Suchergebnisse

PurposeTo develop the self‐interested, business rationale for the export of socially responsible business behavior by multinational firms to developing economies.Design/methodology/approachReview the rationale for the ascendance of corporate social responsibility (CSR) in the developed economies, the skepticism that emerged regarding CSR and the proliferation of codes to guide CSR conduct. From this perspective build a parallel case for the development of a business rationale for CSR in the developing economies and how multinational firms can play a transformative role.FindingsCorporations typically have a self‐interested approach to adopting CSR values; either for marketing purposes, or to sustain acceptance among socially conscious investors, consumers, competitors, etc. This same approach should be adopted in the developing world: because consumers and investors transfer these same expectations globally; because businesses in developing countries want acceptance; and because multinationals can test performance‐based rather than regulatory‐based approaches to CSR behaviors.Research limitations/implicationsMeasurements of on the ground progress in implementing CSR standards abroad are limited both by lack of empirical data, and accepted understanding of measurement yardsticks. This should be the subject of additional research and analysis.Originality/valueCorporations and stakeholders might find common ground in developing acceptable codes of conduct for CSR behavior in the developing economies and non‐governmental organizations (NGOs) might serve as credible, third‐party auditors of conduct.

The nineties has been a period of increasing migratory flows from less developed countries to industrialized nations. It is instructive to compare the two largest economies in the world, the European Union and the United States, in terms of the magnitude, trends and composition of their migratory inflows. While the two economies are similar in terms of size and level of development, the European Union still lags behind in its ability to attract immigrants and in the degree of internal mobility of its citizens. Moreover we document a general feature that became more prominent during the nineties. While both economies attracted less educated workers (primary school graduates) as well as highly educated workers (college graduates) from less developed countries, the United States have been able to attract "talent",( i.e. the best among the skilled workers) from all over the world at a rate unmatched by the European Union. In fact the US attracted a large number of talents from the European Union itself during the nineties. This "brain drain" (probably driven by the large economic reward granted by the American economy to scientific, technological and professional talent) is worrisome for the European Union. Its ability to keep pace with the economic growth of the United States depends, in fact, on its ability to compete in the scientific and technological fields.

The nineties has been a period of increasing migratory flows from less developed countries to industrialized nations. It is instructive to compare the two largest economies in the world, the European Union and the United States, in terms of the magnitude, trends and composition of their migratory inflows. While the two economies are similar in terms of size and level of development, the European Union still lags behind in its ability to attract immigrants and in the degree of internal mobility of its citizens. Moreover we document a general feature that became more prominent during the nineties. While both economies attracted less educated workers (primary school graduates) as well as highly educated workers (college graduates) from less developed countries, the United States have been able to attract "talent" ( i.e. the best among the skilled workers) from all over the world at a rate unmatched by the European Union. In fact the U.S. attracted a large number of talents from the European Union itself during the nineties. This "brain drain" (probably driven by the large economic reward granted by the American economy to scientific, technological and professional talent) is worrisome for the European Union. Its ability to keep pace with the economic growth of the United States depends, in fact, on its ability to compete in the scientific and technological fields.

The long-lasting nature of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict has caused a severe slowdown of economic activity within and between the two economies involved. Palestine is currently afflicted with economic stagnation and structural bottlenecks - namely sharp income reductions, low investors' confidence, and labour market segmentation. Israel must correct a large budget deficit due to a secularly high expenditure on military defence. The former has all the characteristics proper to a Southern low-income economy; while the latter is the most advanced economy of the region, with a well diversified export base and high-tech capacity. Convergence between the two economies seems constrained by exogenous factors and structural impediments. For this reason, we believe that only an immediate effort to help the Palestinian economy recover and an inner industrial boost can restore normal economic activity and allow benefiting from the dynamic gains arising out of North-South interactions. This paper highlights two main points: first, the present arrangements concerning the labour market prevent full use of the Palestinian potential productive capacity and are a hindrance to its short-term recovery. Second, the trade regime between Israel and a future Palestinian State should resemble a Free Trade Area that explicitly takes into account the deep asymmetries dividing the Palestinian and Israeli economies.

