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This paper empirically investigates whether developing countries can enforce their antitrust laws or not by measuring potential antitrust enforcement using two proxies: budgets and staffing levels of antitrust authorities. Data was collected from 40 developing countries since the adoption of the law until 2009. This dataset presents an alternative method to measure antitrust enforcement compared to the widespread use of formal enforcement proxies. The data shows that most developing countries actually are capable of enforcing their competition laws but with varying intensities. This finding challenges the assumption that developing countries only adopt antitrust laws to secure trade agreements and constantly fail to enforce these laws. Using this dataset the paper then assessed what issues contributed to the variation of antitrust enforcement across developing countries, using panel data estimation techniques to examine the relation between the potential antitrust enforcement proxies and variables representing macroeconomic, political, legal and institutional environments. The paper finds that the factors that heavily impact the level of potential enforcement are economic development, openness to trade and corruption.

This paper empirically investigates whether developing countries can enforce their antitrust laws or not by measuring potential antitrust enforcement using two proxies: budgets and staffing levels of antitrust authorities. Data was collected from 40 developing countries since the adoption of the law until 2009. This dataset presents an alternative method to measure antitrust enforcement compared to the widespread use of formal enforcement proxies. The data shows that most developing countries actually are capable of enforcing their competition laws but with varying intensities. This finding challenges the assumption that developing countries only adopt antitrust laws to secure trade agreements and constantly fail to enforce these laws. Using this dataset the paper then assessed what issues contributed to the variation of antitrust enforcement across developing countries, using panel data estimation techniques to examine the relation between the potential antitrust enforcement proxies and variables representing macroeconomic, political, legal and institutional environments. The paper finds that the factors that heavily impact the level of potential enforcement are economic development, openness to trade and corruption.

Intro -- IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT: ELEMENTS AND LEGAL ISSUES -- IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT: ELEMENTS AND LEGAL ISSUES -- CONTENTS -- PREFACE -- Chapter 1 PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION IN IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT: LEGAL ISSUES -- SUMMARY -- INTRODUCTION -- FEDERAL POWER TO REGULATE IMMIGRATION -- PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION GENERALLY -- PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION IN THE IMMIGRATION CONTEXT -- POTENTIAL LIMITS ON THE EXERCISE OF DISCRETION -- Constitution -- Selective Prosecution -- "Take Care" Clause -- Statute -- Whether "Shall" Means Agencies Lack Discretion -- Deference to Agencies' Interpretations of Their Governing Statutes -- Executive Branch Self-Regulation -- CONCLUSION -- End Notes -- Chapter 2 TESTIMONY OF RUTH ELLEN WASEM, SPECIALIST IN IMMIGRATION POLICY, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE. HEARING ON ''DOES ADMINISTRATIVE AMNESTY HARM OUR EFFORTS TO GAIN AND MAINTAIN OPERATIONAL CONTROL OF THE BORDER?'' -- End Notes -- Chapter 3 INTERIOR IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT: PROGRAMS TARGETING CRIMINAL ALIENS -- SUMMARY -- INTRODUCTION -- DEFINING "CRIMINAL ALIENS" -- QUANTIFYING THE CRIMINAL ALIEN POPULATION -- Federal-Level Arrest Data -- Federal, State, and Local Incarceration Data -- Estimates from the American Community Survey -- Other Estimates of the Criminal Alien Population -- HISTORY OF CRIMINAL ALIEN REMOVAL PROGRAMS -- ICE PROGRAMS TARGETING CRIMINAL ALIENS -- Jail Enforcement Programs -- Criminal Alien Program (CAP) -- Secure Communities -- 287(g) Jail Screening Program -- Task Force Programs -- 287(g) Task Force Program -- National Fugitive Operations Program -- Differences among Criminal Alien Enforcement Programs -- DHS ENFORCEMENT PRIORITIES AND DISCRETION -- March 2011 ICE Guidance Memo -- June 2011 ICE Guidance Memo -- August 2011 DHS Announcement and Review of Backlogged Cases -- APPROPRIATIONS -- ENFORCEMENT STATISTICS

Labor standards enforcement in the low-wage workplace has long suffered from a lack of capacity, expertise and remedies that blunt the impact of public and private enforcers alike. The question of how to address these pathologies in state and local workplace regulation has gained new urgency with the virtual explosion of regional labor lawmaking and the deregulatory impulses of the new federal administration. This Article identifies collaboration between state and local agencies and private, public interest organizations ("PIOs") as one pathway to address these enforcement gaps, by amplifying the deterrent effect of public and private enforcement and by improving legal remedies. This Article offers this form of public-private regulatory experimentation, which it calls "collaborative enforcement," as a conceptual framework that can (a) effectively and efficiently address enforcement gaps by integrating a range of enforcement tools that public and private enforcers cannot access independently; (b) subject public agency enforcement priorities to political accountability; and (c) facilitate sophisticated types of tripartite regulation championed by earlier scholarship. Private delegations in collaborative enforcement, however, can create a risk of PIO abuse of the delegation and of public agency cooptation of PIOs, which will require measures to protect public agency and PIO independence National Labor Relations Act preemption and state nondelegation doctrine do not threaten the core requirements of collaborative enforcement, but do constrain the scope of its delegations and legislative aims. The techniques described in this Article may be applied to other areas of civil enforcement in which underdeterrence is a result of similar enforcement pathologies.