Das Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft und Klimaschutz (BMWK) hat mit dem Vorschlag eines "mittelfristigen Brückenstrompreises" für energieintensive Unternehmen eine intensive Diskussion entfacht. Nach den Vorstellungen des … "GastbeitragBrückenstrompreisNeue Subventionen für die energieintensive Industrie?" weiterlesen Der Beitrag <b>Gastbeitrag</b><br>Brückenstrompreis<br><b>Neue Subventionen für die energieintensive Industrie?</b> erschien zuerst auf Wirtschaftliche Freiheit.
Der Fall Intel zeigt: Die Industriepolitik erlebt ein Revival. Anstatt die Produktionsfaktoren für alle zu verbessern, greift die Politik wieder zu Protektionismus und Subventionen. Der Beitrag Das Industrie-Imperium schlägt zurück erschien zuerst auf Prometheus.
That the slow development of the African continent can be traced to Western colonialism is an archetype of this field of study: Mainly interested in extracting natural resources for manufacturing industries sited elsewhere (e.g., Europe), foreigners have come for valuable minerals... and not much more. It would be neat if this story was confined to the history books, but we keep being reminded that it is instead very much a story of the 21st century still. Of note in this respect are the Chinese. The stereotype of Chinese industrialists enticing corrupt regimes all over the continent with easy money in exchange for mineral access is a story told over and over. Stung by this criticism, the PRC decided to change tack in characterizing their activities as developmental win-win situations: In exchange for being granted access to mineral resources, the Chinese would help improve the infrastructure of the countries they operated in to accommodate the influx of wealth brought by extractive industries. That is, improved ports, roads, power stations and so forth would better facilitate trade and development for all concerned. Well, that was supposed to be the story of the Belt and Road initiative:China's engagement in Africa, a focus of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), grew rapidly in the two decades before the COVID-19 pandemic. Chinese companies built ports, hydropower plants and railways across the continent, financed mainly through sovereign loans. Annual lending commitments peaked at $28.4 billion in 2016, according to the Global China Initiative at Boston University. But many projects proved unprofitable. As some governments struggled to repay loans, China cut lending. COVID-19 then pushed it to turn inward, and Chinese construction projects in Africa fell.The chart above indicates what's happened to the much-touted Belt and Road Initiative. Of course lending without conducting substantive due diligence to regimes with questionable governance records was not conducive to being paid back on time! Post-COVID and all these post-non-performing loans, the Chinese are back in Africa. However, the pretense of mutual benefit is largely gone, replaced by a massive focus on extracting more than Westerners can. Yes, it's neocolonialism at its crudest, but it is what it is:Worse still, lots of Chinese goods are flooding these African countries at low prices, creating substantive trade deficits with China all over the continent. In trade terms, it's likely a case of "dumping":With one of Africa's largest trade deficits to China, Kenya has been pushing to increase access to the world's second-largest consumer market, recently gaining it for avocados and seafood. But cumbersome health and hygiene regulations mean Chinese consumers remain out of reach for many producers...But Chinese manufactured goods kept coming. That's not sustainable, said Francis Mangeni, an advisor at the Secretariat of the African Continental Free Trade Area. Unless African nations can add value to their exports through increased processing and manufacturing, he said, "we are just exporting raw minerals to fuel their economy."The story never changes of foreigners exploiting natural resources and then profiting by selling higher value-added goods in these African nations, thereby stifling indigenous development that would occur by garnering capabilities to produce more sophisticated products. The Chinese can keep repeating holier-than-thou rhetoric about not being like those Western imperialists exploiting Africa with naked greed, but it's what they do and not what they say that ultimately counts.
Im Gesetzestext des AI Act befindet sich derzeit ein Schlupfloch. (Symbolbild) – Gemeinfrei-ähnlich freigegeben durch unsplash.com 愚木混株 cdd20In der EU verhandeln Kommission, Rat und Parlament momentan den finalen Text für den AI Act. Dabei könnte ein Schlupfloch im Gesetz landen, das Unternehmen Freiheiten lässt, die Gefährlichkeit ihrer Produkte selbst einzuschätzen. 118 zivilgesellschaftliche Organisationen aus ganz Europa fordern, das nicht zuzulassen.
