According to the author, the introduction of the euro has created the second largest economic space in the world. However, this economic space is not without its quandaries. For example, the author predicts that the exchange rate for the euro is going to increase only after the conditions for investments within the euro space have improved. All the EU governments must work on structural reforms of the labor market & the social policy. This will be facilitated once the euro has become an international currency equal to the dollar. For this to occur, a political union in Europe must be created since a successful currency needs political clout as a back-up. Adapted from the source document.
The author is critical of the introduction of the euro from the point of view of national & political economy. His criticism is based on four assumptions. The first is that the introduction of the euro gives rise to certain legal concerns. Some countries had not met the criteria for the introduction of the euro, yet it was introduced, which means that the European parliament & the national governments & their parliaments no longer respect the due process of law. The second is that the foreign debt, which amounts to 120% of GNP, is impossible to repay in those democracies that are not in the position to impose austerity measures that would include several legislatures. The third criticism is based on the fact that European countries are at different levels of development, which makes the monetary union much too vulnerable. The fourth criticism refers to the fact that common currency means common policy, &, consequently, the end of nation-states in Europe. Croatia may join the EU, but this would pose a challenge to its national sovereignty. 2 Tables. Adapted from the source document.
The article looks into the process of "building" the monetary union of the EU member countries & creating the European currency, the euro. Following lengthy negotiations, the euro-system era commenced on 1 Jan 1999, when the euro was launched, marking the beginning of the third phase of the monetary union. At first, the euro will be virtual money & function as a dual currency, but in 2002, it will be printed/coined for everyday usage. In the first half of that year, local currencies will be replaced by the euro in eleven EU countries that have satisfied the stringent criteria of "suitability" for joining the monetary union. 1 Appendix. Adapted from the source document.
Empirically different (multicultural) Europeans are linked by means of two familiar & historically well-drilled programmatic scripts: the first one is logical-grammatical & the second scientific-technical. The first enables them to express their irreducible empirical differences in the form of a universally comprehensible logical argument that can be democratically decided upon, the second enables them to level all differences by the power of scientific & technical imperatives that disregard the logical & the democratic argument, Eurocracy & Eurotechnocracy operate with calculated scientific algorithms, European citizens & Euro-optimists & Euro-pessimists with analogies of everyday speech & its logical arguments. The communication among the proponents of these two programmatic scripts, among the different media & the different sources of power can be achieved solely by means of translation. However, translation is never going to be completely & totally faithful since the media are incommensurable; hence, mutually selectively it follows that Tertium non datur, or everybody speaks in their own languages heard by all but understood by none, hence the moral: Nenzo contra Europae nisi Europa ipse. 15 References. Adapted from the source document.
The author criticizes those Euro-sceptics who still treat the European Union as an open project that requires major decisions on the road to its fruition, as if the Union had not relinquished the model of the classical nation-state a long time ago. The author also promotes a reinterpretation of those aspects of European history that have given rise or might give rise to anti-European sentiments. Adapted from the source document.
The author looks at documents regarding the protection of minorities, designed by the Council of Europe as the oldest organization promoting the idea of European unity. He also analyzes the steps that the Republic of Croatia has made in its desire to join the Euro-Atlantic integration. Croatian politics, in line with the will of the Croatian citizens expressed in the elections of Jan 2000, has tried to reach that goal by satisfying the requirements for integration. Adapted from the source document.
The Partnership for Peace (PfP) was created by NATO in Brussels in 1994; an excerpt from the document spelling out membership conditions is quoted. Twenty-six countries joined PfP between 1994 & 2000; Croatia became its 26th member, & it also joined the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) as the 46th European country. A membership in both organizations is a significant event in the history of Croatia as an independent state. There are certain duties & tasks that the PfP membership imposed on this country; however, there already are positive results of cooperating with NATO within the PfP program. Z. Dubiel
In the wake of the end of the Cold War, NATO has pursued the promotion of peace & stability on the European continent by: (1) creating the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) in 1997, (2) launching the Partnership for Peace (PfP) program in Brussels in 1994, (3) entering into cooperation treaties with Russia & the Ukraine, & (4) pursuing a "Mediterranean Dialog." The PfP program is presented in more detail, outlining its objectives & mentioning the intentions of the Defense Capabilities Initiative & Membership Action Plan, among others. Croatia's membership in PfP is addressed, clarifying what this program is not (eg, it is not a security organization or a waiting room for membership in NATO) & cautioning the government against neglecting other security policies & arrangement on behalf of PfP. Z. Dubiel
This paper argues that various EU policy initiatives towards the Western Balkans in the period of 1990-1999 did not in fact encourage the Western Balkans to move on and secure quicker integration into the European Union. They also failed to support reforms in the political, economic and social spheres. In addition, EU initiatives were too ineffective in terms of development of regional cooperation among countries of the region. Thus, new models were -- and still are -- needed if the EU remains committed to further enlargement in the Western Balkans. The author proposes development of a euro-region in the Western Balkans. In this way, countries of the Western Balkans would be encouraged to collaborate in applying for EU funding, which would support other forms of cooperation. However, since the funds are now restricted, it is more likely that even this approach would have only limited success. Adapted from the source document.
