Search results

In this article, the author shows the (un)ethical side of democracy determined as a median point of politics. That which is ethical in politics, is also ethical in democracy, which is a vehicle of political accomplishment. The ethics lie in the way & means of accomplishment, & not in the purpose & goals of political activity. Adapted from the source document.

Does science think or does it not think, this traditionally philosophical dilemma has today become, according to the central thesis of this essay, inherent to science itself. The author argues that it is in the interest of contemporary science itself to affirm itself as thought. It is precisely this perspective of science as thought which implies the ethical dimension of science. This is not to be understood in the sense of the necessity of some prohibitive instance such as an ethical demand, but rather in the sense that science, for its own internal reasons, should not give up regarding its desire: to be, both, an experiment of thought & a condition for thought. Only by being useful for thought can science be useful for something else. Adapted from the source document.

Rousseau gives an account of the development of law wherein the constitution of the state is derived from the droits de l'humanite principle. In other words, he seeks and finds the original act which encompasses equality and freedom and from which the two result, and which is simultaneously the constitutive act of the community. In his philosophical doctrine of the state, and in contrast with his ethics, he discovered a new field of human obligations in and of themselves, where the principle according to which they are judged is not the ethical sentiment, but reason, as that which realizes that the obligations are justified. This means that the typical anthropological foundation of equality demanded by Rousseau's ethics proves to be insufficient with regard to the highest principles of the state doctrine. Thus Rousseau's foundation of equality in the form of a peculiar philosophy of freedom, which stands in opposition to his ethics, is of a purely rational character, since only pure reason is the source of cognition regarding conditions that justify coercive power over people, and it is, in turn, clearly opposed to the source of knowledge of good and evil, namely sensitivity and sentiments. This also clarifies Rousseau's view that ethical freedom is possible solely within the state and that only a citizen of the state can have freedom. But belief in the possibility of freedom within the state does not originate from some sort of adoration of the state: it results from his non-abandonment of the ethics of sentimentality, with simultaneous recognition of the validity of the freedom concept gained in the sphere of the legislative state. In Kant's understanding, the basic goal of Rousseau's political thought was to establish and ensure inalienable natural rights of individuums, which are symbolized in the substance of the general will. One may therefore conclude that they both tried to establish a new metaphysics of law, but this does not mean that Rousseau can be considered a direct predecessor of Kant's metaphysics of ethics and his critique of practical reason. Adapted from the source document.

This is a critical examination of the most elaborate statement of the general will theory. Bosanquet contrasts our "lower," merely "actual" will -- described as a series of momentary & passing, ignorant, routine, commonplace, irrational, barren, mutually conflicting violations -- with our "higher," "true," "real" will, which is a comprehensive & coherent system of stable & long-term, well-informed violations that require self-sacrifice & are expressed in "the great moments of life." His central thesis is that the individuals' "real" will is the "general will" of the community that has been internalized & makes up the individual's "higher," "better" self. The theory is meant to solve the problem of political obligation by showing that, when obeying the law, the individual obeys only himself/herself, & his/her freedom is not curtailed but rather affirmed. The author argues that Bosanquet's argument fails at both crucial steps: it does not succeed in contrasting our "actual" & our "real" will, nor in identifying the latter with the "general will" of our community. The individual will is not embedded in his/her community law the way the theory makes it out to be, & if we have a moral obligation to obey the law, it is not grounded as much in the "general will" of community as in our own "higher," "true" will. Adapted from the source document.

In this paper, the author gives a detailed critical discussion of the conditions of possibility of the politics &/or ethics of enjoyment such as that conceived by Sade. She begins by discussing the hypothesis advanced by a set of eminent interpretations of Sade's work according to which there is an irreducible antagonism between disruptive passions & social bonds. The central theme of this essay -- that society is rooted in the imperative of enjoyment -- is elaborated on. As a consequence of this discussion, the author turns to the question of the evil inherent to enjoyment. She concludes that the entire project of the politics & ethics of enjoyment is centered on the deculpabilization of passions & enjoyment since, in Sade, the evilness of enjoyment is imputed to Nature. It could thus be said, argues the author, that Nature is Sade's "symptom," denouncing in this way that Sade, the theorist of enjoyment, is unable &/or unwilling to assume the evilness of enjoyment. Adapted from the source document.

In his Homo sacer trilogy G. Agamben engages with a series of important issues related to contemporary political philosophy & ethics. Agamben shows that the period of National Socialism & Fascism confronts us with an epochal project of subject destruction. The core & uniqueness of this project are derived from an ideologically & biologically founded naturalism. Thus perceived naturalism uses, ie., misuses, the technical possibilities & means of the politics of power of modernity, creating a system of perfect organization with the purpose of destroying the Other. Such a naturalistic policy can be termed historically unique, since its goal is no longer the destruction of individuals, groups, classes or peoples, or even of mankind as a whole. Its aim is to destroy the humanity of man, precisely in the sense ascribed to this concept by Kant -- namely, man's subjectivity. In other words, a fundamental idea is revoked here: the idea of mankind as such, which encompasses the idea of common mankind, and, in this way, the very idea of subjectivity is negated. Adapted from the source document.

