance à accorder à la faisabilité, aux niveaux relatifs ainsi qu'aux niveaux absolus de liberté globale. Troisièmement, je discute plus en détail de stratégies et de propositions de politiques publiques pouvant égaliser la liberté dans des circonstances non-idéales. En guise d'exemple, j'évalue la désirabilité et la faisabilité d'un « droit d'être entendu », qui est un droit destiné aux employés afin de leur offrir une capacité de modifier leur environnement de travail en conformité avec leur plan de vie. Cette évaluation conclut ma défense d'Égale liberté en tant que composante essentielle d'une théorie de la justice sociale. ; (ISP 3) -- UCL, 2012
The main goal of this dissertation is to present an interpretation of what it should mean for a society to fulfil the ideals of freedom and equality. I argue that society should equalise levels of individual freedom. I defend this thesis in three stages, which are associated to the three parts of the dissertation. Part (A) is devoted to the elaboration of a new conception of freedom. The objective is to rehabilitate the intuitive idea that associates individual freedom with the ability to do or be what one wants. In chapter 1, I engage with the analytical literature on freedom and develop a conception of freedom according to which individuals are free overall to the extent that they have the specific freedoms they authentically prefer, where a specific freedom is defined by the probability that the agent will realise a phenomenon. The extent of one's freedom is thus made to depend on how reality relates to what one authentically wants it to be. In chapter 2, I offer a method for the measurement of freedom so conceived. According to this method, a person's level of overall freedom is obtained by multiplying the physical extent of her actual specific freedoms by the evaluative extent to which these actual specific freedoms correspond to her authentically preferred ones. In part (B), I defend the claim that a strictly and continuously equal distribution of this individual freedom is the best embodiment of moral equality. Firstly, in chapter 3, I argue that freedom is a better egalitarian currency than welfare, resources, capabilities and pluralist alternatives because freedom's anti-perfectionism, anti-fetishism and flexibility make it an optimal tool for the pursuit of any life plan. Freedom supports equally moral persons regardless of the ends they require, the means they need or the relative value they assign to these means. Secondly, in chapter 4, I defend strict and continuous equality as a distributive criterion over time. I show that efficiency-based and responsibility-based arguments in favour of inequalities are incompatible with the equal respect owed to moral persons. As long as individuals qualify as moral persons, they are owed equal respect and hence equal amounts of overall freedom. Thirdly, I address the famous claim according to which freedom and equality are conflicting ideals. I argue that this claim either stems from mistaking a conceptual distinction between a currency and a distributive criterion as a conflict of ideals, or expresses deeper disagreement over the meaning of freedom or the role of aggregative considerations in moral distributions. In any case, the claim is seriously weakened if not entirely destroyed. Parts (A) and (B) form the ideal theory of Equal Freedom. In part (C), which is constituted by chapter 5, I try to show how this ideal theory can guide us in nonideal circumstances. Firstly, I suggest a model to understand the relation between ideal and nonideal theory. I argue that nonideal theory is best understood as involving the maximisation of the realisation of the ideal under feasibility constraints and moral constraints imposed by the very nature of the ideal. Secondly, I apply this model to Equal Freedom. The main result is a radically egalitarian balance between concerns for feasibility, relative and absolute levels of overall freedom. Thirdly, I discuss in more detail policy strategies and proposals to equalise freedom in nonideal circumstances. As an example, I assess the desirability and feasibility of a 'right to be heard', which is an enforceable right given to employees that provides them with a capacity to alter their workplace environment in accordance with their life plans. This evaluation concludes my defence of Equal Freedom as the core of a theory of social justice. ; Le principal objectif de cette thèse est de présenter une interprétation de ce que devrait être une société qui réalise les idéaux de liberté et d'égalité. J'y défends l'idée selon laquelle une telle société devrait égaliser la liberté individuelle. Cette défense s'articule en trois moments, qui correspondent aux trois parties de la thèse. La partie (A) est consacrée à l'élaboration d'une nouvelle conception de la liberté. Il s'agit de réhabiliter l'intuition qui associe la liberté individuelle à la capacité de faire ou d'être ce que l'on veut. Dans le chapitre 1, je me sers de la littérature analytique portant sur la liberté pour développer une conception de la liberté selon laquelle les individus sont libres dans la mesure où ils possèdent les libertés spécifiques qu'ils préfèrent authentiquement, considérant qu'une liberté spécifique se définit par la probabilité qu'un agent réalisera un phénomène. L'étendue de la liberté d'une personne dépend donc du degré de correspondance entre la réalité et ses préférences authentiques portant sur la réalité. Dans le chapitre 2, je propose une méthode pour mesurer cette liberté. Selon cette méthode, le niveau de liberté globale d'une personne s'obtient en multipliant l'étendue physique de ses libertés spécifiques actuelles par le degré de correspondance entre la valeur de ces libertés spécifiques et celle des libertés qu'elle préfère authentiquement. Dans la partie (B), je défends l'idée qu'une égalisation stricte et continue de cette liberté