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"Genetics and Heritability Research on Political Decision Making" published on by Oxford University Press.

Housing affordability is an issue in cities around the world, and Albert Saiz performs yeoman’s work in pulling together a wide range of policy options and examples from many cities and countries in “The Global Housing Affordability Crisis: Policy Options and Strategies” (IZA Policy Paper No. 203, October 2023). It’s nearly impossible to summarize the … Continue reading Housing Affordability Policy Options: Dutch Rental Housing Associations
The post Housing Affordability Policy Options: Dutch Rental Housing Associations first appeared on Conversable Economist.

How are employee's risk of being temporary employed linked to occupational closure? Stefan Stuth (2017) derived various measures for occupational closure to answer this question. The data set includes these measures for different Dictionaries of occupational titles in Germany for the years 2000, 2004, and 2007 (KldB 1992 with 4 digits, KldB 1992 with 3 digits, KldB 2010 with 5 digits). The closure measures provided by the data are:

1) Credentialism. Stuth calculates a "credential inflation index (CIX)" which relates the number of all newly awarded occupation-specific credentials to the number of employees in the respective occupation.

2) Standardization. This measure indicates whether credentials are standardized on the school/university level, the level of states or on the federal level.

3) Licensure. The indicator measures the licensure of tasks.

4) Title protection. The indicator measures the legal protection of occupational titles.

5) Occupational specificity. The measure indicates whether occupational incumbents performing highly specialized tasks or whether they are generalist and do a wide range of tasks.

6) Task-niches. The measure indicates whether occupational incumbents performing tasks that are only rarely performed by members from other occupations or whether they are doing tasks that are common for most occupations.

7) Occupational associations. This indicator states whether occupations are represented by associations that lobby on the behalf of their members.

8) Occupation-specific trade unions. The measure indicates whether occupational unions like the train-driver association (GDL) have the right to collective bargain on behalf of the occupational incumbents within firms.

Some control variables are also included.

"Labor unions are interest associations of workers in waged employment. They are formed to improve the market situation and the life chances of their members, by representing them in the labor market, at the workplace, and in the polity, and in particular by collectively regulating their members' terms of employment. Unions emerged in the transition to industrial society in the nineteenth century, together with the de-fedualization of work, the rise of free labor markets, and the commodification of labor. While employing modern means of formal organization, they represent an element of traditional collectivism in a market economy and society. Unions have taken a wide variety of forms and adopted different strategies in different historical periods, countries, and sectors. They are therefore favorite subjects of comparative social science." (excerpt)

The original signatory states to the Treaty of Rome had formally committed themselves to policies of liberalisation by implementing mutual recognition in the sector of professional services by the end of the twelve year transition period. In fact, the process took much longer and the freedom of services implemented in the early 1990s affected professional services in various forms and different degrees.
Business consulting is an industry with a tradition of rather low degree of market regulation in all European countries. However, it is indirectly affected by a high level of regulation in neighbouring fields of business services and in some of the fields where they have developed special consulting expertise. As a consequence re-regulations of these branches do have an impact on the consultants' business as well.
There is a wide agreement in the political and scientific debates over the shift of decision making arenas and powers from the national to the supranational and from the public to the private sector. We argue that business asso-ciations and large companies can be regarded as co-responsible for the increasing impact of supranational institutions on the sectoral governance.
Based on the analysis of documents and on expert interviews in Brussels and in Germany (with representatives of associations and companies) we will highlight the need for differentiation among professions (and would be-professions) and concerning groups of organisations (associations and companies).

The voluntary sector & participative citizenship are interconnected in complex ways that relate to areas of political, social, & economical pluralism & the development of varied initiative taking in society. In the political dimension, the voluntary sector provides service delivery, possibly through state contracts, & also seeks social change through advocacy & activism. It, therefore, experiences tension between financial relations & the need for independence. Services & goods provided by public benefit associations constitute social economy. This work often requires entrepreneurial skills & focuses on areas that are inefficient through the public sector. It requires government support through effective policy, & often protection through umbrella organizations. The voluntary sector is important in brokering policies & establishing issues in a wide range of policy issues, & has excellent potential to share expertise for government planning. The voluntary/civil sector is a source of new thinking & a link between the citizen, the activist, & the politician. L. A. Hoffman

Argues that the neocorporatist model of labor politics that was initially developed by early integration theorists, & applied by particular nation-states in the 1950s & 1960s, was never realized at the European Union (EU) level -- primarily because, in contrast to the nation-state level, labor continued to be underorganized & thus could not stimulate an interaction effect between capital, the state, & itself. The underorganization of labor is traced to wide regional disparities in Europe & corresponding differences in national labor movements. Other causes for the failure of the neocorporatist model in EU integration efforts include the presence of the Council of Ministers, which worked to halt any attempt by supranational bodies to organize interests, & the strength of national corporatist efforts. Three trends indicate that the restoration of neocorporatism at either the national or supranational level is unlikely: (1) an increasing differentiation of social structures & collective interests in advanced capitalist societies; (2) market instability & volatility; & (3) changing roles & structures of interest associations. The future of interest politics at the nation-state & EU levels in light of this context is discussed. D. M. Smith