The prerequisites for achieving perpetual peace are the settlement of the entire Earth; the establishment of republican government (the most stable type of government); & the exchange of goods as a way of bringing peoples together, peoples among whom racial & religious differences have often sparked animosities. Kant attributes these prerequisites to "the great artist Nature," since they occur as a part of the egoistic material interests of men -- at the level of men as natural beings, without influencing their intellectual will. Starting with Kant's proviso that morality does not suffice for achieving the prerequisites for perpetual peace, the author deals with the opposition between man's material interests & the purpose of reason in Kant's ethics. She goes on to show that Kant understands the practical mind as one's disposition for a complete realization of one's humanness. The polarity between the purpose of reason & man's natural strivings she identifies in the exclusion of sensory & emotional impulses from moral acts. The author analyzes this exclusion in combination with Kant's concept of freedom, defined as the causality springing from the freedom of rational will. 11 References. Adapted from the source document.

Tabloidization, sensationalism, the loss of credibility & professionalism, & the violations of ethic norms & standards have been increasingly evident in the Croatian mass media. The broadening of media freedoms is not accompanied by a sufficient level of responsibility regarding reporting; consequently, there is a sort of the media bullying whose victims are individuals or companies. Some of those whose privacy, honor & reputation have been violated send denials to the media, appeal to the journalist associations or seek justice through judicial bodies. In some cases the reports in question were a product of objective & professional reporting, while in others untruths were reported or facts manipulated. The authors analyze the major elements of the above phenomena in the media & the society & the possibilities of protecting the violated rights & interests within the framework of the existing regulations of the Republic of Croatia. Tables, Figures, References. Adapted from the source document.

The author contends that it is, in principle, legitimate to talk about global justice/fairness. Everybody has the right to humane living conditions, irrespective of borders & places of birth. However, we cannot expect the emergence of a world state, not even in the form of a world federation: namely, there is no analogy between the individual's natural state & the states' natural state. States are already an established legal state. This means that any association of states, any federation, even a world state, can come into being only by means of an agreement, which is not very likely. The question is how much the existing borders can & should be open? Is there a universal right to the freedom of movement, the freedom of entering a country, the freedom of employment & immigration? According to the author, the universal moral expectation that every person has exactly the same, unlimited rights in these respects founders over the ethical limitations of universalism. In modernity, the universalistic moral & the ethics of closeness, ie, the responsibilities towards people as such & the responsibilities towards one's own solitary community, have been at variance. To live in modernity means that we cannot apply only one criterion as there are at least two & they allow for the prevalence of one perspective over the other only on a case by case basis, but not generally. Adapted from the source document.

The paper begins with an overview of contemporary liberal-egalitarian theories in order to show the diversity among different understandings of justice. Then, the paper draws a borderline between luck egalitarianism (Arneson, G. A. Cohen, Roemer) and a pro-democratic, relational egalitarianism (Rawls, J. Cohen, Anderson, Barry) that focuses on the society's structure, i.e. the production of its inner relations. The following part introduces the idea of reflective equilibrium and its theoretical benefits in terms of 'de-metaphysised' ethics. Furthermore, this part elaborates Dworkin's liberal principle of justice as the basis of his liberal moral doctrine. Finally, the paper shows that a 'de-metaphysised' ethics could not be equated with the conception of justice as mutual advantage, and neither is it lost in an Archimedean skepticism. By referring to Barry's work, the paper elaborates the idea of justice as impartiality through the debate between moral objectivism and skepticism. The paper ends with synthesising a conclusion of the previous three parts. Also, it defines justice as implied by Rawls' liberal egalitarianism. Ultimately, the paper identifies the need for further research of the topic that would elaborate and answer the questions highlighted by this paper. Adapted from the source document.

This paper examines some of the main assumptions on which the IR theory of political realism is based. According to the theory of political realism, national interest and not morality is the main criterion by which the state acts in its foreign affairs. In its first part this article examines three arguments in support of realists' skepticism towards morality in international relations. In the second part the concept of national interest and the possibility of its application as the main criterion in choosing the state action in international relations are examined. The author argues that the only plausible version of morality is universal morality based on respect for fundamental human rights. Realists' view of morality at the international level cannot be defended in a convincing manner. Still, the theory of political realism provides valuable insights about the nature of international morality and the limits of its application. Adapted from the source document.

Although our talk about human rights is part of the ethical awareness of contemporary politics, it still has not received adequate theoretical justification & foundation. Serious philosophical problems arose in the very beginning of the history of the "human rights" concept, with Locke's liberal natural right & Kant's reasonable right. According to the author, the difficulty stems from the concept of person, for in every liberal legal theory the person is perceived as bearer of human & fundamental rights. Meanwhile, the dominant constitutional theory of human & fundamental rights starts from the identical meanings of "person" as an individual, in its uniqueness, & of "man" as a general definition. It is, however, necessary to start from the fundamental difference between the two key concepts. While the "man" concept is defined universalistically, there is no universal concept for persons & no possibility of breaking them down into subcategories. While every individual, as instance of the concept, must be defined in the same way as everyone else, persons are defined individualistically; each person is a unique individual which can be neither duplicated nor multiplied. The author proposes a solution of the fundamental rights problem-matter within the framework of constitutional law. Personal rights are brought to existence as follows: organs of the state, in accordance with positive law, give to the individual the title of state-citizen as an individualistically unique legal person. Everyone receives it, in the same way, as a unique & irreplaceable person. In the normal conditions, the state has the obligation to make sure, via courts & the police, that everyone's personal right is untouchable. On the basis of this logic, a demarcation line can be drawn between the personal fundamental rights & the collective rights of citizens (such as political rights, which the individual can practice only together with others). Only such an interpretation would provide our libertarian fundamental rights with a consistently secular character, with no concession to the internal attachment, in whichever way it may be concealed, to metaphysical or religious presuppositions. Adapted from the source document.