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the body of literature on institutional fragmentation and interlinkages has become quite extensive over the last 10-15 years, especially in global environmental governance research. This common ground and the merits of existing scholarly approaches notwithstanding, there are still major new conceptual, theoretical and empirical grounds to be explored. Conceptually, the literature could further go beyond additive accounts that are underspecified with regard to the quality of relations among various components of an institutional complex. Instead, more multi-criteria sets should be developed to assess and compare different degrees of fragmentation across environmental issue areas. Moreover, new methodical ground can be broken following the pioneering examples of different network approaches and mappings (Hollway 2013; Kim and Mackey 2013; Widerberg 2014). Similarly, more can be done to root the study of institutional fragmentation and interlinkages theoretically (Chambers et al. 2008, p. 7; cf. O. Young 2008, p. 134). What Underdal (2006, p. 9) observed nearly ten years ago for research on interlinkages also goes for fragmentation research today: the focus of explanatory approaches has been so far 'primarily on interaction at the level of specific regimes and less on links to the kind of basic ordering principles or norms highlighted in realist and sociological analyses of institutions.' Indeed, some the most influential approaches in the literature on institutional complexity suffice with basic ideas about causal pathways while falling short of more fundamental theoretical approaches that relate to concepts of power, interests, knowledge, norms or other scope conditions (e.g. Keohane and Victor 2011). Moreover, many studies still attend to the normative question whether a centralized or a polycentric global governance architecture is preferable (Biermann et al. 2009a; Ostrom 2010; Rayner 2010; Keohane and Victor 2011). This entangling of analytical and normative claims may have partly stood in the way of the development of more fundamental theoretical frameworks. To be clear: I do not mean to build a strawman argument here. As shown, various authors have begun to address this research gap more systematically, notably Oberthür and Stokke (2011), Gehring and Faude (2013), Zürn and Faude (2013) Orsini et al. (2013) and Van de Graaf (2013) – based inter alia on neoliberal institutionalism, sociological differentiation theory or functionalist approaches. As Zelli and van Asselt (2013) argue in the introductory article to a special issue on the institutional fragmentation of global environmental governance, causal explanations would not need to re-invent the wheel but could in part be derived from different strands of institutionalism and cooperation theory. This 'institutionalism revisited' could develop and examine assumptions that link the degree of fragmentation in a given issue area of environmental governance to, for instance: the constellation of power, drawing on neo-realist perspectives (cf. Benvenisti and Downs 2007); situation structures and constellations of interests, based on NEOLIBERAL INSTITUTIONALISM (cf. Rittberger and Zürn 1990; Van de Graaf 2013); major qualities of the issue area (e.g. the global or local nature of a good; the level of scientific certainty) and the question of institutional fit (O. Young 2002); conflicts among core norms or the contestation of discourses (Zelli et al. 2013; see also LIBERAL ENVIRONMENTALISM).Finally, a whole set of empirical themes merits attention of future single case studies or comparative analyses across environmental domains, for example:- the interactions between TRANSNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS and public institutions (Abbott 2014); - the consequences of fragmentation for different types of non-state actors, including further in-depth studies about the legitimacy, accountability and inclusiveness of complex governance architectures (Karlsson-Vinkhuyzen and McGee 2013; Orsini 2013); - the impact of fragmentation on the overall EFFECTIVENESS of a global governance architecture, by both QUALITATIVE COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS and QUANTITATIVE COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS, e.g. by adopting counter-factual approaches to an entire institutional complex (cf. Hovi et al. 2003; Stokke 2012); - the suitability and effectiveness of specific management attempts like ORCHESTRATION (Abbott and Snidal 2010);- the stability or fragility of institutional complexes, including the question whether they move towards a (new) division of labour (Gehring and Faude 2013) or rather towards new types of positional differences and conflicts (Zelli 2011).

We model a simple market setting in which fragmentation of trade of the same asset across multiple exchanges improves allocative efficiency. Fragmentation reduces the inhibiting effect of price-impact avoidance on order submission. Although fragmentation reduces market depth on each exchange, it also isolates cross-exchange price impacts, leading to more aggressive overall order submission and better rebalancing of unwanted positions across traders. Fragmentation also has implications for the extent to which prices reveal traders' private information. While a given exchange price is less informative in more fragmented markets, all exchange prices taken together are more informative. (JEL D47, D82, G14)

Forest fragmentation will inevitably continue over the coming years, especially in developing economies. This book provides a cutting edge review of the multi-disciplinary sciences related to studies of global forest fragmentation. It specifically addresses cross-cutting themes from both an ecological and a social sciences perspective. The ultimate goal of Global Forest Fragmentation is to provide a detailed scientific base to support future forest landscape management and planning to meet global environmental and societal needs.

The development of European Union law plays a fundamental role in the transformation of contract law in civil law systems. This article assesses these transformations of continental legal systems through the notion of juridical subject. It is argued that the evolution of a different conception and regulation of the juridical subject derives from a new conception of competition and of the market order, which involves a major transformation of the function of contract law and of the founding notions of this legal field. The transformations brought forth by a new conception of the market order and the development of the European Union are assessed on the basis of examples taken by French, German and Italian law. Just as the unity of the juridical subject and of the contract stemmed from a specific philosophical and economic approach, the same is true for the present fragmentation, which stems from a new understanding which challenges the foundations and the functions of private law.

This introduction to volume 7 of Inter Faculty traces the reasoning and objectives for taking the theme of Fragmentation and Divergence as the focus of discussion. It takes a close look at the discussions proper and their outcome. In considering the issues taken up here, the introduction underscores the complexity of the systems that make up the present globalised world (economical, political, social, cultural) and questions the role of research in human and social sciences, highlighting the importance of articulating the phenomena of mankind and his existence and those of nature.