Addled horses may be the least of horse racing's worries if the sport's subsidies take a hit.As a casual follower of horse racing, I was intrigued by the legendary horse trainer Bob Baffert being barred from participating in the third leg of the Triple Crown, the Belmont Stakes, due to doping. Baffert has already been cited for doping a number of times, but this time is the most noteworthy, just coming off a Kentucky Derby victory in the sport's most prestigious event. As it turns out, horse racing--in the United States at least--is a dying sport. if the pot of money being contested over keeps shrinking, well, that would help explain why even the most prominent trainers are tempted to turn the odds in their favor through underhanded means. Unbeknownst to me, and I suspect most everybody else outside the industry, American horse racing circa 2021 cannot stand on its own... four legs. Probably by invoking nostalgia and tradition, the industry has managed to wangle massive state government subsidies: It's a story rarely told outside the racing industry, and understandably so: Horse racing is propped up by tax dollars from casinos that have nothing to do with what happens on the track or at the betting windows. Although the sport loses public interest with each passing year, at least 24 states, almost three-quarters of those with racing, directly subsidize it with public funds. Based on publicly available information and statistical analysis, the total is likely close to $1 billion annually.New York and Pennsylvania alone account for half of that amount; over the last 15 years, they've distributed around $6 billion. Both states also forgo countless millions each year in sales taxes they don't charge on racehorse purchases, an exemption that doesn't apply to other kinds of horses.Throughout the country, horse racing has become so heavily subsidized that it resembles a public enterprise. In Pennsylvania, for instance, the Race Horse Development Fund is the state's single largest economic development program, and it funds nearly every aspect of horse racing, from purses to support for breeders, health and pension benefits for horsemen, drug testing of the horses, and even racetracks' advertising costs.Is horse racing too big to fail, in financial parlance? The emerging backlash is that these taxpayer dollars are going to an increasingly marginal pastime whose patrons are mostly the rich who can spare cash to gamble with when there are so many urgent social concerns:But the issue isn't going away, especially not as the pandemic has dynamited state finances, leaving lawmakers with tough decisions. This February, [Pennsylvania governor] Wolf again included a cut to racing's subsidy in his proposed 2021 budget. And last week, the editorial board of The Philadelphia Inquirer called for the industry to be "put out of its misery.""It's like a giant party on the Titanic," Ward said, "except the guests know what is coming." For racing's dependence on public money, Pennsylvania might be just the tip of the iceberg.The doping scandal will probably only raise more questions the industry would rather the general public be unaware of. Make no mistake: American horse racing, a pastime for the wealthy, is on the dole in a big way.
More to come on how to think about the various tariffs (which seem to come under various authorities, including Sec. 232, Sec. 301, countervailing duties, etc., the White House statement doesn't spell it all out) in a bit. But first, some slides covering nuances of trade policy (not even thinking about national security issues) from […]
Der Computerspielpreis starte mit einem Förderstopp – Gemeinfrei-ähnlich freigegeben durch unsplash.com RivageDer Computerspielpreis ist eines der großen Events in der Gamingszene in Deutschland. Doch um die heimische Spieleindustrie steht es schlecht und ihre Zukunft bleibt durch fehlende Förderung ungewiss. Ein Kommentar.
Western weapon makers are preparing to set up shop in Ukraine, raising questions about how the U.S. government will guide industry efforts to establish weapon manufacturing capacity there. It's imperative the government weigh in sooner than later, given that U.S. contractors have already made commitments to jointly produce weapons with Ukraine.Last month, 252 companies from over 30 countries convened in Kyiv for the International Forum of Defense Industries. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky announced the creation of a new Defense Industries Alliance with the goal of protecting Ukraine and "any nation in the world from aggression." The alliance will help Ukraine localize weapon production for its fight against Russia.At least 59 companies from 23 countries — including France, Britain, Germany, and Sweden — have joined the alliance so far. According to Ukrainian Foreign Affairs Minister Dmytro Kuleba, this means contractors have made "concrete commitments to create necessary weapons" in partnership with Ukrainian defense companies.There are scant details about U.S. companies joining, but the wheels seem to be in motion — only a week before the forum, three U.S. defense industry associations reportedly signed cooperation agreements with the Ukrainian government, involving over 2,000 U.S. military contractors in future potential co-production efforts. Boosting weapon production in Ukraine will undoubtably strengthen the military's ability to fight Russian aggression while easing pressure on Western production lines — a particularly appealing prospect to the United States now that it is supporting two ongoing