This paper argues that various EU policy initiatives towards the Western Balkans in the period of 1990-1999 did not in fact encourage the Western Balkans to move on and secure quicker integration into the European Union. They also failed to support reforms in the political, economic and social spheres. In addition, EU initiatives were too ineffective in terms of development of regional cooperation among countries of the region. Thus, new models were -- and still are -- needed if the EU remains committed to further enlargement in the Western Balkans. The author proposes development of a euro-region in the Western Balkans. In this way, countries of the Western Balkans would be encouraged to collaborate in applying for EU funding, which would support other forms of cooperation. However, since the funds are now restricted, it is more likely that even this approach would have only limited success. Adapted from the source document.
The development of regional cooperation in Southeastern Europe is very low in comparison with other European regions. The changes occurring in the attitudes of the international community (through increased sensitivity & familiarity with the situation in the field & the new democratic advances of Croatia) are now creating favorable conditions for the development of regional cooperation. This region can be strengthened through international efforts, including the international community's presence, since with its economic, political & even police/military resources it has enough instruments to support these developments. Southeastern Europe is expected to commence its transformation of the relationships by developing different forms of useful cooperation that should lead to increased security & a more peaceful coexistence. In this context, by means of regional cooperation, it should be possible to integrate this area into the Euro-Atlantic region as a whole. Adapted from the source document.
The goals of NATO to secure peace in Europe after the end of the Cold War & promote peaceful cooperation between all states on the continent, spelled out in the documents issued at the closing of the London summit in 1990 & Rome meeting in 1991, are listed. Two organizations created to achieve these objectives are presented: (1) the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC), formed in Brussels in 1991, & replaced by the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC), formed in 1997; & (2) the Partnership for Peace Program (PfP) created in 1994. The objectives of PfP are listed, & the participation of the Republic of Slovenia in this program since its very inception is discussed, identifying both positive & negative outcomes of this cooperation. The Slovenian government is criticized for failing to perform a cost-benefit analysis & provide adequate information to the public on how the interests of the country & PfP converge. Z. Dubiel
The author analyzes the process of democratization of international relations & the future configuration of international order following the end of the era of bipolar confrontation & the establishment of cooperation in a world that has witnessed changes in the key actors' roles regarding their approach to the resolution of the post-Cold-War crises that jeopardize the world's peace & stability. First, the author provides a short outline of the genesis of the evolution of US foreign policy, from the end of WWII to the beginning of the Cold War & the formation of NATO. He points out that today's agenda of the international order, its structures, interventionism, & use of force in achieving political objectives, were already shaped at that time. The suggestions put forward constituted the framework & foundation for world politics until the late 1980s; the cumulative effect of these responses on today's attempts at solving post-Cold-War crises enables us to evaluate the roles & behavior of individual actors in the resolution of the Kosovo crisis. The maintenance of peace & stability in the post-Cold-War world in the circumstances of cooperation & partnership requires an appropriate approach & manner of resolving the crises triggered off by the collapse of communist federations. Imperial policies & regimes must be eliminated, while the processes of geopolitical consolidation & the creation of independent & sovereign states in Central & Eastern Europe (& in Euro-Asia on the whole), built around democratic & market principles, must be wrapped up. The new political leaders (mostly leftist) in the countries that for 50+ years (& now through the Kosovo crisis) have been developing the transatlantic alliance within the military-political framework of NATO (based on the same values, principles, & goals), are now developing appropriate strategies for the post-Cold-War hotspots (based on cumulative experience). 25 References. Adapted from the source document.