More than 1200 political scientists, including some of the field's most prominent voices, are calling on President Joe Biden and other U.S. politicians to push for an "immediate ceasefire" in Gaza and an end to the Israeli blockade of the besieged strip."Only immediate ceasefire and provision of aid are adequate to prevent enormous further loss of civilian life," they argued in an open letter, noting that the conflict risks sparking a wider war in the region. "Continuation of the conflict also endangers the hostages whose safe return depends on a deescalation of hostilities.""As Israel's longtime patron and chief ally, the United States has both a special responsibility for this crisis and a special influence upon it," the letter continues. "The U.S. response to the Gaza war thus far has badly damaged its credibility and moral authority, giving rise to reasonable suspicions of U.S. proclamations about a 'rules-based international order.'"The signatories, which also include leading scholars of Middle East politics, join a growing list of academic and professional groups that have called for a ceasefire and argued that continued fighting will further deepen the humanitarian crisis in Gaza, where at least 13,000 people have been killed and an additional 1.7 million displaced over the past month.While polls show that a supermajority of Americans support a ceasefire, U.S. politicians have largely refused to advocate for a sustained break in hostilities, which President Joe Biden and many in Congress claim would play into Hamas's hands. "To Hamas's members, every cease-fire is time they exploit to rebuild their stockpile of rockets, reposition fighters and restart the killing by attacking innocents again," Biden argued in a recent op-ed for the Washington Post.The pro-ceasefire effort, which also condemns Hamas's actions, echoes a 2002 open letter in which leading political scientists urged then-President George W. Bush to stop the march toward the U.S. invasion of Iraq. In fact, the two letters share some signatories, including University of Chicago Professor John Mearsheimer and Harvard University Professor Stephen Walt, both of whom are non-resident fellows at the Quincy Institute, which publishes Responsible Statecraft.Other notable signers of the ceasefire letter include Margaret Levi, Jane Mansbridge, Lisa Martin, Rogers Smith, and Carol Pateman, all of whom previously served as president of the American Political Science Association, the field's leading professional group. Prominent scholars of non-state movements and peacekeeping — including James C. Scott, Page Fortna, and Melani Cammett — also endorsed the petition.This broad support from the political science community stems in part from the letter's carefully chosen wording, argues Lisa Wedeen, a professor at the University of Chicago who helped organize the petition. Wedeen told RS that the final language came a long way from the first draft, which was proposed by junior faculty and staked out a position that was unlikely to draw support from a wide swathe of political scientists."It had the advantage of offering a big tent perspective that could allow important scholars with disparate views to call resoundingly for a ceasefire," Wedeen said, adding that she is grateful to junior colleagues who agreed to tone down the language in order to build a broader coalition.Notably, the final letter says its signers "may differ about the precise outlines" of a resolution for the conflict but argues that "the crisis facing Gaza is so dire as to demand that we set aside for now any underlying disagreements about the broader conflict and register the urgent need for ceasefire and humanitarian aid."Wedeen says the letter has created an opportunity for the broader political science community to have conversations about the conflict and engage with its potential consequences. She has succeeded in persuading some colleagues to sign the letter by pointing out the "wishful thinking" of Israel's strongest backers, whose goal of completely eradicating Hamas harkens back to the U.S. "war on terror," a strategy that largely backfired against American interests.Some who refused to sign the letter argued that a "humanitarian pause" would be more appropriate than a ceasefire, while others claimed that Israel's campaign, however brutal it may be, is necessary in order to guarantee the safety of Israelis, according to Wedeen.Wedeen is pragmatic about the odds that the letter will have an impact on U.S. policy but hopeful that the initiative will bolster pro-peace efforts by "registering a kind of outrage and inducing political solidarity among other political scientists" as well as signaling to people in the Middle East that American scholars are also "outraged" at what she views as "a disproportionate response that is just ethically, unspeakably awful."

There has been much attention on journals and journal practices recently on the Leiter Reports, as well as elsewhere. The Association of Philosophy Journal Editors (APJE) has been relaunched by Carol Gould and me. Additionally, the APA has a subcommittee looking into journal practices at present as well.

Journal articles are highly important for academic careers. There are many reasons given for perhaps the more obvious benefits:

1. Journal articles as a seal of approval.
Journal articles are a seal of approval (of sorts). When a journal accepts an article for publication, it is giving its support to the essay's "publishability" (is this a word? Well, it is now!). This stamp of approval says to the wider community that an essay has a particular importance as judged by the journal and its associates.

Not all seals of approval are the same. One example is that not all journals run the same review process. Thus, journal x may be double-blind while journal y is triple-blind. Or journal x may use one referee while journal y will use two or three referees. There are also differences in persons used. Some journals may have a more prestigious list of editorial board members and referees to use in assessing essays than another. Therefore, even if two journals had the same formal procedures for assessing essay submissions, papers would be assessed by academics with very different backgrounds.

A further comment is worth noting. Many critical of journal practices have focussed their attention almost entirely to the mechanics of review: what procedure is followed, how long reviews take, etc. These are highly important issues, but far from the only central concerns. Others include how referees are selected and who these referees are. A further concern is the standard that referees employ in assessing submissions. Thus, the same referee might recommend different decisions for different journals. This is not always problematic. It may be that paper x submitted to journals y and z falls outside the remit of journal y but not journal z: there is then nothing specifically problematic about a referee recommending rejection for one journal and acceptance at another for the same paper on such grounds. Things are different where the remit of the journal is not at issue, but judgements about the necessary standards of publishable quality are an issue. The blog Ethics Etc had an interesting poll where many colleagues said that they would employ different standards.

In the end, getting published in a journal is a seal of approval by a certain team -- journals should be seem as a collective project involving editors, editorial boards, referees, and authors -- although there may sometimes be questions about the relative value of one seal approval versus another.

2. Journal articles as an academic job qualification.
In large part due to the fact that journal articles are understood as a seal of approval, journal articles also are often tickets to academic jobs as they are seen as academic job qualifications. Let me elaborate. Candidate x may be qualified for an academic job without articles. However, earning tenure regularly involves satisfying some standard of research productivity which, in turn, regularly involves demonstration of publications.

Furthermore, journal articles may be helpful to those candidates who come from more modest academic training grounds. Perhaps their department was not in a top ten list, but nevertheless the quality of research is quite high by candidate x as in the evidence of an article in journal y. The journal article as seal of approval can also play an additional role as providing further job qualifications both to acquire a new position and to earn promotions.


While many focus on the related (1) and (2) points above, I believe that there is a third element often overlooked:

3. Journal articles as academic brand awareness.
(I can already see readers cringe at my use of business-speak....I share your pain!) The article as seal of approval is a leading reason behind the importance of publishing in academic journals. However, I believe that there is something more to be said about this importance often overlooked, namely, articles are an excellent medium to communicate ideas. Suppose there are journals x, y and z. Some libraries may get all three; some libraries will have some combination of them; some libraries will only subscribe to one of them. Publishing in more than one journal is not simply a sign that you have earned several seals of approval by different journal communities, but an opportunity to reach a wider audience. This should give many reason to publish in more than one journal: it offers a better opportunity to communicate your ideas to more people. This is not to say that academics should publish the same thing again and again. However, often one's work explores new issues in a field where one has engaged in previous research on different issues. A person's work is often composed of papers that together make up a larger project on a set of issues, questions or concerns. Publishing in multiple venues may offer better brand awareness about your research project than if you stuck with a single venue.


The above are some reflections on academic publishing. What have I missed?

UPDATE: Many thanks to Brian Leiter for kindly noting this post on the Leiter Reports!

Die Chance ist da, unsere Wissenschaft Richtung Offenheit, Transparenz und Diversität umzubauen. Wir sollten sie jetzt nutzen. Ein Gastbeitrag von Doreen Siegfried und Klaus Tochtermann.






Das Open-Science-Magazin auf der Website des ZBW (Bildschirmfoto).






DEN BEGRIFF haben inzwischen viele schon einmal gehört. Open Science. Anfangs nur von einzelnen Akteur:innengruppen der Wissenschaftscommunity gepusht, fordern mittlerweile auch die
Europäische Kommission und nationale Forschungsfördereinrichtungen Open Science als "New Normal" der Wissenschaft ein.



 



Aber was genau soll das eigentlich sein – Open Science? Ist sie wirklich abgesehen schöner Reden schon mehr als ein Nischenphänomen? Und wie korrespondiert Open Science mit einer anderen, viel
beachteten – und diskutierten – Reformanstrengung in der Wissenschaft: der Etablierung einer neuen Logik der Forschungsbewertung? 



 



Wofür genau steht
eigentlich "Open Science"?