individuelle est la meilleure interprétation de l'égalité morale. Premièrement, dans le chapitre 3, je suggère que la liberté est une meilleure unité de comparaison pour l'égalitarisme que le bien-être, les ressources, les capabilités et les alternatives pluralistes car son anti-perfectionnisme, son anti-fétichisme et sa flexibilité en font un outil optimal pour la poursuite de tout plan de vie. La liberté offre en effet un soutien égal aux personnes morales sans égard aux fins qu'elles poursuivent, aux moyens qu'elles requièrent ou à la valeur relative qu'elles accordent à ces moyens. Deuxièmement, au chapitre 4, je propose l'égalité stricte et continue comme critère s'appliquant aux distributions ayant une dimension temporelle. Je montre que les arguments qui justifient des inégalités en se fondant sur des considérations d'efficacité ou de responsabilité sont incompatibles avec l'égal respect qui est dû aux personnes morales. Tant et aussi longtemps que des individus se qualifient comme personnes morales, on leur doit un égal respect et par conséquent, des quantités égales de liberté globale. Troisièmement, je traite de la fameuse idée selon laquelle la liberté et l'égalité sont des idéaux qui s'opposent. Je soutiens que cette idée découle soit d'une méprise concernant la distinction conceptuelle entre une unité de comparaison et un critère distributif, ou d'un désaccord plus profond portant sur le sens de la liberté ou le rôle de considérations agrégatives dans la détermination des distributions morales. Dans tous les cas, cette idée en sort sérieusement affaiblie sinon complètement anéantie. Les parties (A) et (B) constituent la théorie idéale d'Égale liberté. Dans la partie (C), qui est formée du chapitre 5, je tente de montrer comment cette théorie idéale peut nous guider dans des circonstances non-idéales. Premièrement, je suggère un modèle pour comprendre la relation entre la théorie idéale et la théorie non-idéale. Je soutiens que la théorie non-idéale doit être comprise comme impliquant la maximisation de la réalisation de l'idéal moyennant le respect des contraintes de faisabilité ainsi que des contraintes morales imposées par la nature même de l'idéal. Deuxièmement, j'applique ce modèle à l'idéal d'Égale liberté. Le résultat principal de cette application est un équilibre radicalement égalitaire entre l'importance à accorder à la faisabilité, aux niveaux relatifs ainsi qu'aux niveaux absolus de liberté globale. Troisièmement, je discute plus en détail de stratégies et de propositions de politiques publiques pouvant égaliser la liberté dans des circonstances non-idéales. En guise d'exemple, j'évalue la désirabilité et la faisabilité d'un « droit d'être entendu », qui est un droit destiné aux employés afin de leur offrir une capacité de modifier leur environnement de travail en conformité avec leur plan de vie. Cette évaluation conclut ma défense d'Égale liberté en tant que composante essentielle d'une théorie de la justice sociale. ; (ISP 3) -- UCL, 2012
The digital divide has been, at least until very recently, a major theme in policy as well as interdisciplinary academic circles across the world, as well as at a collective global level, as attested by the World Summit on the Information Society. Numerous research papers and volumes have attempted to conceptualise the digital divide and to offer reasoned prescriptive and normative responses. What has been lacking in many of these studies, it is submitted, is a rigorous negotiation of moral and political philosophy, the result being a failure to situate the digital divide - or rather, more widely, information imbalances - in a holistic understanding of social structures of power and wealth. In practice, prescriptive offerings have been little more than philanthropic in tendency, whether private or corporate philanthropy. Instead, a theory of distributive justice is required, one that recovers the tradition of emancipatory, democratic struggle. This much has been said before. What is new here, however, is that the paper suggests a specific formula, the Rawls-Tawney theorem, as a solution at the level of analytical moral-political philosophy. Building on the work of John Rawls and R. H. Tawney, this avoids both the Charybdis of Marxism and the Scylla of liberalism. It delineates some of the details of the meaning of social justice in the information age. Promulgating a conception of isonomia, which while egalitarian eschews arithmetic equality (the equality of misery), the paper hopes to contribute to the emerging ideal of communicative justice in the media-saturated, post-industrial epoch.
"This book argues that ultimately human rights can be actualized, in two senses. By answering important challenges to them, the real-world relevance of human rights can be brought out; and people worldwide can be motivated as needed for realizing human rights. Taking a perspective from moral and political philosophy, the book focuses on two challenges to human rights that have until now received little attention, but that need to be addressed if human rights are to remain plausible as a global ideal. Firstly, the challenge of global inequality: how, if at all, can one be sincerely committed to human rights in a structurally greatly unequal world that produces widespread inequalities of human rights protection? Secondly, the challenge of future people: how to adequately include future people in human rights, and how to set adequate priorities between the present and the future, especially in times of climate change? The book also asks whether people worldwide can be motivated to do what it takes to realize human rights. Furthermore, it considers the common and prominent challenges of relativism and of the political abuse of human rights. This book will be of key interest to scholars and students of human rights, political philosophy, and more broadly political theory, philosophy and the wider social sciences"--
