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This dissertation examines the sources of U.S. President Bill Clinton's foreign policy, with special attention to understudied political elements of intervention. The basis of this study is the Clinton Doctrine, in which Clinton opposed ethnic cleansing, and supported democratic governance worldwide. The primary research question asks to what extent and why was there a variation in Clinton's application of his own doctrine in the specific cases of Rwanda in 1994, Haiti in 1994, and East Timor in 1999. To address this question, the following five hypotheses are posited: H1: The more vital interests are at stake, and the closer the United States is to the crisis, the more the president will push for intervention. Conversely, the more peripheral interests are at stake, and the more distant the United States is from the crisis, the less the president will push for intervention. H2: The more a U.S. ally is likely to intervene, the less the president will intervene. Conversely, the less a U.S. ally is likely to intervene, the more the president will intervene. H3: The more the United Nations is likely to call for intervention, the more the United States is likely to support it. H4: The more the U.S. Congress is likely to call for intervention, the more the president will intervene. Conversely, the more the U.S. Congress is likely to oppose intervention, the less the president will intervene. H5: The more the media opposes the president's policy, the more public opinion will engage during crisis, and the more cautious the president will be regarding intervention. Conversely, the more the media endorses the president's policy, the less public opinion will engage during crisis, and the less cautious the president will be regarding intervention. These hypotheses pertain to the five variables examined, including support for intervention from international allies, the United Nations, the U.S. Congress, U.S. public opinion and the media, and U.S. interests under the Clinton administration.

"August 1992." ; Shipping list no.: 92-0594-P. ; Distributed to some depository libraries in microfiche. ; At head of title: 102d Congress, 2d session. Committee print. ; Mode of access: Internet.

The author examines the way in which past conflicts shape the responses to current crises. In examining the facts of the Rwandan case compared with what is known of the Kosovo crisis, he identifies a number of similarities shared in both contexts. However, these first order similarities prove to be outweighed by the differences in the capacity for control possessed by Milosevic, the ethnic and demographic composition of the communities in the conflict, and military capabilities. Importantly, levels of public support for action were higher in the case of Kosovo, as were the steps taken by the international community in the leadup to the bombing. ; L'auteur examine de quelle façon les conflits du passé contribuent à configurer la réponse aux crises présentes. Comparant les faits du cas rwandais à ce que l'on connaît pour le moment de la crise du Kosovo, il identifie un certain nombre de similarités se manifestant dans les deux contextes. En même temps, ces similarités de première analyse s'avèrent fortement contre balancées par d'importantes différences: la capacité qu'a Milosevitch de garder la situation sous son contrôle, la composition ethnique et démographique des communautés en conflit, les capacités militaires. Fait crucial: l'appui public apporté à une intervention active fut supérieur dans le cas du Kosovo, et les mesures prises par la communauté internationale, qui allaient mener vers les bombardements, furent conséquement plus fermes.

The moral acceptability of four methods of getting rid of unwanted groups -- genocide, ethnic cleansing, forced assimilation, & expulsive secession -- is examined. After considering one group's motivations for desiring the removal of other groups from its national boundaries, several examples of groups who have attempted to get rid of such unwanted groups are presented. Although genocide is differentiated from ethnic cleansing, it is contended that both practices are morally unacceptable forms of removing unwanted groups. Forced assimilation, however, is deemed an acceptable method of getting rid of unwanted groups; nevertheless, it is claimed that such practices must respect collective rights & not infringe on the unwanted group's economic, linguistic, & religious freedoms. Despite some similarities between ethnic cleansing & expulsive secession, it is stated that the moral acceptability of such measures is largely influenced by the expelled group's capacity to become economically & politically viable. J. W. Parker

Over the last five centuries, as the system of states has developed, so too have norms of legitimate state behaviour. These reflect the struggle of the international community to respond to practices, such as forced displacement, ethnic cleansing or genocide, that have come to be regarded as unacceptable. While there has not been any smooth evolution of norms that proscribe such practices, in different periods norms of legitimate state behaviour have been articulated in response to the most extreme practices of state-builders. This paper traces such responses across four cases, drawn from both the early modern and modern periods, and highlights the interaction between the domestic and international aspects of state sovereignty that give rise to the articulation of shared norms of legitimate state behaviour.