 



Open Science umfasst Vorgehensweisen, Methoden und Werkzeuge, mit denen der Forschungsprozess unter Nutzung der Chancen der Digitalisierung geöffnet wird. Zentrale Prinzipien von Open Science
sind Transparenz, Reproduzierbarkeit, Wiederverwendbarkeit und offene Kommunikation. Der Ansatz beschränkt sich nicht allein auf die Publikation von Forschungsergebnissen, er erstreckt sich
vielmehr auf die Offenlegung des gesamten wissenschaftlichen Prozesses – einschließlich Forschungsdaten, Forschungssoftware, angewandten Methoden und verwendeten Werkzeugen.



 



Der Gedanke basiert auf der Prämisse, dass wissenschaftliche Erkenntnisse als globales Gemeingut betrachtet werden sollten, um maximalen gesellschaftlichen Nutzen zu generieren.



 



Ist Open Science auf dem Weg, zum Prinzip für



gute wissenschaftliche Praxis zu werden?



 



Die wachsende Bedeutung von Open Science spiegelt sich in der verstärkten Aufforderung zu mehr Transparenz und Nachvollziehbarkeit in der wissenschaftlichen Praxis etwa durch die Europäische
Kommission und nationale Forschungsfördereinrichtungen wider.



 



Allerdings ist der Grad der Annahme in verschiedenen Disziplinen unterschiedlich. In vielen Fällen ist Open Science noch ein marginales Phänomen, aber der Trend bewegt sich in Richtung eines
neuen Standards für gute wissenschaftliche Praxis.



 



Neue Forschungsbewertung
als Katalysator



 



Im Januar 2022 wurde die Initiative "Coalition on the Advancement of Research Assessment (CoARA)" gestartet. Diese Initiative der Europäischen Kommission und der EU-Mitgliedsstaaten zählt zu den 20 Schlüsselinitiativen der neuesten Agenda zur Weiterentwicklung des
Europäischen Forschungsraums, die im vergangenen Jahr verabschiedet wurde. Sie zielt darauf ab, den Forschungsbewertungsprozess durch ein spezielles Abkommen, das Agreement On Reforming Research
Assessment, zu reformieren, welches auf zehn grundlegenden Verpflichtungen beruht.



 



Zu diesen Verpflichtungen gehört beispielsweise, mehr auf Qualität als auf quantitative Indikatoren (wie Zitationshäufigkeit) zu setzen und Beiträge anzuerkennen, die das Wissen und die
(potenziellen) Auswirkungen der Forschung voranbringen. Das CoARA-Abkommen wurde in Zusammenarbeit mit europäischen Wissenschaftler:innen, nationalen Förderorganisationen wie der DFG und
europäischen Dachverbänden wie Science Europe und der European University Association erstellt. Im Zuge des Entstehungsprozesses wurden vier Workshops organisiert, die jeweils zwischen 300 und
400 Teilnehmer:innen aus der Wissenschaftsgemeinschaft versammelten.



 



Wer treibt hier 



eigentlich wen?



 



Die aktuell laufende Reform der Forschungsbewertung und die ebenfalls wissenschaftsgetriebene Open-Science-Bewegung haben ähnliche Ziele: Sie zielen auf eine Kultur der Offenheit, Transparenz und
Diversität. Forschungsbewertung ist ein Critical Incentive Driver für Wissenschaftler:innen und kann die Open-Science-Bewegung erheblich beeinflussen. Daher sollten beide Initiativen
gemeinsam gedacht und aktiv verfolgt werden, um Synergien zu nutzen. 



 



Es gibt unterschiedliche Meinungen darüber, welche Initiative die andere antreibt. Manche sehen die Open-Science-Bewegung als Impulsgeber für Reformen im Bereich der Forschungsbewertung, während
andere argumentieren, dass ohne eine grundlegende Reform der Forschungsbewertung Open Science nicht den gewünschten Umfang erreichen kann. Letztlich sind beide Bewegungen stark miteinander
verflochten und wirken synergetisch.



 



Implikationen für die
Nachwuchsforschenden



 



Die Transformation in Richtung einer diverseren Forschungsbewertung und Open Science birgt das Potenzial, die Karrierewege für Nachwuchsforschende grundlegend zu verändern. Es sind nicht nur die
konkreten Outputs, die zur Diskussion stehen, sondern auch die Mechanismen und Kriterien, die zur Bewertung und Gewichtung dieser Outputs herangezogen werden. In dieser Umbruchphase sind junge
Forschende konfrontiert mit einer komplexen Entscheidungsfrage: Investieren sie weiter in traditionelle Publikationswege – oder diversifizieren sie ihren wissenschaftlichen Output, etwa durch die
Publikation von Forschungsdaten, Forschungssoftware, Policy-Empfehlungen oder erfolgreichem Wissenstransfer?



 



Dieser Paradigmenwechsel stellt das etablierte Verständnis von wissenschaftlicher "Qualität" und "Exzellenz" grundlegend in Frage, was bei einigen Forschenden zu einer kritischen Haltung
gegenüber den Reformen führt. Auf institutioneller Ebene obliegt es den etablierten Senior Scientists, einen Übergang zu orchestrieren, der die Karrierepfade junger Forschender nicht
kompromittiert und First Mover diesem Bereich nicht benachteiligt. Wissenschaftspolitische Entscheidungsträger, sprich: die Wissenschaftsgovernance, innerhalb der Reforminitiativen
spielen dabei ebenfalls eine kritische Rolle.



 



Darüber hinaus muss gewährleistet werden, dass sowohl etablierte als auch aufstrebende Wissenschaftler:innen adäquat in den Reformprozessen repräsentiert sind. Sie müssen gemeinsam neue
Messmethoden für neue Forschungsbewertungen entwickeln und sich insbesondere über die Wichtungen der diversen Forschungsbewertungs-Indikatoren unterhalten. Im Zentrum aller Diskussionen steht der
kollektive Wunsch, dass die Kriterien für die Forschungsbewertung mit den Attributen und Werten korrespondieren, die sowohl die akademische Gemeinschaft als auch Gesellschaft, Politik und
Wirtschaft von Forschenden erwarten und schätzen.



 



Der Kulturwandel: Ein notwendiger Pfeiler



für Open Science und Forschungsbewertung



 



Open Science und die Reform der Forschungsbewertung verfolgen ein gemeinsames Ziel: den Aufbau einer wissenschaftlichen Kultur, die auf Offenheit, Transparenz und Diversität fußt. Sowohl die EU
als auch nationale Förderprogramme definieren Open Science als unabdingbaren "modus operandi" für moderne Forschung. Mit dem Ergebnis, dass Wissenschaftler:innen aller Disziplinen zumindest
theoretisch mit den Prinzipien von Open Science vertraut sein sollten.



