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A number of interpreters & critics have often complained that Rawls's concept of the individual contains an element of schizophrenia. How is it possible that privately a person is a staunch believer in a moral doctrine, while publicly adopting the principles of political liberalism? The author tries to show how Rawls's concept of the overlapping consensus might avoid this objection. The paper brings two major critiques of Rawls's overlapping consensus: Gray's & Barry's. John Gray claims that the very pursuit of such a consensus is illusory; instead, he advocates a modus vivendi. According to him, the consensus promoted by Rawls is unfeasible even in the US due to the emergence of the so-called "moral majority," & the fact that a huge portion of the population practices rather bigoted variants of Christianity. Brian Barry criticizes Rawls because of his renunciation of his original position, which is apparent in his problematic search for the support from comprehensive doctrines. This maneuver is ill-advised, as it is hard to believe that those citizens who are ardent partisans of a comprehensive doctrine might simply "graft" political liberalism upon it & then, in case of a conflict between their concepts of the good & the justice that political liberalism requires, accept the primacy of justice. The author claims that these criticisms could not be refuted had Rawls believed that the overlapping consensus might be realized in the near future. Rawls, however, is not unrealistic; he only provides arguments why such a consensus might be possible. Rawls finds the grounds for his optimism in the belief that just institutions drastically advance the sense of justice. This means that those who would in the future embrace the overlapping consensus would not have to be schizophrenic after all. 6 References. Adapted from the source document.

What is the state of consciousness of modernity presently like? Is modernity as out of date as is claimed by neoconservatism in general & the postmodernists in particular? Neoconservatists accuse modern culture of undermining the ethical foundations of social life. The author shows that neoconservatism does not understand the relation between culture & society, & that it ascribes to cultural modernity the pathological syndromes (hedonism, narcissism, loss of identity) which are, in fact, the product of capitalist modernization of economy & society. Through money & power, the systemic imperatives of market economy & of the bureaucratic state gravely endanger the world of life & the process of cultural reproduction & social integration. Thus, it is solely through distinction between societal & cultural modernization that one can also understand the pathological effects resulting from the sphere of culture itself. While societal modernization is characterized by a growing autonomy of purposefully rational activity (in market economy & administration), which leads to colonization of the world of life, cultural modernization is marked by an increasing differentiation of cultural value spheres (science, morality, art) based on varied aspirations to validity (truth, rightness, authenticity) & by a differentiation of structures of rationality (cognitive-instrumental, moral-practical, aesthetic). Conservative critics of the aporiae of modern culture reject the entire project of modernity, advocating either a return to pre-modernism, or a step forward into postmodernity, or else mere anti-modernity (philosophers such as Nietzsche, Heidegger, Bataille, Foucault, Derrida). In contrast to them, the author sees the potentials of modernity in the protection & development of the sphere of communicational rationality against the systemic imperatives of economy & of the state, in the reestablishment of links between the spheres of science, morality & art, & in connecting the corresponding expert cultures with the communicational practice of the world of life. Thus perceived, modernity is still an unfinished project, which encompasses historical emancipatory potentials only as a differentiated reactive linkage of modern culture with everyday practice, only if societal modernization can also be steered down other non-capitalist paths, if the world of life can develop out of itself institutions limited by the dynamics of the economic & administrative system. Adapted from the source document.

The author analyzes the direction that the European Union has taken after the Nice conference. In order to create an appropriate & transparent competency system for the European Union, the priority on today's agenda are the models borrowed from the constitutions of different federal states. The first model is the so-called dual federalism that evolved in the US. This model aspires to strictly separate the European competency & the member countries' competency. The second option has been provided by the German Fundamental Law (Constitution). According to this model, the European Union would be accorded competences in line with the systematics of the exclusive, competitive & comprehensive legislation. The author is of the opinion that this would lead to a sort of formal transparency but would not completely prevent the overlapping of the competences of the Union, its member countries & other territorial units. A special focus is given to the transparency & efficacy of the reform process. Also, it is emphasized that a coherent coordination of the horizontal & vertical reform of the competency system is called for. Regarding democracy, the author thinks there is no need for a new model of democracy, but a systematic revision of the existing system of decision making in the European Union. Besides, a genuine democratization would not set its sights solely on reforming institutional regulation, but also on strengthening the mediation bodies. This would improve the relations between the public & the parliaments of the nation-states & the federal units concerning European issues. This would go hand in hand with an expansion of European party organizations & a more efficient "Europeanization" of central associations & institutions for interest-promotion. And finally, the author looks into the traditional boundaries between the private & the public. The public sector would take over from private economy some established procedures or would completely hand over certain tasks. This would require well-defined criteria. Also, an efficient control by parliaments & government bodies is necessary as a guarantee of innovation & cost-effectiveness & as a protection against abuse. This might help to turn Europe into a place of unity & cooperative behavior. Adapted from the source document.