The United Nations recently reported that a landmark number of 1 million refugees have returned to their houses since the Dayton Peace Accords brought the war in Bosnia to an end in 1995. During the past few years, Gerard Toal, professor of government and international affairs at the Virginia Tech Alexandria campus, has been at the forefront of research on the returns process in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Toal's research investigates the contradiction in the Dayton peace treaty that pledged to reverse ethnic cleansing but, at the same time, sanctioned a segregated Bosnia created by ethnic cleansing and ruled by local authority ethnonationalists. This contradiction has resulted in a 10-year struggle between the international community and local authorities over the ethnic composition of Bosnia.

December 1994 saw the Russian military launch an assault on Grozny, capital of the obscure Caucasian autonomous republic of Chechnya, in an effort to put an end to its pretensions to national independence. Three years earlier, in 1991, a renegade Chechen general in the Russian Army, Djokar Dudayev, had acceded to the pleadings of Chechen "elders" who wished to take the territory out of the Russian Federation-Russia. By mid-1996, what had quite unexpectedly become a very bloody operation, and a political hot potato in Moscow, remained uncompleted. In spite of a declaration of cease-fire by President Yeltsin and the killing of Dudayev, Chechen "freedom fighters" based in the mountains and villages continued to wage an Afghan-style struggle against the "occupiers" from Moscow. After some 30,000 deaths, most of them civilian, there was no end in sight. Is the war in Chechnya sui generis, as some would claim? Or is it symptomatic of a broader class of wars? As of late 1995, according to the Kennedy School's Project on Internal Conflict (Harvard University), some 35 major armed intra-state struggles were underway around the world. In a number of ways, Chechnya is unique, but it can also be seen as an archetype for similar conflicts taking place, or pending, around the world. Why the apparent increase in ethnic conflict in the early 1990s? What, if anything, might the United States and the rest of the world do in the future to prevent such carnage from becoming an accepted feature of global politics? Absent satisfactory explanations of these crises, the chances are better than even that, within the next few years, the United States and its allies will find themselves confronted by a similar "no-win" situation in any one of the dozens of places where very little provocation will trigger new episodes of ethnic cleansing. We offer an account of the causes of ethnic and sectarian conflict that is applicable to a growing number of countries and regions. In brief: What we have come to call "ethnic and sectarian conflict" is neither ethnic nor sectarian per se. Rather, it is about struggles over the levers of power and wealth within societies and countries in which ethnicity and religion provide the cultural and historical resources for mobilizing popular support for particular elites. These countries are almost always caught in the throes of economic and political transformations, brought on by external factors and forces. These erode or destroy old social, political and economic relations—old ways of doing things—and conflicts follow. The outcomes of such struggles are not pre-determined—ethnic cleansing is not dictated by some kind of historical materialism. There are possibilities for intervention before violence erupts.

The question of whether "average war criminals," defined as everyday citizens who were raised in cultures that expressed hatred for members of other cultures or ethnic groups & committed various war crimes, should be held accountable for war crimes committed by their states is addressed. The ability of Aristotle's typology of evil -- moral weakness, wickedness, & brutishness -- to account for average war criminals' behavior is examined; it is argued that average war criminals are either preferentially or perversely wicked. However, an analysis of cognitive & noncognitive understandings of wickedness revealed that perverse wickedness ultimately functions as a form of preferential wickedness. Even though average war criminals, particularly those who were involved in ethnic cleansing in the Balkans & Kosovo, had no choice in being born into cultures that espouse hatred toward certain racial & ethnic groups, it is maintained that these individuals are morally responsible for war crimes since they preferred to participate in ethnic cleansing. It is concluded that the international community has a moral obligation to at least censure average war criminals. J. W. Parker

Članak raspravlja o uporabi silovanja kao politike u slučajevima kada se, do tragičnih posljedica, ukrštaju nasilje, rod i etnicitet. Prvo se ispituje kampanja srbijanskih medija 1990. na Kosovu protiv Albanaca kao silovatelja; zatim se analizira upotreba silovanja u prinudnom etničkom čišćenju prilikom srpske agresije na Bosnu, 1992-1993. Pokazuje se da je kampanja na Kosovu bila predigra stvarnom silovanju u Bosni. U oba je slučaja silovanje poslužilo u ograđivanju teritorija i definiranju srpske etničke niše na Balkanu. ; The paper examines two cases of rape as politics where violence, gender, ethnicity intersected with tragic consequences. First, the Serbian media campaign against the Albanians as rapists in Kosovo in 1990 has been examined; secondly, the rape as politics of ethnic cleansing in the Serbian aggression in Bosnia in 1992-1993 was analyzed. It has been shown that Serbian media's rape campaign against Kosovo Albanians as perpetrators has been prelude to the actual rapes by Serbian soldiers in Bosnia. In both cases, rape served as the special mean for defining the boundary of the Serbian ethnic niche in the Balkans.