 



Die eigentliche Frage aber lautet: Werden diese Prinzipien auch in der täglichen Forschungsarbeit umgesetzt? An dieser Stelle rückt der Kulturwandel in den Fokus. Es ist unerlässlich, sich der
Grenzen traditioneller Messgrößen bewusst zu werden und die Notwendigkeit einer Veränderung zu erkennen. Eine diverser aufgestellte Bewertung würde bislang weniger beachtete Beiträge zur
Wissenschaft besser einschließen: vom Teilen von Daten oder Code über die Qualität der Lehre und den Wissenstransfer bis hin zur Wissenschaftskommunikation und der Nachwuchsförderung. Das
Ergebnis wäre ein ganzheitlicheres Bild des wissenschaftlichen Fortschritts.  



 



Es ist daher unabdingbar, einen Konsens darüber zu erreichen, welche wissenschaftlichen Beiträge als relevant gelten und welche Bewertungskriterien dafür herangezogen werden sollten. Wichtig ist
zudem, in der Diskussion zu klären, wie und von wem diese vielen Bewertungskriterien überprüft werden. Hier, so einige Kritikerstimmen, könnte ein zusätzlicher und kaum zu bewältigender Aufwand
in Begutachtungsprozessen entstehen.



 



Die Idee eines "one size fits all" ist in diesem Zusammenhang nicht anwendbar. Erst wenn die neu definierten Bewertungskriterien in Entscheidungen von Tenure Committees und anderen
Evaluierungsgremien einfließen, wird der Kulturwandel tatsächlich Realität. Bis dahin besteht die Herausforderung darin, den bestehenden Enthusiasmus und Optimismus, aber auch die Bedenken, in
greifbare Lösungen umzuwandeln.



 



Wie in der Open-Science-Bewegung ist auch hier der Prozess genauso wichtig wie das Endziel. Es geht nicht nur darum, eine endgültige Kriterienliste zu erstellen, sondern vielmehr darum, eine
Richtung einzuschlagen, die mit den wissenschaftlichen Werten im Einklang steht. Wie eine junge Forscherin treffend bemerkte: "Der Ball rollt langsam in Bezug auf die Forschungsbewertung. Was
Open Science dazu beitragen kann, ist ein bisschen mehr Aktivismus!"



 



Klaus Tochtermann ist Direktor der ZBW – Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft und Vorstandsmitglied der European Open Science Cloud
Association. Doreen Siegfried ist Kommunikationsmanagerin und arbeitet als Abteilungsleitung Marketing & Public Relations an der ZBW.




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With no ceasefire in the war between Israel and Hamas in sight and Houthi forces in Yemen still firing missiles and drones at commercial shipping in the Red Sea, the EU's efforts at addressing conflict in Gaza and its broader regional ramifications keep flailing.After weeks of discussions, the EU officially launched its naval operation in the Red Sea on February 19 to protect international commercial shipping from Houthi attacks. The Houthis claim they wantto force a ceasefire in Gaza. Yet, while the ceasefire remains elusive, the attacks impose real costs on EU members: the EU commissioner for economy Paolo Gentiloni recently estimated that the rerouting of shipping from the Red Sea has increased delivery times for shipments between Asia and the EU by 10 to 15 days and the consequent costs by around 400%. Around 40% of the EU's total trade with the Middle East and Asia passes through the Red Sea.Protecting that shipping route thus is an important collective economic and security interest for the EU. Yet only four countries — France, Germany, Italy and Belgium — out of the 27 member states have agreed to provide warships for the new operation. Spain, which refrained from using its veto power to block the initiative, nonetheless declined to participate, having expressed concerns from the outset that any armed operation would reduce pressure on Israel to agree to a ceasefire in Gaza. A bigger question is how effective this new EU operation will be in countering the Houthi threat given its purely defensive mandate to provide "situational awareness, accompany vessels and protect them against possible attacks at sea." Accordingly, the participating EU warships will be authorized to fire on Houthi targets only if they themselves or commercial vessels they are to protect are attacked. That rules out pre-emptive action against Houthi missile batteries or related targets.The defensive nature of the operation, however, may not be enough to convince the Houthis to refrain from attacking the European ships. In fact, Houthi leaders warned Italy, one of the new operation's chief promoters, that it will become "a target if it participates in attacks on the Houthis." If this threat comes to fruition, will the EU authorize offensive action against the Houthis, potentially drawing itself into a wider conflict? Will it rely on U.S. hard power for protection given that Washington is already engaged against the Houthis through "Operation Prosperity Guardian," in which a few EU nations – Denmark, Netherlands and Greece, as well as non-EU NATO members Britain and Norway -- are also participating? Would such developments not lead to a de facto merging of the U.S. and EU-led operations under Washington's lead — an outcome Europeans sought to avoid and which is the very reason why they launched their own mission in the first place? That these are not abstract questions is underscored by the failure, so far, of scores of U.S.- and UK-led strikes to degrade the Houthis' capabilities to the point where they would no longer pose a significant threat. Indeed, just as the EU announced its mission, the Houthis hit a British cargo ship which was at risk of sinking in the Gulf of Aden in what the Yemeni rebels claimed was their biggest attack yet. The United Kingdom Maritime Trade Operations confirmed the incident, though it did not name the ship.Ironically, the safest way for the EU to avoid a direct military engagement with the Houthis, apart from testing their vow to stop attacking shipping if Israel ends its Gaza offensive, would be to reduce the number of targets in the Red Sea by encouraging ships to reroute. But such an outcome would, of course, vindicate the Houthi strategy to impose costs on the Western powers for the failure to stop the war in Gaza.And that brings us back to the mother of all conflicts in the Middle East: the continuing war in Gaza. The EU's approach so far has been to delink Gaza from the crisis in the Red Sea and the broader escalation in the region, including clashes between Israel and Lebanon's Hezbollah. Yet mounting tensions on that front show that its approach is not working. Some actors in the EU understand the urgent need for a ceasefire in Gaza as a necessary condition for regional de-escalation. The EU high representative on foreign policy Josep Borrell has been particularly vocal in his criticism of Israel. He suggested limiting arms sales to Tel Aviv on the grounds that such transfers violate EU guidelines that ban sales to countries accused of violations of the international humanitarian law. A Dutch appeals court recently ordered a halt to exports of F-35 jet parts to Israel on the same grounds. However, it is highly unlikely that the EU as a whole would adopt such a position, given that a number of countries – especially Germany, Austria, Czech Republic, Hungary – strongly support Israel.A stronger point of leverage could be to suspend fully or partially the association agreement between the EU and Israel. The EU is Israel's largest trading partner. In 2023, that agreement enabled 46.8 billion euros worth of bilateral trade. The prime ministers of Spain and Ireland, Pedro Sanchez and Leo Varadkar, respectively, asked the president of the European Commission, Ursula von der Leyen, to "urgently review" whether Israel is violating the human rights clauses included in that agreement. On February 19, the Spanish foreign minister, Jose Manuel Albares, insisted that the review should be completed in time for the next EU foreign ministers meeting on March 18.A full suspension of the agreement seems very unlikely even if the Commission finds Israel to have violated its human rights obligations because that would call for a unanimous decision by all member states. A partial suspension would require a qualified majority: 55% of member states (or 15 out of 27) representing 65% of the EU's total population. Notably, the only precedent for taking such an action came in 2011 when the EU suspended an association agreement with Syria in response to mass violations of human rights by the Bashar al-Assad regime. Meanwhile, the EU proved unable last week to issue even an official appeal to Israel not to follow through with its plans to carry out a ground invasion of Rafah, the southernmost city in Gaza, which has become the last refuge of nearly a million refugees from elsewhere in the enclave. In the face of a veto threat by Hungary, the other 26 member states instead issued a joint statement warning of the catastrophic humanitarian consequences should Israel move ahead with such an invasion. Notably, however, Hungary was isolated in its opposition to the appeal as Germany and other member states that have traditionally been reluctant to criticize Israel's conduct of war were on board. That is a step forward, but it's too little and it comes too late. As long as the EU keeps avoiding imposing real consequences on Israel for its conduct, it will keep losing influence in the Middle East.