wars. But the Pentagon can't leave it to military contractors to figure out the mechanics of joint production.Military contractors consistently lobby for more national security spending. Meanwhile, contractors price gouge the Pentagon and downplay their financial health to stuff the pockets of shareholders. They cannot be trusted to carry the torch into what appears to be the next chapter of U.S. support for Ukraine: industrial collaboration. The Pentagon must guide co-production efforts by clarifying relevant policy on military technology transfers and production overseas, as well as coordinating with industry to ensure co-production efforts are efficient and cost-effective.The Pentagon has been openly encouraging "friend-shoring," or "co-development, co-production and co-sustainment" with partners to expedite weapon production and ease the strain on the U.S. industrial base. The Wall Street Journal has reported that the department is even "relaxing rules" to share military technology with and authorize production by manufacturers in allied nations like Poland and Germany. The key question is how, and whether, such relaxed rules apply to a country at war.The Pentagon will likely facilitate the lion's share of joint ventures with Ukrainian manufacturers, but the State and Commerce departments could be involved if such ventures included the transfer of certain weapons or technology. The Commerce Department is notably lacking in transparency when it comes to reporting exports of certain small arms, including various firearms, artillery, and ammunition (which Ukraine currently desperately needs). So the logistics of joint production also directly impact the level of transparency around the U.S. defense industry's investments within Ukraine — the security implications of which warrant further exploration.Since the war in Ukraine began, most U.S. security assistance to the country has flowed from well-documented supplemental spending packages. Logistically, the Defense and State departments have channeled aid through presidential drawdowns, the Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative, and the Foreign Military Financing program. Presidential drawdowns comprise the majority of this aid, with the secretary of state — in coordination with the Department of Defense — so far facilitating 44 drawdowns from Pentagon stockpiles to transfer arms to Ukraine.The administration has consistently detailed both the scope and nature of this military assistance to Ukraine since Russia's invasion, a welcome reprieve from an otherwise discouraging trend in arms trade transparency. But House Republicans are increasingly hostile toward more security assistance for the country, and public support is declining. For that reason, the Biden administration's latest request for supplemental Ukraine aid may be the last until the 2024 elections.Still, President Biden has stated that the United States will support Ukraine "for as long as it takes," committing to "bolstering Ukraine's defensive capabilities in the long term, including through partnerships with Ukraine's defense industrial base." In September, Biden announced that the U.S. government will soon host a conference to convene defense, business, and government leaders from the United States and Ukraine to "explore options for joint ventures and co-production."These partnerships could very well become a significant channel for U.S. support to Ukraine as both political will for arms transfers and Pentagon stockpiles dwindle. As the Pentagon prepares its upcoming (and first) National Defense Industrial Strategy, it should prioritize shaping the parameters and guardrails for joint production to ensure that it's maximally effective in aiding Ukraine and protecting the Pentagon from potential contractor malfeasance.
In der Podcastserie "EU to go – Der Podcast für Europapolitik" präsentiert das Jacques Delors Centre kompakte Hintergründe zur aktuellen Europapolitik. Einmal im Monat analysiert Moderatorin Thu Nguyen zusammen mit Gästen ein aktuelles Thema. In 20 bis 30 Minuten erklären die Policy Fellows und Forscher:innen Zusammenhänge und stellen Lösungsansätze vor. "EU to go – Der Podcast für
On Tuesday 18 July 2023, André François Giroux, Consul General of Canada in Sydney, and Jerome de Baecque, Director of APAC for Moment Factory, addressed the Institute on the intersection between culture and diplomacy, drawing on Canada's experience in Australia and the Asia-Pacific. André opened with a comment on the connective function of diplomacy. Countries, […]
Australia is losing its ability to manufacture basic materials, with recent plant closures spelling the end to local production of polyethylene and the industrial gas helium, while the future of Australian nickel refining is in ...
A Cato Institute policy brief found that while licensed occupations see a nice bump in pay, licensing requirements lower wages for other similar occupations.
For some Russian regions, the country's invasion of Ukraine means they face shelling and dwindling export revenues due to sanctions. For others, it means an unprecedented influx of cash as they profit from the flywheel of war and growing domestic consumption.
Persistently high levels of unemployment have emerged to become a key policy challenge in Nigeria. Between 2010 and 2018, the unemployment rate rose from 5 percent to 23 percent. Worsened by the COVID-19 pandemic, the economy is simply not generating enough jobs for labor entrants, particularly women and youth. In 2020, the national unemployment rate…