The war devastating Bosnia-Herzegovina from 1992 to 1995 is primarily aimed at the creation of homogenous ethnic territories and is accompanied by violent ethnic cleansing campaigns. But the evolution of the war on the ground can not be properly understood without taking into account the political constellations and crises that are proper to each national community. ; La guerre qui ravage la Bosnie-Herzégovine entre 1992 et 1995 a pour finalité première la constitution de territoires ethniquement homogènes et s'accompagne de violentes campagnes de nettoyage ethnique. Mais les évolutions du conflit sur le terrain ne peuvent être comprises sans prendre en compte les configurations et les crises politiques propres à chaque communauté nationale.

The war devastating Bosnia-Herzegovina from 1992 to 1995 is primarily aimed at the creation of homogenous ethnic territories and is accompanied by violent ethnic cleansing campaigns. But the evolution of the war on the ground can not be properly understood without taking into account the political constellations and crises that are proper to each national community. ; La guerre qui ravage la Bosnie-Herzégovine entre 1992 et 1995 a pour finalité première la constitution de territoires ethniquement homogènes et s'accompagne de violentes campagnes de nettoyage ethnique. Mais les évolutions du conflit sur le terrain ne peuvent être comprises sans prendre en compte les configurations et les crises politiques propres à chaque communauté nationale.

In Bosnia-Herzegovina, good everyday relationships among members of different national communities are often described using the word "komsiluk" ("good neighbourliness"). Komsiluk is a result of the Ottoman imperial political order and differs from the notions of citizenship and nation associated with political modernity. Consequently, ethnic cleansing as implemented by nationalist parties aims also at destroying komsiluk and turning yesterday's neighbour into a murder. ; En Bosnie-Herzégovine, les bonnes relations quotidiennes entre membres de communautés différentes sont souvent décrites sous le vocable de "komsiluk" ("bon voisinage"). Le komsiluk est un produit de l'ordre politique impérial ottoman, et diffère des idées de citoyenneté et de nation associées à la modernité politique. Dès lors, le nettoyage ethnique mis en oeuvre par les partis nationalistes vise aussi à détruire le komsiluk et à transformer le voisin d'hier en assassin.

In Bosnia-Herzegovina, good everyday relationships among members of different national communities are often described using the word "komsiluk" ("good neighbourliness"). Komsiluk is a result of the Ottoman imperial political order and differs from the notions of citizenship and nation associated with political modernity. Consequently, ethnic cleansing as implemented by nationalist parties aims also at destroying komsiluk and turning yesterday's neighbour into a murder. ; En Bosnie-Herzégovine, les bonnes relations quotidiennes entre membres de communautés différentes sont souvent décrites sous le vocable de "komsiluk" ("bon voisinage"). Le komsiluk est un produit de l'ordre politique impérial ottoman, et diffère des idées de citoyenneté et de nation associées à la modernité politique. Dès lors, le nettoyage ethnique mis en oeuvre par les partis nationalistes vise aussi à détruire le komsiluk et à transformer le voisin d'hier en assassin.

Discusses the present state & potential achievements of the body & discourse in modern society. It is argued that scientists & historians have rejected certain social & cultural phenomena by disavowal of the premises on which the phenomena are founded (eg, UFO [unidentified flying objects] hysteria does not exist since UFOs do not exist). Such rejection has limited the scope of these fields. The concept of boundary violations is fundamental to the postmodern perspective, & it is suggested that these border crossings have been traditionally viewed as threatening & dangerous. Further, the rigid definitions of boundaries have led to extremist religious & political actions such as ethnic cleansing & national isolationism. Even the liberal proponents of multiculturalism are engaged in the separation of people (through cultural categorization) & the rejection of border crossings, a situation exacerbated by modern communication technologies. 2 References. T. Sevier