For the increasingly-desperate opponents of
Republican Atty. Gen. Jeff Landry
to keep him from triumphing in the governor's race, it's pinning their hopes on
making a thousand cuts – even if the "wounds" aren't real.

Just over a month prior to the general election,
Landry continues to have a commanding lead in the contest, much to the chagrin
of other candidates and their backers. Party regulars among Democrats behind Democrat
former cabinet member Shawn Wilson and
the party's white populist rump pinning their fading hopes on independent trial
lawyer Hunter Lundy see Landry
as the most dangerous to their agendas, while other Republicans and their
supporters see these candidates' chances of getting into a runoff with Wilson
and therefore an easy win going up the road.

So, to varying degrees, they have formed an unofficial
conspiracy to try to stop Landry. Their problem is his agenda is popular and
his background, often successfully through the powers of his office providing a
conservative foil to Democrats Pres. Joe Biden
and Gov. John Bel
Edwards, has inspired confidence among many voters that he best can start
the process of ejecting liberalism from Louisiana governance.

The strategy rests upon trying to dig up so many
little, if not microscopic, things that can make Landry look bad that his
candidacy dies from a thousand cuts. Within the past month, Landry found
himself subject to an ethics investigation over failure to file a document
about donated travel and struck by a negative
advertisement about a campaign donor in trouble for allegedly deceptive
legal practices.

The timing isn't coincidental. The trip, where
Landry hitched a ride with a longtime friend with no business with the state to
a conference, happened a couple of years ago, but only now came to the
attention of the state's Board of Ethics. That panel
populated with members with antipathy towards conservatives (Edwards
appointees from lists compiled by private college leaders, who as a whole don't
exactly lean to the right of the political spectrum) then voted to file charges
over failure to file the document – Landry essentially to himself – to be heard
in the near future.

It comes now because few would have known about
trip, and the person after not seeing a form filed held onto this until right
before the election – most likely somebody with connections to Republicans not
a fan of Landry's. Of course, the Edwards allies on the Board, given the
information, would run with it.

The ad by the GOP Treas. John Schroder campaign came from sharp
eyes culling the nearly 3,000 donors in the last quarter to Landry's campaign.
But it's no more than a wild attempt to create guilt by association where the campaign
can't control who gives to it and Landry's office has no role in determining
whether the donor violated legal ethics or the law.

The latest
involves a political
action committee of very shadowy origins, but which few records about it
points towards the Republican former gubernatorial appointee Stephen Waguespack, which ran the ad over
the weekend principally on the web. It accused Landry of giving an alleged
donor preferential treatment in prosecution.

Except that this accusation appears entirely fabricated.
So much, in fact, that a state court ordered cessation of its circulation.
Typically, the judiciary allows wide leeway in vetting the contents of campaign
ads over the very narrow grounds for injunctions, so to take this step
indicated a very blatant disregard for truth in the ad's contents.

But that wasn't the point of its creators, who
surely would have known the real facts of the case and that Landry's campaign never
received a penny from the accused given media coverage if it – also two years
ago – and transparency about donors. They likely knew it legally would get shot
down quickly because of its extreme departure from the truth, and they chose a
cheap path to thrust it into public view. Their end goal merely was to have it
discussed that could create an anti-Landry impression.

This all reeks of desperation, but also shows off
the competence behind the Landry team and Landry's campaigning skills. Over the
past two decades, all too often leading conservative candidates have been hit
with negative ads at best circumstantial, at worst ridiculous, where the
campaign belatedly if at all responded either with ads or other communications
countering the narrative or with legal action. The Landry campaign's swift
dismantling of this particular narrative means the incident will have close to
zero, if not zero, impact on the race.

Yet it doesn't mean further attempts won't be
made. That's to be expected as Landry's juggernaut to the state's highest
office seems to continue with few brakes.

