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AbstractFor decades it has been taboo to mention the role played by religious organizations in development cooperation. Today, however, there is growing awareness of the contribution that these organizations can make to sustainable development, just as there is of the risk they pose of abuse and conflict aggravation. Those involved in development therefore have to learn to cope with the double-edged nature of these organizations. Government donor agencies and faith-based organizations should jointly monitor their work in conflict-prone areas to ascertain whether it fosters peaceful settlement of conflict or whether, in fact, it aggravates the violence.

Abstract:This paper examines in depth one of the potential causes of the low performance of foreign aid; in particular, the role incentive structures within international donor agencies could play in leading to 'a push' to disburse money. This pressure to disburse money is termed as the 'Money-Moving Syndrome' (MMS). The theoretical analysis in this paper relies on the principal–agent theory to explore how donor agencies' institutional incentive systems may affect the characteristics of an optimal and efficient incentive contract and thus give rise to the MMS. The basic framework of the principal–agent theory was innovatively adapted to fit the organizational settings of donor agencies. The model concludes that the extent to which a performance measure based on the amount of aid allocated within a specific period of time would lead to the MMS and affect aid effectiveness depends on the level of 'institutional imperatives', the degree of aid agency's accountability for effectiveness, the level of corruption in recipient countries and the degree of difficulty to evaluate development activities.

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AbstractThis article critically evaluates guidelines concerning participatory development by the World Bank and the United States Agency for International Development (USAID). It focuses on the different conceptual frameworks adopted in order to examine the different ways of incorporating participation in their development agenda.A literature‐based method was adopted and the analysis included evaluation of five documented experiences, including the Ghana Secondary Education Improvement Project and Ghana Water Sanitation and Hygiene Project from both the World Bank andUSAID. Baum project cycle stages have been taken as activities for project participation. The findings show the need for better planning, ensuring sustainability and involving beneficiaries.

Abstract This article discusses the attempt undertaken by several development aid agencies since the turn of the century to integrate political economy assessments into their decision making on development assistance. The article discusses three such attempts: the Drivers of Change adopted by the UK's Department for International Development, the Strategic Governance and Corruption Analysis (SGACA) developed by the Dutch Directorate General for International Cooperation and the new thinking on political economy analysis, policy reform and political risk advanced by the World Bank. On the basis of a political-economic interpretation of development agencies, two main factors are found to hinder the successful application of political economy assessment. In the first place, the agencies' professional outlook leads them to see development in primarily technical terms. In the second place, the nature of incentives for development professionals leads them to resist the implementation of