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Abstract: Trauma and Collective Memories in Georgia's Foreign PolicyGeorgia's foreign policy since the mid-1990s would appear to be a regional anomaly. While Georgia's neighbors have either accommodated to Russia's geopolitical interests or sought to navigate between Russia and the West, Georgian governments have pursued a comparatively stable pro-Western foreign policy orientation. Thus, structural arguments like geographic proximity, or Russia's assertive foreign policy, cannot account for the variation in foreign-policy orientation among post-Soviet states. Moreover, although alternative explanations, like Georgia's European identity and commitment to democracy, or explanations related to qualities of the Mikheil Saakashvili government, are not without merits, they cannot fully account for the continuity in Georgia's pro-Western foreign policy over time. This article argues that the collective memory of the traumatic years 1989–1994 is a key factor for understanding Georgia's foreign policy continuity. The collective memory and trauma related to loss of territory, together with a weak state and Russia's negative involvement, have shaped the strategic thinking of Georgia's foreign policy elites. This trauma explains Georgia's shift to a pro-Western foreign policy in the mid-1990s and the continuity of this policy up until today. This argument is supported by the author's interviews with key Georgian decision-makers responsible for foreign policy decisions.

Abstract: Russia's operationalization of a sphere of interest in the South CaucasusA central foreign policy objective of Russia is to maintain an exclusive sphere of interest in its post-Soviet neighbourhood. This article analyses how Russia employs a combination of political and military instruments in operationalizing its perceived sphere of interest in the still conflict-ridden South Caucasus. Russia is the only external power in the region to have military bases there, and is the only one seemingly ready to undertake military action. At present, Russia appears satisfied with the status quo in the South Caucasus. The unresolved conflicts in Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Nagorno-Karabakh are therefore unlikely to be resolved in the near future. Unresolved conflicts suit Russia's objectives. Russian military bases in Georgia and Armenia provide Moscow with both a key lever against Tbilisi and Yerevan and a structural advantage for potential Russian military operations in the region. Russia's military posture in the Caucasus is relevant to the potential for large-scale conflict in the Southern war theatre, including the wider Middle East, and not just local conflicts in the Caucasus.

Abstract: Security Policy and Memory Politics: Establishing the Soviet Liberation Monument in Kirkenes, 1945–1952A few kilometers from the border with Russia, in the town of Kirkenes in the easternmost corner of Northern Norway, there stands a bronze statue of a Soviet soldier looking out over the borderland. The Soviet Liberation Monument, as the statue is called, was unveiled in 1952 by the Norwegian authorities, in gratitude for the Soviet liberation of the East Finnmark area in 1944. The statue has served as a meeting place for regular commemorative ceremonies involving the Norwegian and Soviet authorities, throughout the Cold War and up until the present. This article explores the interplay between security policy and memory politics at the onset of the Cold War by examining the seven-year long process of establishing this monument. As the Iron Curtain descended over Europe, the monument and the memories attached to it became important tools with which Norway developed a critical dialogue with its great-power neighbor. The article shows how the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs learned how to use the collective memories of the Soviet liberation to ensure Norway's security-policy goal of low tension in its relations with the USSR.

Abstract: HIV and AIDS in Russia: Regime Dynamics and ResponseOver the last two decades, the number of persons living with HIV in Russia has increased dramatically. According to WHO criteria, Russia is now facing a generalized HIV epidemic. This article analyzes how regime dynamics have influenced Russia's capacity to build a domestic response to the epidemic. Putin's cultural conservative turn in 2012 may have negatively affected the regime's ability to curb the spread of HIV. Evidence collected for this study indicates that three developments in particular have contributed to this. The first is the introduction of legislation aimed at reducing foreign involvement in Russia, which has weakened civil society as the main provider of prevention programs and services to key populations, and has forced global agencies to leave the country. Secondly, the increasing use of value-based conservative rhetoric after 2012 has meant better access to state structures, policy crafting and governmental funding for actors opposed to conventional methods of preventing HIV. Lastly, Putin's post-2012 cultural conception of the state has served to entrench Russian neopatrimonialism. As neopatrimonialism creates conditions unfavorable to successful implementation of reforms, including those necessary to deal with the ongoing epidemic, its stabilization may have assisted inaction as regards HIV.