China and the United States, like sports captains picking sides, have been engaged in a considered effort to enlist partners. In the recruitment rush, the Biden administration has given short shrift to the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and its much vaunted balancing, or "centrality" in the Asia Pacific. Washington, like Beijing, has favored certain ASEAN members over others, frustrated no doubt by the group's lack of cohesion and effectiveness. But in the new multipolar world, these hinge countries and their groupings can be as important as power poles. There has been a lot of coalition building lately. In August, the BRICS bloc — Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa — invited six new members to join at the start of 2024. In March, Iran and Saudi Arabia reestablished ties after years of antagonism in a deal brokered by Beijing. In July, China signed an accord on law enforcement and security with the Solomon Islands and announced a strategic partnership with Georgia. This month, China upgraded its relationship with American bugaboo Venezuela to an "all-weather" partnership.The U.S. has been similarly busy — perhaps more so to make up for Beijing's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) bridge-building over the past decade. In August, President Joe Biden and his Japanese and South Korean counterparts launched a trilateral grouping at Camp David. The U.S. and the Philippines in February revived an agreement giving increased American access to Filipino military facilities. In May, the U.S. and Papua New Guinea concluded a defense pact. At the G20 summit in New Delhi this month, the leaders of the U.S., the European Union, India, Saudi Arabia and other countries committed to developing an India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor for cooperation on clean energy, power grids and telecommunications. After the G20, Biden traveled to Hanoi where the U.S. and Vietnam announced that they were elevating relations to a "comprehensive strategic partnership," deepening cooperation in cloud computing, semiconductors and artificial intelligence — all areas of contention between Washington and Beijing. In a 2021 lecture, Biden's national security adviser Jake Sullivan described how the administration was assembling a "latticework of alliances and partnerships globally." This was "not just about refurbishing the old bilateral alliances," he explained, "but modernizing those elements of the latticework and adding new components." Sullivan cited as examples the upgrading of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, known as the Quad (Australia, India, Japan, and the U.S.), to leader level and the creation of AUKUS, the partnership among Australia, the United Kingdom and the U.S. to provide nuclear-powered submarines to Canberra and collaborate on advanced technologies.Both Washington and Beijing say they are not forcing countries to pick sides, though the impression that they do just that is unavoidable. Beijing has applied economic pressure on states for actions that it perceives to hew too closely to American positions — Canada, Australia, South Korea and Japan have had to deal with such coercion. In network building, the U.S. has offered more carrots than sticks, particularly when it comes to courting pivotal states that Washington deems to have distinct geostrategic importance and — more to the point — the capacity to contribute to countering or containing China. In the Indo-Pacific, India, the Philippines and Vietnam have been the chief recipients of American courtship. But what about ASEAN? Washington insists that it values ASEAN centrality, but the proof of its perspective is in its actions. Biden skipped ASEAN's annual leaders' jamboree with dialogue partners, leaving it to his vice president to go to Jakarta, but squeezed in a visit to Hanoi just days later. The president's participation in the G20 was a not-to-be-missed opportunity to butter up Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi, who only in June had been feted at the White House. India is the most-prized pivot country in the Indo-Pacific (that status so obvious in the term). Under Modi, it sees itself as a power pole in its own right. New Delhi has proven its multi-alignment credentials, with its participation in the Quad, the BRICS and the China/Russia-conceived Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), and its refusal to turn against traditional ally Moscow since the Ukraine war broke out. Biden is oiling the Indian hinge so it swings more Washington's way — and may be succeeding, given India's border clashes with China and its participation in joint military activities in the Pacific, Quad initiatives and Biden's Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for Prosperity (IPEF).ASEAN should be as critical a hinge player if not to win over, at least to keep "central" as the region's balancer — a crucial section of the lattice that would act as a security blanket for peace and stability. Some member states, worried that the China-U.S. rivalry undermines their agency, have warned the two great powers against forcing them to choose sides. ASEAN has not bought into the American Indo-Pacific construct, merely articulating an "outlook" on the concept. Southeast Asian nations will profit more not by putting on any one team's jersey, but instead playing the field as something of a referee or honest broker in good stead with both sides, however heated the competition.U.S. administrations have never taken the centrality of ASEAN seriously, largely because member states themselves have failed to show what it means to be the region's ballast. It is a systemic problem — ASEAN is no EU in either form or practice. Even though it has launched an "economic community" and has sought to address thorny problems, such as Myanmar and the South China Sea, as a group, it remains a politically divided, economically diverse collection of states, with a reputation for glacial progress and ineffectiveness. It was born this way, though it was successful in its founding mission to be a bulwark against communism's spread.But ASEAN has strengths beyond being the world's fifth largest economy. Its convening power is unmatched, reaching across economic and strategic spheres. Its ASEAN Regional Forum and ASEAN Defense Ministers Meeting-Plus are as evolved and inclusive a strategic framework for the region as is possible. ASEAN-led platforms offer a neutral space for the great powers to interact on a wide range of issues. By lavishing attention on certain ASEAN members — the Philippines, Vietnam and Singapore (host of a U.S. military facility) — Washington is mimicking the Chinese divide-and-conquer approach (Cambodia, Laos and Myanmar are reckoned to be on Team Beijing). But even small gaps weaken a lattice. The ASEAN way may be slow and plodding — negotiations with Beijing on a code of conduct in the South China Sea have dragged on for years — but this tortoise cannot be written off.In a speech on September 13 outlining "the power and purpose of American diplomacy," U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken tellingly never mentioned ASEAN. Yet, the Biden administration may be smartening up. Seven of the ASEAN 10 are part of the IPEF, the American answer to the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP), from which the U.S. withdrew, and the ASEAN-China concocted Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) trade accord. And guess who's coming to the White House for a bilateral with Biden in November? Indonesian President Joko Widodo, the very leader whom Biden "snubbed" in favor of one night in Vietnam. With its sizable population, strategic geographical position, participation in China's BRI, a maritime dispute of its own with Beijing, a growing strategic relationship with Washington, and a critical presidential election next year, Indonesia is the key hinge power in Southeast Asia. Like India, it has proven its agency and pragmatism, particularly in vital areas such as data security standards and infrastructure development. Giving Jakarta more attention would bolster ASEAN's position in the American Indo-Pacific latticework, especially with Laos, a country that tilts towards Beijing and is taking over from Indonesia as ASEAN chair next year.

