Abstract This article questions the role of historical analogies in reaching – or not – effective and durable agreements. It compares two emblematic cases, the Israeli-Palestinian case and the Franco-Algerian case, and focuses on the tension that exists between the weight of the past and the need to move forward. The purpose of the article is not to reduce the hardest cases to their historical dimension. It is rather to show that the ways in which the memories of past events are interpreted, misinterpreted, or even manipulated create the context that shapes peace processes. The analysis is structured on the three main functions attributed to historical analogies: representing the unfamiliar, assigning social roles, and framing action. The examination of these functions helps us to better understand how negotiators and mediators can try to live with the memories rather than without them or against them.
Using a recent book by Jeffrey Record as a point of departure, this essay considers the role of historical analogies in decisions by U.S. leaders to use force during the Cold War. The analogies considered by Record those of Munich and Vietnam may have had a bearing on some decisions, but it is often difficult to assess their relative weight compared to other critical variables. Moreover, several analogies not considered by Record Pearl Harbor, for example may have been far more salient during certain crises than the analogies he examines. In any case, we need a more systematic analysis of historical analogies than Record provides if we are to gauge the real influence and impact of historical analogies on the Cold War.
A review essay on a book by Jeffrey Record, Making War, Thinking History: Munich, Vietnam, and Presidential Uses of Force from Korea to Kosovo (Annapolis, MD: Naval Instit Press, 2002). Using a recent book by Jeffrey Record as a point of departure, this essay considers the role of historical analogies in decisions by US leaders to use force during the Cold War. The analogies considered by Record -- those of Munich & Vietnam -- may have had a bearing on some decisions, but it is often difficult to assess their relative weight compared to other critical variables. Moreover, several analogies not considered by Record -- Pearl Harbor, for example -- may have been far more salient during certain crises than the analogies he examines. In any case, we need a more systematic analysis of historical analogies than Record provides if we are to gauge the real influence & impact of historical analogies on the Cold War.
Purpose Historical analogies are everywhere in political discourse, but history teachers know to tread carefully. Even with relentless pressure to make history relevant, analogies can be as dangerous as they are appealing. On the one hand, cognitive research has showcased the usefulness of analogies in helping students distinguish between essential and superficial features of a phenomenon. On the other hand, historical knowledge does not easily boil down to core theorems or conceptual truths that hold constant across time and place. Comparing two moments in history does not expose an immutable law; rather, it creates a space to appreciate both what has changed and what has stayed the same. This paper aims to discuss this issue.
Design/methodology/approach In this paper, the authors draw upon the research on document-based lessons to craft an academically rigorous, intellectually authentic and practical tool for teachers to address the connections between past and present in their classrooms. In the process of doing so, the authors scrutinize comparisons between the fascism of the 1930s and the contemporary populism of President Trump as presented in today's media.
Findings In this paper, the authors offer an instructional tool to support teachers in transforming pat and reductive analogies into opportunities for rich historical learning. The historical analogy lesson template revolves around a central question, engages students in careful document analysis and includes instructional scaffolds that assist students in assessing the similarities and differences between both sides of the analogy. Using this tool can help students better decipher political discourse and map current events onto historical processes of continuity and change.
Originality/value Few tools exist to support teachers in facilitating rich learning about the connections between the past and present. As historical analogies are part of the language of political discourse, it is incumbent upon teachers to prepare students to understand and evaluate analogies in rich ways as part of the preparation for citizenship. The paper outlines a structure for teachers to approach these topics.
This article offers a conceptual framework that broadens & enhances our understanding of the role of "history" in contemporary governance & the attempts by policy-makers to "manage" critical issues. Building upon the literature on historical analogies in policy-making, we distinguish three dimensions that clarify how the past may emerge in & affect the current deliberations, choices, & rhetoric of policy-makers. We apply this in a comparative examination of two cases of crisis management where historical analogies played an important part: the Swedish response to (alleged) submarine intrusions in 1982, & the European Union sanctions against Austria in 1999. We induce from the case comparison new concepts & hypotheses for understanding the role of historical analogies in public policy-making & crisis management. 1 Table, 61 References. Adapted from the source document.
Established models of the domestic policymaking process accord some role to the individual decision‐maker, but they usually fail to show how policy decisions are ultimately influenced by the character of the information available to the policymakers concerned. Drawing on one prominent model of decision‐making developed by analysts of foreign policy—the analogical reasoning approach—this article proposes that individual‐level approaches are most useful in domestic policy analysis where decision‐makers must confront a discrete policy "episode" in which perceived levels of cognitive uncertainty and ambiguity are high. An analysis of decision‐making by political leaders during the 1967 Detroit riots reveals that these leaders made widespread use of historical analogies at various stages of the policymaking process. Policymakers can probably be expected to rely on analogizing under circumstances and contexts that make cognitive demands similar to those observed in the Detroit case.
This paper assesses the role that analogical reasoning played in Israel's decision making during the 2006 Second Lebanon War with Hezbollah. Two analogies seemed to dominate internal deliberations: the 'air power superiority' analogy which drew on more than a decade of developments in military theory and the air-based campaigns of the two Gulf wars and the Balkan wars of the mid-1990s and late 1990s; and the 'Lebanese quagmire' analogy which drew on Israel's own traumatic experience of Israel following the its first war in Lebanon in 1982. The misuse of these analogies by the Israeli political-military leadership during the war produced a myopic approach which advocated an almost total reliance on air power rather than ground maneuver to win the war and refrained from using ground forces for fear of entering another bloody and unpopular war in Lebanon. The constraining power of these analogies prevented the consideration of alternative courses of action or the effective calculation of cost-benefit analysis during the war. Whereas previous studies of the war provided various explanations to singular decisions or episodes, this paper shows that the air power and quagmire analogies contained the conceptual boundaries of Israeli decision making during the war and thus best explain its attraction and limitations. Adapted from the source document.
Analyzing mass protest movements in different countries this paper argues that protests against electoral fraud in Moscow in December 2011 do not represent "Russian Spring", "Orange Revolution", or a new version of Perestroika. Rather they have more in common with the Progressive movement that fought political corruption in the U.S. during the early part of the 20th century. The author notes that protest movement can provide new chances for institutional reforms and social development but only if main elite groups are ready to cooperate in elaboration of new more open and more transparent "rules of the game".
