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Title from cover. ; Index to U.S. government periodicals ; Excerpta medica. ; Legal resource index ; Mode of access: Internet.

This paper empirically investigates whether developing countries can enforce their antitrust laws or not by measuring potential antitrust enforcement using two proxies: budgets and staffing levels of antitrust authorities. Data was collected from 40 developing countries since the adoption of the law until 2009. This dataset presents an alternative method to measure antitrust enforcement compared to the widespread use of formal enforcement proxies. The data shows that most developing countries actually are capable of enforcing their competition laws but with varying intensities. This finding challenges the assumption that developing countries only adopt antitrust laws to secure trade agreements and constantly fail to enforce these laws. Using this dataset the paper then assessed what issues contributed to the variation of antitrust enforcement across developing countries, using panel data estimation techniques to examine the relation between the potential antitrust enforcement proxies and variables representing macroeconomic, political, legal and institutional environments. The paper finds that the factors that heavily impact the level of potential enforcement are economic development, openness to trade and corruption.

This paper empirically investigates whether developing countries can enforce their antitrust laws or not by measuring potential antitrust enforcement using two proxies: budgets and staffing levels of antitrust authorities. Data was collected from 40 developing countries since the adoption of the law until 2009. This dataset presents an alternative method to measure antitrust enforcement compared to the widespread use of formal enforcement proxies. The data shows that most developing countries actually are capable of enforcing their competition laws but with varying intensities. This finding challenges the assumption that developing countries only adopt antitrust laws to secure trade agreements and constantly fail to enforce these laws. Using this dataset the paper then assessed what issues contributed to the variation of antitrust enforcement across developing countries, using panel data estimation techniques to examine the relation between the potential antitrust enforcement proxies and variables representing macroeconomic, political, legal and institutional environments. The paper finds that the factors that heavily impact the level of potential enforcement are economic development, openness to trade and corruption.

Intro -- IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT: ELEMENTS AND LEGAL ISSUES -- IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT: ELEMENTS AND LEGAL ISSUES -- CONTENTS -- PREFACE -- Chapter 1 PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION IN IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT: LEGAL ISSUES -- SUMMARY -- INTRODUCTION -- FEDERAL POWER TO REGULATE IMMIGRATION -- PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION GENERALLY -- PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION IN THE IMMIGRATION CONTEXT -- POTENTIAL LIMITS ON THE EXERCISE OF DISCRETION -- Constitution -- Selective Prosecution -- "Take Care" Clause -- Statute -- Whether "Shall" Means Agencies Lack Discretion -- Deference to Agencies' Interpretations of Their Governing Statutes -- Executive Branch Self-Regulation -- CONCLUSION -- End Notes -- Chapter 2 TESTIMONY OF RUTH ELLEN WASEM, SPECIALIST IN IMMIGRATION POLICY, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE. HEARING ON ''DOES ADMINISTRATIVE AMNESTY HARM OUR EFFORTS TO GAIN AND MAINTAIN OPERATIONAL CONTROL OF THE BORDER?'' -- End Notes -- Chapter 3 INTERIOR IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT: PROGRAMS TARGETING CRIMINAL ALIENS -- SUMMARY -- INTRODUCTION -- DEFINING "CRIMINAL ALIENS" -- QUANTIFYING THE CRIMINAL ALIEN POPULATION -- Federal-Level Arrest Data -- Federal, State, and Local Incarceration Data -- Estimates from the American Community Survey -- Other Estimates of the Criminal Alien Population -- HISTORY OF CRIMINAL ALIEN REMOVAL PROGRAMS -- ICE PROGRAMS TARGETING CRIMINAL ALIENS -- Jail Enforcement Programs -- Criminal Alien Program (CAP) -- Secure Communities -- 287(g) Jail Screening Program -- Task Force Programs -- 287(g) Task Force Program -- National Fugitive Operations Program -- Differences among Criminal Alien Enforcement Programs -- DHS ENFORCEMENT PRIORITIES AND DISCRETION -- March 2011 ICE Guidance Memo -- June 2011 ICE Guidance Memo -- August 2011 DHS Announcement and Review of Backlogged Cases -- APPROPRIATIONS -- ENFORCEMENT STATISTICS

Drug Enforcement Administration details the numerous fronts in the unit's ever-expanding fight against drug traffickers and describes the tactics used to bring them to justice. Key topics covered include:. -The DEA's history and predecessor agencies. -Marijuana smuggling and use. -Mexican drug cartels. -South American drug cartels. -Narco-terrorism. -The global heroin trade. -The methamphetamine epidemic. -Money laundering

AbstractThis paper compares the effectiveness of two mechanisms of regulation enforcement: (1) the frequency of inspections and (2) penalties for violations. Threat effects of increased penalties and inspection rates, rather than corrective effects upon receiving an inspection or penalty, are the focus of analysis. Mining industry data from 2004–2009 are used to analyze the responses of mines to separate increases in inspections and citation penalties regarding regulations of safety standards. Mines did not improve safety in response to increased penalties at the ex-ante inspecting rates; however, mines significantly reduced accidents under increased inspections when implemented at those higher penalty rates. The identification strategy results in a local average treatment effect that implies increasing inspection rates from current levels would likely increase social welfare. Results are shown to be robust to bandwidth changes and model specification. The interpretation of the estimated local effect in the context of selection is analyzed. Robustness checks regarding selection exploit staffing changes and restrict to similar samples of treated and non-treated mines, justifying that results are representative.