Im diesem Beitrag stellt Bella Grosman folgenden Text vor:Cornejo-Valle, Monica; Ramme, Jennifer (2022): "We Don't Want Rainbow
Terror": Religious and Far-Right Sexual Politics in Poland and Spain.
In: Paradoxical Right-Wing Sexual Politics in Europe: Palgrave
Macmillan, Cham, S. 25–60. Online verfügbar unter
https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-030-81341-3_2.Dieser Aufsatz untersucht, wie in der Ideologie der extremen und radikalen Rechte (im Folgenden als Rechtsaußen bezeichnet) "Regenbogenterrorismus" als Bedrohung erschaffen wird und warum sie in Polen existiert, aber nicht in Spanien. Framing paradoxer PanikDieser Abschnitt beschäftigt sich mit den Mechanismen, die durch eine Politik kognitiver Dissonanz moralische Panik auslösen. Es handelt sich um eine moralische Panik, wenn eine Gefahr wahrgenommen wird, die die Ordnung der Gesellschaft oder eines idealisierten Teils der Gesellschaft bedroht. Polen und Spanien bilden hier ein Beispiel der "Sex Panik" als eine moralische Panik. Bestandteil sind reproduktive und sexuelle Rechte sowie alle, die für sie einstehen.Diese Panik wird zu einer moralischen Panik im Kontext von Religion und Nationalismus. Die Darstellung als Gefahr benötigt einen Prozess, bei dem Realität sozial konstruiert wird, was mit Paradoxa einhergeht. Ein typisches Paradoxon der Rechtsaußen (Sexual-)Politik ist das Einnehmen der Opferrolle unter Anwendung der "DARVO"-Taktik. Diese besteht aus dem Leugnen der Beschuldigungen, Zurückangreifen und Umkehren des Opfers in den Täter. Die moralischen Paniken der Rechtsaußen sind das Ergebnis von frames, die verschiedene Themen im gleichen framework in Verbindung bringen und zusätzlicher Untersuchung verschiedener politischer Chancen (in Polen und Spanien). (vgl. Cornejo-Valle und Ramme 2022, S. 28–29)Akteure der Rechtsaußen SexualpolitikDie katholische Kirche spielt in beiden Staaten eine wichtige, aber unterschiedliche Rolle in der Leitung des ideologischen Diskurses über kulturelle Fragen, Werte und nationaler Identität. In Polen propagiert sie vor allem Patriotismus. Durch die Wahl eines polnischen Papstes wurde das weiter gestärkt. Außerdem war sie die führende moralische Autorität während des politischen Systemwandels in den 90ern und danach.Eine Studie aus dem Jahr 2017 zeigte einen deutlich höheren Anteil an Katholiken in der Bevölkerung als in Spanien. Die sinkende Zustimmung und Unterstützung der katholischen Kirche in Polen ist eine neue Entwicklung der letzten Jahre. Die Kirche ist in Spanien weniger beliebt und wird wegen ihrer Zusammenarbeit mit den Faschisten im Zweiten Weltkrieg nicht als politischer Akteur gewertet. (vgl. Cornejo-Valle und Ramme 2022, S. 30)Obwohl in beiden Staaten die Kirche nicht sehr streng in Bezug auf außerehelichen Sex, Scheidung und Verhütung ist, ist sie in Polen gegen gleichgeschlechtliche Ehe und Adoption, während sie in Spanien dafür ist. Dennoch haben "anti-gender" Aktivist*innen in beiden Staaten einen katholischen Hintergrund, dogmatische Sprache, Anti-LGBTQ* Agenda, nationalistische familienorientierte "pro-life" Rhetorik und rechtspopulistische Zugehörigkeit. (vgl. Cornejo-Valle und Ramme 2022, S. 30)Bereits vorhandene Vereinigungen gegen Abtreibungen wandelten sich oft zu Anti-LGBTQ* Parteien. In Spanien drängten sich kleine Gruppen auf Plattformen zusammen. Alle davon mit direktem oder indirektem religiösem Hintergrund, der in deren Argumentationslinien und Rhetorik deutlich wird. Daraus bildete sich CitizenGo als einflussreichster Verband heraus und war Teil des globalen anti-gender Netzwerks 2012. Mit anderen Organisationen verbunden, verfolgen sie entsprechende Ziele als Teil der EU-weiten Anti-Abtreibungslobby. Hauptmitglieder dieser Organisationen sind oft auch in der spanischen Volkspartei (Partido Popular). (vgl. Cornejo-Valle und Ramme 2022, S. 31)In Polen ist die Anti-LGBTQ* Agenda hinzugekommen, steht aber immer noch der Lebensrechtsbewegung (gegen Abtreibung) nach. Die polnischen Gruppen "Jeden z Nas" (Einer von Uns) und die Polish Association of Human Life Defenders gehören ebenfalls zur europäischen Lobby. Außerdem haben beide Verbindungen zur Kirche (über Stiftungen). Radikale anti-feministische und -LGBTQ* Aktionen wurden durch rechtspopulistische Fraktionen, wie die 2019 Teil des Parlaments werdende Partei Konfederacja, organisiert.Sie vertreten ein Weltbild aus einer Zeit vor dem National-Katholizismus und Faschismus des Zweiten Weltkriegs. Es werden Vereinigungen mit Organisationen und Aktivist*innen, die gegen Abtreibung sind, sowie Rechtsaußen veranlagte Repräsentanten der katholischen Kirche eingegangen. Sexualpolitik wird hierbei an Ideen weißer Vorherrschaft, Rassismus, Antisemitismus und Islamophobie geknüpft. Ihre Konkurrenzpartei PiS wurde 2015 zur Regierungspartei. Das hatte zur Folge, dass Mitglieder der bereits benannten Organisationen höhergestellte Positionen in Ministerien und staatlichen Rollen einnahmen, so auch Sitze im Obersten Gericht. (vgl. Cornejo-Valle und Ramme 2022, S. 31–33)Rhetorik von welcher Krise? "Kultur des Todes", "Gender Ideologie" und die dogmatische Sprache der AngstAnalysen von Sprache und einem transnationalem ideologischen framework zeigten die weltweite Rolle der katholischen Kirche in der Systematisierung von Argumenten. Besonders wichtig war das Zusammenbringen und die Ausrichtung von Stammzellforschung, gleichgeschlechtlicher Ehe, Euthanasie, Transgender-Themen, Abtreibungen, künstlicher Befruchtung und Marxismus. Aus dieser Ausrichtung heraus sind alle diese Themen ein Irrglaube der "Gender-Ideologie", die durch marxistischen Feminismus inspiriert wurde.Gleichzeitig spiegelt der frame "Kultur des Todes" den Versuch wider, menschliches Leben auf der Erde auszulöschen, was gegen das Gebot der Vermehrung in der Bibel ist. Somit wird die "Kultur des Todes" zur einem "master frame", der erlaubt, über kirchliche Belange hinauszugehen und einen ideologischen Zusammenschluss mit anderen pro-nationalistischen Agenden einzugehen. Außerdem können dadurch Ideen, Fakten und Gefühle in einem frame untergebracht werden, der Schuldzuweisung zu marxistischen Feminist*innen, der "gay lobby" und Machiavellismus beinhaltet. Des Weiteren ist eine lokale Anpassung der Krisen an kollektive Emotionen und Erinnerungen möglich, sodass die moralischen Paniken lokal Sinn ergeben. (vgl. Cornejo-Valle und Ramme 2022, S. 33–34)Während in Polen ein offen homophobes und misogynes Vokabular von Politiker*innen, Aktivist*innen etc. verwendet wird, wollen diese in Spanien nicht als homophob wahrgenommen werden. Obwohl sich die frames dadurch unterschiedlich darstellen, ist dennoch auch in Spanien von einer "LGBT-Doktrin" und einem "falschen Recht auf Homosexualität" die Rede. Auch transphobe Kampagnen werden trotzdem umgesetzt. (vgl. Cornejo-Valle und Ramme 2022, S. 34)Insgesamt folgen einzelne Akteure in beiden Staaten dem Skript der globalen Rechtsaußen. In Polen kommt jedoch hinzu, dass Repräsentanten der katholischen Kirche Ideologien der Rechtsaußen offen