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AbstractInvestment protection clauses, and the investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS) mechanisms they enable, have become a common feature of international agreements on trade and investment. Intended to promote foreign investment, these protections may also discourage governments from regulating in the public interest. This raises challenging normative questions about the rights of investors and distributive justice. In this paper, I argue that a global investment regime that disadvantages developing countries and socially disadvantaged groups is prima facie unfair. This conclusion must be defended against the claim that investors have certain independent moral rights to have their property protected, regardless of the distributive consequences. Granting the premise that such investor rights exist, I argue that these cannot plausibly ground a general rule against public interest regulation that undermines the value of property. I conclude that even if foreign investors have rights that must be safeguarded, the current investment regime must be reformed.

The article deals with one of the modern tendencies in public administration: private intervention in quotidian activities of entities which are obliged by law to fulfill all social necessities. For better understand this idea, first, we shall examine private intervention in the period of dictatorship; second, try to determine few principles of this operation in democracy. As the 1990s made the issue of democracy the center of political discourses, finally we shall examine what is politically correct in the area. All this debate must be seen from the second direction: national private investors and state policy to encourage themselves (first aspect) and foreign investors as a second direction. Our paper tries to determine those rules which must be applied for those different kinds of investors.

The International Investment Regime (iir) materialises in international arbitral tribunals that protect the rights of foreign investors. Could these tribunals hamper the implementation of exceptional measures agreed to end armed conflicts? The principle of proportionality, usually employed to balance competing demands such as the interests of international investors and the right of states to self-determination, could fall short when it comes to the concept of a nation and a society's right to peace. Focusing on the Colombian peace process, this article argues that the agreement on land redistribution, a cornerstone of the peace agreements, benefits the whole society, including foreign investors. However, the colonialist nature of the iir could lead foreign investors, who see their investments and expected profits affected, to demand compensation for governmental land acquisition. The Colombian case suggests powerful lessons for the willingness of transitional states to defend their people's right to peace in international tribunals. © 2016 Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, The Netherlands.

AbstractWe test whether foreign investors price foreign exchange risk differently from local investors. Drawing from the closed‐end country fund literature, we argue that both differential access to information by foreign versus local investors and different sources of exchange risk that investors face (economic or translation exposure) will lead to different pricing of the exchange risk associated with American Depositary Receipt (ADR) investments. We apply a two‐step method to country portfolios of ADRs of Australia, France, Japan, and the United Kingdom traded on the New York Stock Exchange. Our results show that foreign investors generally price exchange risk differently from local investors, and that the source and magnitude of differences in exchange risk pricing vary significantly across countries. Although significant differences in pricing exchange risk between foreign and local investors are observed for Australia, France, and Japan, no such pricing difference is noticed for the United Kingdom. Furthermore, the pricing differences observed for Australian and French ADRs are mainly attributed to the exchange risk of underlying share returns (economic exposure), whereas the pricing differences for Japanese ADRs are mainly attributed to the exchange risk associated with currency translation (translation exposure). We offer some explanations for our findings.

Governments must choose between general policies and individual negotiations to reach agreements with foreign investors. General policy leaves nothing to be negotiated. But once negotiation is selected, governments face difficult choices over how to conduct ne otiations. No single choice of organizational structure or administrative process is optimal for all countries or for all industries. Each organizational choice carries a range of economic and political costs and benefits that are valued differently by the domestic and foreign interests affected by the negotiation's outcome. Interviews with government officials in four Asian countries and corporate executives in four industries, all involved in international business negotiations between 1978 and 1982, demonstrate that different governments should and do choose different approaches to negotiating with foreign firms. Even single countries use different approaches at different times and with different industries. Moreover, the managerial choices of structure and process are not random. Rather, they are influenced by a government's general strategy toward foreign investment, the "political salience" of a given investment, and the degree of competition among countries for a specific investment. Ultimately, a government's management of international business negotiations shapes its effectiveness in negotiating with foreign firms and in competing for foreign investment.

China has undergone a remarkable transformation process and rapid economic development. However, the resources that such growth demands have raised deep concerns about the long-term sustainability and hidden costs of China's development. Many of these concerns are associated with the state of China's water resources. As demand for water has increased, so too have problems with water shortages, pollution, falling groundwater tables, and flood/drought damages. To tackle these challenges, the Chinese government increasingly encourages foreign companies to engage in the country's water market. Market research studies claim that this market holds promising business opportunities for both domestic and foreign companies. This article analyses this statement from a foreign investor's perspective. It evaluates key factors influencing the reform policy of the Chinese government and introduces the main policy and investment implications. It shows that in spite of the remaining market barriers, the Chinese water market indeed holds business opportunities. In fact, a key role in solving China's water crisis should be played by international companies and governments.