Search results

Firms across the globe are affected by red tape, but there is little academic research on how country-level institutions shape red tape perceptions. Drawing on institutional theory, we argue that a variety of formal and informal country-level institutions affect perceptions of red tape in the private sector. We test our hypotheses using six data sources, including the World Economic Forum and the World Bank. Our results indicate that red tape is weakly associated with a country's level of formalization and rule enforcement effectiveness and more prevalent in federal as opposed to unitary states. As for informal institutions, we find that red tape perceptions are more pronounced in countries with an increased conservative political ideology, higher levels of corruption, and cultures that emphasize individualism and uncertainty avoidance. We conclude with a discussion of the implications for theory and practice.

This article continues the discussion about the results and prospects of applying the institutional approach to the study of economic development, which was initiated by R. Kapeliushnikov (Voprosy Ekonomiki, 2019, No. 7—8). The focus is on the balance of interests and ideas in the light of economic growth, the question of the existence and protection of property rights in various social orders, taking into account the role of the state, the characteristics of institutions in the light of the problem of efficient resource usage, the refraction of the theory of social orders through the prism of objects left outside of the study by North, Wallis and Weingast, on the one hand, and Acemoglu and Robinson, on the other hand. An assessment of the adequacy of the conclusions regarding the pan-institutional nature of the North et al.'s approach is presented, as well as directions for the development of research in the context of a new institutional economic theory.

Christians have a moral obligation to help the poor and destitute, and many Christians argue that we must exercise our moral obligation by, for example, redistributing income or by enacting price controls and minimum wages. Christians must proceed with caution when prescribing such policies: the resulting changes in incentives embodied in changed formal institutions may in fact work to the detriment of "the least of these" among us.

'Die Finanzwirtschaft Rußlands zeichnet sich durch zwei Besonderheiten aus. Zum einen handelt es sich um eine Föderation: Die Einnahmen- und Ausgabentätigkeit findet auf verschiedenen staatlichen Ebenen statt. Zum anderen erlebt Rußland eine Systemtransformation, die für die Finanzwirtschaft wiederum ganz spezifische Bedingungen schafft. Im folgenden wird unter besonderer Berücksichtigung der Transformationsaufgaben untersucht, wie die Aufgaben- und Einnahmekompetenzen in Rußland als Föderation verteilt sind. Dabei werden anhand der wichtigsten rußländischen Normativakte zunächst die formellen Institutionen analysiert. Sodann stellt sich die Frage, ob und wie diese Normen in der Praxis befolgt werden. Um hiervon einen Eindruck zu gewinnen, wurden offizielle rußländische Statistiken und Dokumente sowie die Presseberichterstattung ausgewertet. Aus der Gegenüberstellung ergeben sich schließlich die Kritikpunkte an der rußländischen Finanzwirtschaft.' (Autorenreferat)

AbstractThis paper analyses the relationship between informal institutions measured by social trust and the provision of private credit. Research on the trust–finance relationship abounds, although most of it is confined to the micro-level, with far fewer contributions from a wide, cross-country perspective. Considering a sample of 119 economies in the period 1993–2015, results suggest that social trust is an important determinant of private credit, and that its effects are transmitted indirectly via some particular aspects of the quality of economic-judicial institutions. In addition, and contrary to previous findings in related areas, substitutive effects for informal and formal institutions are not found. Therefore, informal institutions can improve the quality of the certain types of formal institutions but they are, per se, unable to replace them in the provision of credit. Accordingly, a solid economic-judicial system becomes essential to guarantee credit transactions.