After the breakup of the USSR, and the several rounds of Post-Cold War enlargements of the Western integrations, once large space of newly independent and geopolitically uncontrolled European post-communist states, located between the EU, NATO and Russia, contracts geopolitically and 'wanders' strategically. The three states, Belarus, Ukraine and Moldova, located on Russia's western borders share about three thousand kilometers of borders with the EU and NATO, and about two thousand and five hundred kilometers with Russia, which implicates that they are prone to the geopolitical influences from their surroundings. This Interspace of the three states lies inside the strategic triangle comprised of: 1) Russia - geopolitically and militarily powerful state as well as a giant considering its energy reserves, which makes her relatively strong 'hard' power as well as a significant 'soft' power; 2) the EU - economic giant on the global level that is not unified enough; has domestic problems and is partially dependent on Russia when it comes to energy, a civilian power without 'hard' power that in its foreign relations relies on policies based on financial assistance, assurance, and attractiveness; 3) NATO, led by the USA - the most powerful military-political-security 'hard' power that exists today; it does not have the kind of influence on Europe and the Post-Soviet space that it had in the 90-ies. However, as a consequence of subordination of the Interspace that lasted for a couple of centuries, the common characteristics intrinsic to this space occur: ambiguous identities; deficits in the democratic practices; complicated, prolonged and incomplete transition; economic decline, demographic problems - all of which favor a strategic 'adoption' of the Interspace by the Kremlin, a former imperial master. At the same time, a relative marginalization of the Interspace is evident regarding the processes of Euro-Atlantic integration. After the unsuccessful attempts of 'pulling out' Kiev, Kishinev, and the South Caucasian Tbilisi from this Russian sphere of influence, the states positioned in the Interspace, together with Russia, comprise a regional security complex, a stabilized geopolitical 'Russosphere' that is a key part of the Kremlin's attempts for Eurasian reintegration under Russia's leadership. Adapted from the source document.
The author analyzes recent Habermas' writings on the process of European integration & the new international political order. Having for a long time ignored the issues of foreign policy, in his recent works & speeches Habermas has increasingly turned to these topics. The supranational level is becoming important both due to the more severe limitations to state sovereignty in the process of globalization, & because of the development of new mechanisms of international cooperation & the new regional economic-political integrations. In his theory of democracy at the national level, he emphasizes its deliberative character & shows public communication as the central sphere of mediation between the informal (private) opinions & the institutions of the formation of political will. However, today it is necessary to go beyond the boundaries of the nation-state & establish the parallel mechanisms of political deliberation & decision-making at the international level. The most important step in that direction are regional integrations (in Europe, naturally, it is the European Union). The regional integrations must supplement the UN institutions to compensate for the loss of the ability to govern at the national level & to create a counterbalance to global capitalism. In this context it is important to get the answers to a certain crisis of the EU identity. The European Union today is often seen as a mechanism of bureaucratic management & restrictive regulation, instead of as a guarantor of good life. Habermas thinks that Europe should focus on the guarantees of fundamental rights & values such as the right to education, social justice, autonomy & participation. For that purpose, the European Union should develop into a federal state. To the Euro-skeptical objection that Europe lacks a state-building nation i.e a unified nation as the foundation of political community, Habermas responds that the European civil sodety, European public & the common political culture -- if, indeed, they can be built -- are sufficient for Europe's political unity. The process of designing & adopting the European Constitution has strengthened all three components. The Constitution also helps to explain the objectives of the European integration (boundaries of EU's expansion, interrelationship among levels of goverment) & to enhance legitimacy by creating a fundamental legal act, its the design of which European citizens are involved. For Habermas, the crisis of European unity caused by the disunity of the member-countries' governments over the American war in Iraq is an opportunity. The mobilization of the European civil society against that war (as demonstrated by the pan-European peace demonstrations of 15 February 2003) & the creation of the model of the procedurally well-ordered international politics & cooperation which boosts economic development & social security serve as the counterbalance to the American unilateralism & the aspiration for domination. Habermas supports the model of "multispeed Europe" & thinks that it will not cause a rift in the EU, but can as a matter of fact dynamize the process of European integration. The author concludes that Habermas' political views of the European integration & international politics contain a remarkable dose of utopism. However, the attempt to see beyond the limitations of the existing political reality is a must if these limitations are to be overcome. 12 References. Adapted from the source document.