The author looks into the structure & explanation of the socioeconomic expectations of young people regarding Croatia's future drawing on the theoretical framework & operational model of historical consciousness & on findings of a 1995 international study of 27 European countries & a replication of the study in Croatia in 2000. The findings show that the structure of such expectations may be explained by a universal factor of sociopolitical pessimistic/optimistic expectations of Croatia's future. This structure is in line with the expectations of young people from other European states concerning the future of their respective countries. Unlike in other European states, the Croatian youth in 1995 were optimistic in their socioeconomic assessments. The same conclusion was reached in 2000, the only exception being the pupils of Serbian extraction from the Danube region; this group represents the most pessimistic group at both levels of comparison. The perceptions of the present can account for 8%-20% of the variance of the variable of the expectations of young people. There is a significant decrease in the predictive power of the ethnic-religious value orientation, while the influence of attributing material differences to injustice in the society is constant. Concerning interethnic differences in the Danube region, it seems that the opposite expectations are partly due to the identical ideological ethnocentric pattern, indicative of the perpetuation of the attitudes generated during the disintegration of the former Yugoslavia. The notions of the past can explain 12%-13% of the variant of the criterion variable. In most samples, the best single predictor is the critical attitude toward democracy as a historical product, with the exception of the pupils of Serbian extraction in the Danube region; together with other predictors, this indicates that the expectations about Croatia's future of these youth are not based on the perception of democratic processes. Also, they reflect a lower level of confidence in the democratic institutions of the Republic of Croatia. 4 Tables, 2 Figures, 16 References. Adapted from the source document.

The author holds that the constitutional theory today is put to the test in three areas. The first is the problem of the relationship between transnational regimes & government institutions. Constitutional/legal theory is faced with the question how the norms concerning transnational regimes can acquire the dignity of legal norms via "constitutionalization." The second challenge is posed by transnational regimes sui generis such as the EU's legal system. The third concerns the process of EU's expansion. For the author, a constitution is both an instrument & a symbol; ie, it is doubly coded. On the one hand, it leans on practice & instrumental implementation, & on the other on the world of representation. There are different types of constitutions. Type one are manifests, largely solely symbolically coded. Type two are the constitutions in the form of contracts, structured more in the form of a legal relationship between discrete actors than a monolithic symbolic corpus. Type three are programmatic or planned constitutions, & they are associated with the rise & fall of socialist societies. They identify the already politically defined developmental goals. And finally, there are the so-called constitutions-cum-laws. These are a result of a regular legislative process that enables people in the capacity of presumed agents of sovereignty to debate constitutions & accept them. The author's opinion is that the transition of Central- & East-European countries is a transition from the simple-coded with the primacy of the symbolic to the double-coded constitutions. This transition is not smooth. The first difficulty lies in "transplanting" constitutional solutions to different social/historical contexts. The second relates to the anticonstitutional mentality that prevails in these societies. Despite everything, the constitutional balance in Central & Eastern Europe is satisfactory on the whole. The constitutions of these countries are interesting because of three symbolic aspects. The first refers to the constitution formation processes in which these societies ceased to be objects of authoritarian rulers. The second aspect regards the search for new forms of identity & unity. The third aspect refers to the attempts to banish tyranny from politics & social life by means of legal chains. 35 References. Z. Dubiel

The texts focuses on constitutionalisation of democracy in the European Union and the phenomenon of democratic deficit through the failed Constitution for Europe and, thereafter, the Lisbon Treaty, which takes over the definition of democracy as the foundation of the European Union. In this context, the author also looks into the contribution of political scientist Zvonko Posavec, who was one of the first in Croatia to advocate the need for constitutionalisation of the European Union as a project of finalising the process of European integration. While writing about the need for constitutional foundation of the European Union, Posavec simultaneously reflects on representative democracy as the form of democracy on which the European Union is predominantly founded. Beside a valorisation of Posavec's works on democracy in the European Union, this paper deals with the problem of the democratic deficit in the European Union which is manifest in the lack of democratic legitimacy of EU institutions, with the sole exception of the European Parliament. The author finds, however, that the main deficit of the European Union is not the democratic process, but political alienation. He perceives the latter as alienation of citizens from the EU as a derivative community, non-transparent and distanced from the basic interests of the citizens and the media interest in politics. Although the European Union declaratively relies on basic democratic values, in practice democracy is experienced primarily through a democratic deficit contrasted by a more obvious bureaucratic surfeit of the European political construction. The author asserts that the Lisbon Treaty was a step towards founding the EU on democratic principles inasmuch as it introduced elements of participative democracy, although it did not accept proposals for introduction of direct democracy in the EU. Finally, the author puts forward some ideas which might reduce the degree of political alienation of citizens in relation to the European Union; this requires giving greater authority to the European Parliament, abolishing the monopoly of the legislative initiative of the European Commission, incorporating the Council of the European Union into the European Parliament as the second House, i.e. the European Senate, and consequently implementing the mechanism of consulting the citizens regarding the legislative initiatives of the EU. The author concludes that the democratic deficit and political alienation cannot be overcome in the European Union without overcoming the democratic deficits and concrete forms of political alienation in the member states which the European Union consists. Adapted from the source document.