ausdrücken, indem sie zum Beispiel vom "Tod der Zivilisation" primär als Bedrohung des Überlebens der "Weißen Rasse" formulieren. Außerdem sind Kommunismus und Staatssozialismus als wichtiger meta frame einzigartig für Polen. Somit werden egalitäre Werte als totalitär gewertet, sexuelle und Geschlechter-Diversität zu Staatssozialismus und Rechtsaußen-Positionen die einzige unschuldige und native Alternative dazu. Das wird durch das historische Verständnis von Nazismus als Deutscher Nationalsozialismus verstärkt und hat seinen Ursprung in Polens Geschichte als Satellitenstaat. (vgl. Cornejo-Valle und Ramme 2022, S. 36–38)Die Tradition des Diskurses wurzelt im Ersten Weltkrieg, als "das Judentum" und Marxismus die Feinde darstellten. Heute haben gender und LGBTQ*-Ideologien die Feindrolle abgelöst, werden jedoch immer noch an Judentum und Marxismus geknüpft. In Polen war das so erfolgreich, dass in einer Umfrage 31% der Männer die "LGBT Bewegung" als aktuell größte Gefahr für Polen angaben. Außerdem kam in Polen 2015 das frame der "muslimischen Invasion" hinzu, in dem Geflüchtete eine "sexuelle Bedrohung" für polnische Frauen und ein Anschlag auf das Christentum sind (vgl. Cornejo-Valle und Ramme 2022, S. 38)Verflechtung von Ideologien: Nationale Souveränität, Familismus und christliche VorherrschaftIm Vergleich fällt auf, dass obwohl spanische anti-gender und -LGBTQ* Akteure die gleichen Taktiken und Rhetoriken verwenden wie in Polen, der Diskurs nicht in die Mitte der Gesellschaft rückte und lange Zeit keinen Fortschritt machte. Schlüsselfaktor ist ein unterschiedliches Profil von Nationalismus. (vgl. Cornejo-Valle und Ramme 2022, S. 38)Nationalismus in Spanien wird als pluralistisches und säkulares Konzept in einem extrovertierten Stil beschrieben, den verschiedene Nationen gemeinsam haben. Im Gegensatz dazu hat der Nationalismus in Polen einen introvertierten Stil und ist auf Märtyrertum und einem Wiederbeleben nationaler Traumata aufgebaut. Sie werden politisch instrumentalisiert, um ein Gefühl nationaler Isolation und ethnischer Diskriminierung zu schüren.Die Rhetorik greift immer wieder auf, dass sich Polen in akuter Gefahr befindet und sich gegen diese "feindlichen Mächte von außen" verteidigen muss. Der einzige Unterschied dieser Rhetorik zu der im 20. Jahrhundert, ist, dass "der Jude" als Bedrohung durch "den Homosexuellen" ersetzt wurde und der "Jüdische Masterplan" (Weltverschwörung) durch eine "Lobby der Homosexuellen". Es ist also eine transnationale Wiederkehr und Fortführung antisemitischer Rhetorik zu beobachten. Jüdische Menschen bleiben weiterhin schuldig, denn sie stellen die überstehende Gefahr dar, zusammen mit Marxisten*innen, Feminist*innen und queeren Menschen.Eine Besonderheit der Rhetorik in Polen ist die Strategie der PiS, Polen als weiterhin unabhängiges Land darzustellen. Dadurch rechtfertigte die Partei während ihrer Regierungszeit ab 2015 "dobra zmiana" (gute Veränderungen) als Heilmittel für diese, zuvor durch sie etablierten, Krisen. Sie äußerten sich in Familismus bzw. der katholischen Familie als Grundbaustein der Nation, die die Souveränität von Polen aufrechterhält.Die katholische Kirche bietet zugunsten dieser strengen Sexualpolitik eine Unterstützung während des Wahlkampfes. Des Weiteren wurde 2020 die Pandemie und damit einhergehende mangelnde Protestmöglichkeiten genutzt, um demokratische Strukturen weiter zu schwächen. So wurde beispielsweise eine dreijährige Haftstrafe für sexuelle Aufklärung, die LGBTQ*-Themen enthält, eingeführt. (vgl. Cornejo-Valle und Ramme 2022, S. 38–40)Im Vergleich dazu wurden in Spanien durch einen Wertewandel Anti-Sexismus und sexuelle Diversität zu neuen Symbolen eines progressiven Spaniens. Zwar waren auch hier Nationalismus und Sexismus während der Diktatur bis 1975 miteinander verflochten, jedoch ist das heute nicht mehr der Fall. Dennoch rief das Gesetz zu gleichgeschlechtlicher Ehe eine nationalistisch motivierte anti-gender Antwort im Jahr 2005 hervor. Dieser ging zwischenzeitlich zurück und machte 2018 eine Rückkehr, die Nationalismus wieder mit sexuellen und reproduktiven Rechten verknüpfte. Viele Rechtsaußen Parteien erlebten dadurch ein schnelles Aufstreben.Die Zunahme der Diskussion um Kataloniens Unabhängigkeit im Jahr 2018 unterstützte das, da die Einigkeit Spaniens bedroht war. Davon profitierte die rechte Partei Vox. Sobald Vox im regionalen Parlament vertreten war, versuchte sie, die Forderung nach Souveränität wieder fallenzulassen und rückte Anti-Gender an erste Stelle. Vox gelang es innerhalb kürzester Zeit, ein nationaler Akteur zu werden und durch gewollt provokative Aussagen und Proteste eine starke mediale Aufmerksamkeit zu generieren. Elemente waren unter anderem Teil einer Wahlkampagne, und die Medienberichterstattung, die darauf einging, verstärkte den Einfluss von Vox in der Bevölkerung und verhalf ihnen zu 15% der Stimmen in der Wahl 2019.Auch Vox nutzte, wie die Volkspartei, die Covid-19 Pandemie als eine Chance, um xenophobe Argumente in Spanien weiterzuentwickeln. Im Gegensatz zu Polen diskutierte die katholische Kirche, das Wählen einer bestimmten Partei an ihre Anhänger zu empfehlen, kam jedoch zu keiner Einigung, da viele kritisierten, dass die Haltung gegen Geflüchtete und Migrant*innen unkatholisch sei. (vgl. Cornejo-Valle und Ramme 2022, S. 40–44)Schlussfolgerung: Paradoxe Paniken und transnationale frames für nationalistische AgendenObwohl polnische und spanische Konservative und Rechte versuchten, "moralische Paniken" herzustellen, gab es unterschiedliche Erfolgsraten. Um die Unterschiede und Gemeinsamkeiten zu beobachten, wurden drei Aspekte betrachtet: Totalitäre und autoritäre Vergangenheit, Katholizismus und Nationalismus. Sie setzen sich in Spanien und Polen auf unterschiedliche Art zusammen, dennoch wird auf der gleichen Rhetorik von Krisen gebaut.Solche Krisen und Gefahren sind Feminist*innen, Linke und Marxist*innen, die "gay-lobby", Nicht-Katholiken, Geflüchtete in Polen und Migrant*innen in Spanien. Diese globale Ansammlung nationalistischer und Rechtsaußen-Argumente sowie die Verwendung der DARVO-Taktik bilden die wichtigsten Paradoxa ihres Vorgehens. Das Ziel der Rechtsextremen, Einfluss über Staat und Bevölkerung zu gewinnen sowie eine Homogenität zu erringen, ist eindeutig. (vgl. Cornejo-Valle und Ramme 2022, S. 44–46)LiteraturCornejo-Valle, Monica; Ramme, Jennifer (2022): "We Don't Want Rainbow Terror": Religious and Far-Right Sexual Politics in Poland and Spain. In: Paradoxical Right-Wing Sexual Politics in Europe: Palgrave Macmillan, Cham, S. 25–60. Online verfügbar unter https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-030-81341-3_2.Möser, Cornelia; Ramme, Jennifer; Takács, Judit (Hg.) (2022): Paradoxical Right-Wing Sexual Politics in Europe. 1st ed. 2022. Cham: Springer International Publishing; Imprint Palgrave Macmillan (Springer eBook Collection). Online verfügbar unter https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/978-3-030-81341-3.pdf, zuletzt geprüft am 22.06.2022.