Modern day business is beset with changing operating paradigms. Economies with efficient economic policies and stable political systems are a big draw among the investors. Countries that have opened themselves to world markets and that have good legal systems in place, providing protection to investors have attracted more capital in the process of globalization. As the demand for capital is growing in both the developed and the developing economies, the need to establish good governance practices has gained momentum. Governance practices however, are not uniform across nations. This diversity may be particularly because of the different legal structures and cultural settings adopted by different nations. This paper tries to explore the arguments on convergence and divergence of corporate best practices, keeping in view the various governance models currently in practice. Explaining the rationale behind the emergence of corporate governance as a movement, this paper attempts at discussing the various prevalent systems of governance. In the end an attempt is made to address the challenges to corporate governance in the context of globalization of best practices. Given the cultural settings of different nations it is argued that it would never be possible for corporate laws to converge universally. New models of corporate governance are likely to emerge given the large‐scale experimentation done by transition economies.

This paper looks at the international process for overcoming sovereign debt crises in developing and transition economies. It first characterizes the nature of sovereign debt crises, and how their resolution has fallen under the domain of global policy. It then highlights the complexity of determining how much debt a post-crisis country should end up with and how the major players interact in determining the actual workout in typical cases. It concludes by considering certain proposals for improving the chances that debt workouts will be effective, speedy and fair. In all, the message in this paper is that sovereign debt crises are international political problems involving on the one hand the governments of the major economies, which represent or are themselves the creditors, and on the other hand the developing or transition economies in difficulty. The different ways the crises have been addressed reflect the relative importance of different groups of creditors in the defaulted debt. In this sense, the creditors drive the process. The people in the crisis countries have the least influence in shaping the process and usually pay most dearly for the crises. Overall, the approach has been reactive and largely ad hoc. This paper argues instead for developing a more comprehensive international approach for dealing with sovereign debt difficulties that would be more attractive to all the relevant parties.

Trade and growth theories generally predict a positive
relationship between openness to international trade and economic
growth. There are a number of channels through which openness is thought
to influence economic growth. First, a liberal trade regime enhances
efficiency through greater competition and improved resource allocation.
Second, greater access to world markets allows economies to overcome
size limitations and benefit from economies of scale. Third, imports of
capital and intermediate goods can contribute to the growth process by
enlarging the productive capacity of the economy. Fourth, trade can lead
to productivity gains through international diffusion and adoption of
new technologies. Empirical studies on the relationship between openness
and economic growth have largely supported the view that openness has a
favourable impact on economic growth. It is not surprising, then, that
the proposition that more open economies tend to grow faster has gained
wide acceptance in academic as well as policy circles. The objective of
this paper is to examine the relationship between openness and economic
growth in the context of Pakistan's economy. Section 2 reviews the
literature on openness and economic growth. Section 3 provides an
overview of trade liberalisation in Pakistan. Data and methodology are
described in Section 4, while Section 5 presents the empirical results.
Section 6 concludes the discussion.

This volume explores phenomena frequently noted (yet seldom analyzed) in the scholarly literature: the profound similarities in the industrialization processes and the contemporary political economies of Germany and Japan. These parallels—not just in the early stages of industrialization, but through the experiences of depression and war, and on to the rise of postwar "miracle" economies in both nations—are often casually ascribed to the late-developer effect, to the strategic imitation of German economic institutions in Japan, or to cultural factors, from lingering "feudal remnants" to enduring "traditional" social structures. Tagging the economic regimes which had evolved in Germany and Japan by the 1970s "nonliberal" capitalist systems, the essays in this collection seek to investigate systematically "the many similarities between the two capitalisms, the no less intriguing differences between them, and the differences between the two and Anglo-American 'standard capitalism'" (p. xiii). More specifically, this volume examines "the origins of some of the social institutions that have constrained the spread of free markets within the capitalist economies of Germany and Japan while providing them with alternate mechanisms of economic governance" (p. 5). Throughout, the contributors argue for a more subtle, historically grounded, and systematic understanding of the distinctive practices and institutions of the German and Japanese "nationally embedded capitalisms."

The "Rise of the West" has been treated by economic historians as stemming from the onset of rapid economic growth, driven by technological advances. In contrast, all premodern and non-Western economies have been treated as showing only slow or no growth, interrupted by periodic crises. This is an error. Examined closely, many premodern and non-Western economies show spurts or efflorescences of economic growth, including sustained increases in both population and living standards, in urbanization, and in underlying technological change. Medieval Europe, Golden Age Holland, and Qing China, among other cases, show such remarkable efflorescences of impressive economic growth.Yet these did not lead to modern industrialized societies. The distinctive feature of Western economies since 1800 has not been growth per se, but growth based on a specific set of elements: engines to extract motive power from fossil fuels, to a degree hitherto rarely appreciated by historians; the application of empirical science to understanding both nature and practical problems of production; and the marriage of empirically oriented science to a national culture of educated craftsmen and entrepreneurs broadly educated in basic principles of mechanics and experimental approaches to knowledge. This combination developed from the seventeenth to nineteenth centuries only in Britain, and was unlikely to have developed anywhere else in world history.