Jacques Bidet's theory of modernity is a fascinating research project which confronts us in a challenging way with a series of key theoretical & practical problems. The text focuses on the concepts of metastructure, domination, class & democracy. The most important concept is "metastructure," which is to be perceived as all coordination & legitimation resources (on the economic, legal-political & cultural levels -- the overcoming of any transcendental order) at the disposal of the citizens of modernity. These resources can be combined in several different ways, in varied structures of modernity. How are we to understand the ontological status of this metastructure? A full answer confronts us with another question: is it possible to offer a scientific explanation of the genesis of this modern (meta)structure? Thus, if metastructure is some sort of general grammar of modernity, the social structures are an actualization of the possibilities of metastructure according to the spectrum ranging from the extreme of planned collectivism to the extreme of liberistic capitalism. Consequently, the duality of modernity is manifest in the fact that it is characterized, on the one hand, by universalistic legitimacy and, on the other, by the persistence of forms of (class) domination. According to Bidet, in capitalism a dominant class will be established with two poles -- property & competence -- which correspond to the interlinkage of market & organization in such a form of society. For this reason, an attempt to achieve emancipation from the domination of the proprietor, in the case of planned collectivism, developing to the full the organizational dimension in order to satisfy the social needs in a more egalitarian way, necessarily results in the organizer's domination. But the thesis that the dominant class in capitalism has two poles (property & competence) is met with the objection that simultaneously too much & not enough is said about the second pole of this class (of managers). Namely, it remains unclear how we must think the unity of capitalist domination in the plurality of spheres of social power; & if, on the contrary, we must abandon this unity, why should we limit ourselves to only two poles? The author concludes with a discussion of two questions which he deems to be decisive: to what extent can the inequalities related to property or competence be designated as class relations or forms of domination? And what is the relation between various modalities of class relations or relations of domination, & the institutions of modern poliarchic democracy which is centered on the multi-party system? Adapted from the source document.

In Karl Popper's famous book, The Open Society and Its Enemies, appears the formulation social engineering. That is an unfortunate wording. There is nothing mechanical in Popper's political strategy. The keywords are rather piece-meal & trial & error. It is even possible to characterize Popper as -- up to a point -- anti-rationalistic. His warning that we should not think too much of our knowledge of the functioning of the social world & of our ability to make forecasts, reminds one of what a critic of the French Revolution like Edmund Burke had to say. We should start with the delivered institutions, diagnose what is working badly &, aware of possible error, try to improve it. That said, one is not surprised of meeting a strain of antipolitics in Popper's philosophy. Although Popper welcomes measures to clear away suffering & distress, it is uncertain how he would balance his negative utilitarianism against individual freedom. He is distrustful of political power. The idea that democracy gives the people the instrument of governing is an illusion. Democracy's point is to make it possible to dismiss a government (notice the parallel with his methodology, a government is a kind of hypothesis, the election an opportunity for falsification.) However, it is not Popper's political philosophy in a substantial meaning that makes him worth studying, but his theory of the critical discourse, a theory that is very relevant for a reformistic political strategy. The idea of the Popperian discourse is not to get the parties closer emotionally, not to reach a compromise, not even to convince, but for me to listen to & learn from the criticism of my hypotheses. People with divergent standpoints should not be kept out of the discourse, they should be welcomed. Popper admires Greek culture up to Socrates & he emphasizes its openness to influences from other cultures along the shores of the Mediterranean. That is in keeping with Popper's antinationalism. Nationalism fattens stupidity & is often the cause of devastating violence. In his later works Popper regularly uses an evolutionary model & his theory of language is no exception. He sets forth how the development of describing, language's third function besides expressing & warning, created the possibility of storytelling. Now, stories can be true & false, & that makes language's fourth function necessary, the function of argumentation, of proving or disproving of what has been said. Lying, however, is a wonderful invention. To lie, to say what is not, but could be true, is a nursery for fantasy & creativeness. 33 References. Adapted from the source document.