Testimony issued by the General Accounting Office with an abstract that begins "The Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) developed strategies in the 1990s to control illegal immigration across U.S. borders and to address enforcement priorities within the country. In 1994, INS's Border Patrol issued a strategy to deter illegal entry through "prevention through deterrence;" that is, to raise the risk of being apprehended for illegal aliens to where they would consider it futile to try to enter. The plan called for targeting resources in a phased approach, starting in areas with the greatest illegal activity. In 1999, INS issued its Interior Enforcement Strategy to focus resources on areas that would have the greatest impact on reducing the size and annual growth of the illegal resident population. The strategy established the following five areas: (1) identify and remove criminal aliens and minimize recidivism; (2) deter, dismantle, and diminish smuggling or trafficking of aliens; (3) respond to community reports and complaints about illegal immigration; (4) minimize immigration benefit fraud and other document abuse; and (5) block and remove employers' access to undocumented workers. For these to be effective, INS needs better data to determine staff needs, reliable information technology, clear and consistent guidelines and procedures for working level staff, effective collaboration and coordination within INS and with other agencies, and performance measures that help INS assess program results. Having an effective interior strategy is an essential complement to having an effective border strategy."

- What they do--describes typical responsibilities, working conditions, and more - Education and training--explains how to prepare for a career and whether or not apprenticeships, internships, and degree or licensing requirements are necessary - Earnings--offers general information on average salary ranges and fringe benefits - Outlook--forecasts the future in terms of the expected rate of growth or decline of job openings and opportunities in the field - For More Info--a sidebar that lists pertinent organizations and contact information

The day-to-day behaviors of undocumented immigrants are significantly affected when local law enforcement officials do the work of federal immigration enforcement. One such behavior, which has been widely discussed in debates over so-called sanctuary policies, is that undocumented immigrants are less likely to report crimes to the police when local law enforcement officials work with U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) on federal immigration enforcement. However, the mechanism that explains this relationship of decreased trust in law enforcement has not yet been systematically tested. Do undocumented immigrants become less trusting of police officers and sheriffs when local law enforcement officials work with ICE on federal immigration enforcement? To answer this, we embedded an experiment that varied the interior immigration enforcement context in a survey (n = 512) drawn from a probability-based sample of undocumented immigrants. When local law enforcement officials work with ICE on federal immigration enforcement, respondents are statistically significantly less likely to say that they trust that police officers and sheriffs will keep them, their families, and their communities safe; will protect the confidentiality of witnesses to crimes even if they are undocumented; will protect the rights of all people equally, including undocumented immigrants; and will protect undocumented immigrants from abuse or discrimination.

Many young adults might associate police jobs with dangerous confrontations, but these types of situations represent only a very small part of a law enforcement officer's responsibilities. Law enforcement professionals are charged with maintaining order and enforcing laws at local, state, and federal levels. This informative title describes various law enforcement career paths, including details on training requirements, compensation, and advancement. Readers will learn about the real rewards and challenges across a range of career options, from patrol officer to FBI agent or national park ranger.

Artificial Intelligence (AI) is increasingly and pervasively affecting society. AI and algorithms play a relevant role in the Intellectual Property (IP) discourse as well. Tomorrow, algorithms will of course come as creators and innovators but today they are already here as enforcers. Content sanitization online will soon — and inevitably — become the sole domain of algorithmic enforcement tools. This process towards algorithmic enforcement online has been characterized by a few important recent developments. First, emerging regulatory framework, new legislative obligations and judicial trends would like to force online intermediaries to implement architectural changes leading to sanitization of allegedly infringing content — possibly legit freedom of expression — by design. Second, as a consequence, algorithmic enforcement brings about privatization of enforcement and delegation of public authority. Third, in online enforcement of intellectual property — as well as any other content sanitization — algorithms take decisions reflecting policy's assumptions and interests that have very significant consequences to society at large, yet there is limited understanding of these processes. Finally, but critically for the focus of this investigation, Online Service Providers' (OSPs) regulatory choices — occurring through algorithmic tools — can affect profoundly enjoyment of users' fundamental rights, such as freedom of expression, freedom of information and right to privacy and data protection. This Chapter will map the complex conundrum triggered by algorithmic enforcement in the IP domain with special emphasis on copyright and trademark enforcement online. In doing so, this chapter, first, briefly explains what algorithmic enforcement online actually is. Second, this chapter will dig into voluntary, judicial and legislative measures that have been promoting the emergence of algorithmic enforcement online. Third, this chapter will assess tensions between algorithmic enforcement and human rights, including due process, freedom of information, freedom expression, privacy and freedom of business. In conclusion, this chapter will discuss solutions for protecting human rights from algorithmic enforcement negative externalities.