"The peaceful protests that erupted in the southern Syrian City of Dar'a in March 2011 sparked a protracted protest movement that has now entered its second year. These uprisings have been met with fierce repression by the regime, which has until recently rejected all regional and national demands for a halt to the violence, instead offering cosmetic political reforms, for example, in the form of a political parties law and a new constitution. Thus far, the regime has been able to shield itself from a more substantive political transition process in large part because of the absence of a unified Syrian opposition. Although the Syrian uprising has created the political opportunity for the formation of multiple Syrian opposition groups, they have, to date, been unsuccessful in uniting under one common organizational framework. Rather, as the uprising continues, more and more groups claiming to represent the opposition have emerged, creating disunity, conflict, and mistrust between the different opposition groups. In this paper, the author asks the following question: What are the factors behind fragmentation in the Syrian opposition? Here, the author makes three claims. First, the presence of external and internal (inside/ outside) opposition groups has impeded coordination among different political actors and the formation of a cohesive, organized framework for the mobilization of the opposition. The dynamics behind inside/ outside divisions are complex, and include the lack of trust between different political actors and the inability of external based groups, such as the Syrian National Council (SNC), to affect political change on-the-ground. Following this latter point, the second claim made here is that the lack of popular representation among the protestors has contributed to fragmentation. This has created a legitimacy deficit that has multiple implications both domestically and internationally. On the one hand, their lack of popular representation has allowed the regime to avoid including these groups in a political transition process. On the other hand, this deficit has also prevented the international community from providing its full political and material support to the opposition. The legitimacy deficit is important to understanding fragmentation since it has discouraged Opposition groups from centralizing their coordination. To some degree, the legitimacy deficit is a product of failed political strategies. The final claim advanced here concerns the competing political strategies of opposition groups. Opposition groups have been confronted with key strategic questions since the uprising began, including questions of violence or non-violence, negotiation with the regime or not, as well as whether to support military Intervention. The political strategies adopted vis-a-vis these strategic questions have placed various Opposition groups in tension with one another and have contributed to their fragmentation. The most obvious example here is of groups that emerged, such as the Free Syrian Army (FSA), to exercise violence against the regime. These groups have caused major splits with those, such as the Local Coordination Committee (LCC), who advocate non-violence. Despite the political opportunity provided by the Syrian uprising, there remains no cohesive opposition. Rather, the opposition remains weak and fragmented. This fragmentation is reflected in the multiple splits between groups and the lack of coordination on key strategic issues. These divisions have negatively affected the possibilities for affecting political change in Syria and have worked to shield the regime from demands for a political transition process." (author's abstract)

This paper measures and compares fragmentation in aid sectors. Past studies focused on aggregate country data but a sector analysis provides a better picture of fragmentation. We start by counting the number of aid projects in the developing world and find that, in 2007, more than 90 000 projects were running simultaneously. Project proliferation is on a steep upward trend and will certainly be reinforced by the emergence of new donors. Developing countries with the largest numbers of aid projects have more than 2 000 in a single year. In parallel to this boom of aid projects, there has been a major shift towards social sectors and, as a consequence, these are the most fragmented. We quantify fragmentation in each aid sector for donors and recipients and identify which exhibit the highest fragmentation. While fragmentation is usually seen as an issue when it is excessive, we also show that some countries suffer from too little fragmentation. An original contribution of this paper is to develop a monopoly index that identifies countries where a donor enjoys monopoly power. Finally, we characterise countries with high fragmentation levels. Countries that are poor, democratic and have a large population get more fragmented aid. However, this is only because poor and democratic countries attract more donors. Once we control for the number of donors in a country-sector, democratic countries do not appear different from non-democratic ones in any sector and poor countries actually have a slightly less fragmented aid allocation.

Cross-border production chains tend to include geographically proximate countries. This suggests that increases in fragmentation should be largest among nearby trading partners, and thus may serve to localize gross trade. Using data on gross and value added trade from 1970-2009, we present three results supporting this conjecture. First, value added to export ratios are lower and falling more rapidly within geographic regions than between them. Second, gross trade travels shorter distances from source to destination than value added trade, and this gap is growing over time. Third, bilateral value added to export ratios have fallen most among nearby trading partners.

Kris McDaniel argues that there are different ways in which things exist. For instance, past things don't exist in the same way as present things. Numbers don't exist in the same way as physical objects; nor do holes, which are real, but less real than what they are in. McDaniel's theory of being illuminates a wide range of metaphysical topics.

This paper investigates the use of reputation in an economy where principals hire agents for two different kinds of tasks, in which the agents have differing aptitudes. Principal-agent matches are remade every period, but a principal can acquire some information on the past behavior of her current agent. I consider two different reputation mechanisms—one in which an agent's past record of defections makes no reference to the kind of task (Integrated Reputation), and another in which information about past defections is available separately for each task (Fragmented Reputation). The two kinds of reputation can be interpreted as "personal honor" and performance record (e.g. credit history) respectively.I first characterize the equilibria under the two mechanisms and make some welfare comparisons, showing that IR strictly welfare dominates FR over a significant range of parameter values. I then show that, when both mechanisms are available, integrated reputation will not be used in equilibrium by principals. Thus if the economy is in equilibrium using only the IR mechanism, and the FR mechanism becomes subsequently available, then IR will become obsolete. In the appropriate ranges of parameter values, this change reduces welfare.