Global economic activity clearly rebounded in the first half of this year. The pick-up from the weakness in the latter half of 2001 was especially marked in North America and Asia, with GDP rising by around 1½ per cent in the first quarter in the United States, Canada and Japan. Activity in Europe was more muted, with GDP rising by 0.3 per cent in the Euro Area and 0.1 per cent in the UK. Although recent monthly data have been mixed, and a number of temporary factors that boosted growth at the turn of the year may have run their course, it appears on balance that there was a further broadly based pick-up in activity in the second quarter of the year. Outside the major industrial economies improving conditions in the IT sector have provided a significant stimulus to some emerging market economies, especially in Asia, but several economies in Latin America have seen a marked deterioration in domestic economic and financial conditions. All told, we expect world GDP growth (measured at purchasing power parities) to be around 2¾ per cent this year, little changed from our previous forecasts. This would be a modest improvement on the growth of 2½ per cent last year, but well below the trend increase of 3½ per cent per annum experienced over the past 30 years.

The Future of Political Authority, by Pierre S. Pettigrew
The nation-state emerged as a vertical political authority operating on a spécifie territory in relation to a relatively homogenous group. Internationalization builds on this momentum on the basis of the interdependence of states. Globalization imposes a new relationship between economies and politics: the horizontal power of the market is increasingly replacing the vertical power of the state. Political and economie spaces no longer coincide; and the pace of politics, slowed by consultations, has little in common with the pace of economies, accelerated by new technology. This new situation may resuit in greater exclusion of populations or even of increasingly marginalized states. This is the source of the problem of values and cultural diversity. With regard to culture, variety concerns France as it concerns Canada, which — through the mosaic model — serves as an inspiration for many societies. With regard to values, a moral renewal is emerging that will take us from an ethics of justice to an ethics of otherness; the contributions of women and of NGOs will be decisive here. Seattle will be remembered mainly as the first place of confrontation between the old order, which must adapt, and the new order, which is striving to emerge. The century just beginning will be marked by their coexistence.

Herein we argue that different diversification strategies are associated with different sets of economic benefits. Firms that have diversified into related areas can realize benefits from economies of scope, while those that have diversified into unrelated areas can realize benefits from efficient internal governance mechanisms. We hypothesize that distinctly different internal organizational arrangements are required to realize these different benefits. Firms attempting to realize economies of scope need organizational arrangements that stress cooperation between business units. Firms attempting to realize economic benefits from efficient internal governance need organizational arrangements that stress competition between business units. If a diversified firm is to achieve high performance it must establish an appropriate fit between its diversification strategy on the one hand, and its organizational structure and control systems on the other. We test this thesis on 184 Fortune 1000 firms that participated in a survey of organizational arrangements. The results indicate that the appropriate fit between strategy, structure, and control systems is associated with superior performance. Firms attempting to realize economies of scope perform better if their organizational arrangements stress cooperation between business units, while firms attempting to realize economic benefits from efficient internal governance perform better if their organizational arrangements stress competition between business units.

AbstractFive global changes over the past 30 years are identified as driving forces shaping the nature and importance of macromarketing. Beyond the "coming of age" of marketing in the Western world, these changes are: the transition of command economies, deregulation in developed economies, the globalization of competition, the revolution in knowledge‐based competition, and internalization of the environment. As driving forces they establish an imperative for measurement and analysis of macromarketing phenomena. It is postulated that systems theory can provide macromarketing with the philosophy and organizing principles to help the discipline meet the challenges generated by the forces driving global change.RésuméOn distingue cinq changements mondiaux survenus depuis 30 ans, definis comme eant les forces motrices qui ont modele la nature et l'importance du macromarketing. Plus marquants que ≪ l'arrivee a maturiue ≫ du marketing dans le monde occidental, ce sont: la transition des economies dirigeantes, la dërëglementation des ëconomies ëvoluëes, la mondialisation de la concurrence, la rëvolution dans la course des connaissances et l'internationalisation des questions environnementales. Ces ëlëments moteurs ont ëtabli la nëcessitë de mesurer et d'analyser le phënomëne du macromarketing. L'article avance l'hypothëse que le macromarketing peut puiser dans la thëorie des systëmes la philosophie et les principes d'organisation qui l'aideront ä relever les dëfis engendrës par ces forces quipoussent au changement mondial.