After twenty five years since the introduction of the semi-presidential system in Serbia and in the region, this text attempt to reassess its performance, achievements and limits. It analyses the factors which the power of the directly elected president depends on (constitutional competences, manner of election, whether he is a party president, whether his party has majority in the parliament). The text explains the origin of the concept and institution, reasons for introduction, criteria for maximalist and minimalist understandings of semi-presidentialism. In new democracies the semi-presidential system faces additional challenges and temptations: 'the third mandate', absence of reelection-related incentives in the second mandate, manner of inclusion in/exclusion from the creation of politics and whether the directly elected president is in the same time the party president. Possible redesign of this political institution would require taking care that the manner of election is only one of the dimensions important for functioning of this system. The issue of the level of competences is of no less importance. The key is in the careful balance of power among the three branches of power, but above else between the president of the state and the prime minister.
This article analyses the weaknesses of contemporary democratic orders which stem from the use of modern manipulation techniques employed by those who manage to win the trust for making the government in democratic elections. Contemporary democracies are under the threat of populist promises which are most often unrealistic. The combination of populism and democracy is usually a product of the powerlessness of political elites, i.e. political parties, in states to solve citizenry's most important problems – to increase the growth and development of the economic system, to introduce the rule of law, and to rehabilitate political institutions so they could rationally and efficiently function within the political system. Contemporary democracies are not equally developed, nor do they have equal chances for developing. The facts demonstrate how in many societies and states – formally oriented towards establishing a democratic governance and towards starting the democratisation of societal and political life – democracy gets misused and diminished to democratic phraseology with the help of populism, while in the institutional aspect being diminished to creating a façade of democratic institutions. It has been demonstrated that the patterns of dominance follow and are characteristic for democratic governances to a larger or smaller degree. The essence of democratic governance are politically responsible decisions, rather than mass participation in making political decisions which are not realistic, while being dangerous in terms of their consequences. Democracy means making good decisions for the benefit and good of all citizens, while hierarchy must not be challenged when it is necessary that institutions function in a rational and efficient way. Introducing equality where professionalism, competence and accountability are needed is devastating for the functioning of institutions, therefore for the functioning of democracy as well. Democracy can be tricked with the help of authorities'populism, as was the case with Nazi Germany. After Nazis took power, not all institutions of the Weimar Republic were dismantled nor challenged, nor was the Weimar Constitution changed. However – parallel to state authorities, Constitution and laws – dozens of new orders and laws were enacted, creating an illusion that nothing is changed in German state. What Nazis did was developing a new mechanism, party mechanism, parallel to the state mechanism. The two functioned next to each other. Such patterns lead to the parallelism of power and democracy, which usually led to the totalitarianisation of democracy. In contemporary states – especially those in the process of democratic transition – such parallelism shows how party leaders do not forfeit party leadership once they get elected to state offices. In that way democracies become submissive and captured by political parties, especially their leaderships and leaders. The relation of freedom and democracy has also been analysed. Experiences show that democracy is founded more successfully in places where people managed to gain their liberties, rather than in those places where democracy is yet to provide liberties to citizens. Dangers for democracy tied with the abuse of democratic conditions are being discusses in the last part of the article. Each condition necessary for the functioning of a democratic order can be simulated through manipulative ways. A special danger for contemporary democracies comes from circumstances in which those who come to power do everything so that society and state are riled by anti-political principles: indifference, fear and trepidation, and powerlessness. Anti-political principles jeopardise democratic order, and those who use them demolish democracy. Democracy is facing constant challenges and temptations for scraping democracy in the name of democracy.
Nowadays, there are divided opinions in Bosnia and Herzegovina when it comes to further mandate of the OHR and the institution of the High Representative. However, the e nd of the mandate of the High Representative is realistically expected in the near future. The need to abolish the office of the OHR and the institution of the High Representative has been mentioned increasingly in Bosnia and Herzegovina, especially in the Republic of Srpska. The reasons for the abolition of the function of the High Representative are different between the entities in Bosnia and Herzegovina as well as among its constitutive peoples. The authority of the High Representative has been increasingly questioned.It is on that basis that questions arise more frequently whether his (High Representative) legal acts will be valid, in particular individual decisions, such as deprivation of certain rights to citizens, the right to work, political action and passive right to vote. Representatives of the international community are worried that the interested domestic political circles could set a thesis (and be successful at it) that all acts of the High Representative will cease to apply at the moment when Annex X of the General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina is ended.A number of imposed laws not yet adopted by the local legislator himself, in the event of cancellation, would actually return BiH to the original competences under the Constitution BiH, as the legal consequence. The institution of the High Representative was set up by Annex X (Agreement on Civilian Implementation of the Peaceful Solution) of the General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina.Simultaneously, bearing in mind these facts, legally speaking, Bosnia and Herzegovina can not be classified into any known form of international dependence, however, the objective situation is such that Bosnia and Herzegovina with the powers vested in the High Representative and the actions that he is taking, can be considered a state with a specific form of international dependence and a special form of guardianship.
After the termination of war confrontations, on the basis of the UN Security Council Decision, a protectorate had been established in Kosovo and Metohia, including the engagement of international security and civil forces. The order of interim administration ended in 2008, when the self-proclaimed Kosovo assembly adopted the decision on declaration of independence from the Republic of Serbia, and the process of administrative mandate transfer started from international to local institutions. In the paper, first of all, general performances of social and political life were delineated, and then the complex architecture of security forces active there during previous eleven years was presented. Also, all the most important problems Kosovo and Metohia faces are enumerated. The post-war Kosovo and Metohia may be characterized as a society in disorganization. The old system of institutions was destroyed, and a new one has not been established. The number of Serbs is decreasing, and local Albanians have not maturated for a self-administration of the newly established state. The further maintenance of this circumstances or even its deterioration might move towards social riots, caused by the bad living conditions, large unemployment, impoverishment of significant social groups or the escalation of attacks at remaining non-Albanian population, which could induce serious security threats in the region.
U okviru rada je detaljno analizirana politička delatnost srpskih pristalica ugarske vlade u užoj Ugarskoj od Austro-ugarske nagodbe 1867. do poraza Slobodoumne stranke na izborima 1905. Nastankom nagodbenog pravnog okvira ugarska politička elita je smatrala da su se stekli uslovi da se odredi da u Ugarskoj postoji samo jedna politička nacija. Predvodnici nemađarskog stanovništva su trebali da odluče da li da pokušaju da izdejstvuju što bolji položaj za svoju naciju unutar vladajuće političke stranke ili da se posvete nacionalnoj i državno-pravnoj opoziciji. Deo srpske inteligencije je smatrao da državno-pravna opozicija može više da šteti srpskim nacionalnim i kulturno-prosvetnim interesima nego da bude od koristi. Oni nisu osnovali zasebnu političku stranku već su pristali uz stranke Ferenca Deaka i Kalmana Tise, koje su se 1875. ujedinile u Slobodoumnu stranku. Pored Ugarskog sabora, oni su delovali i unutar ugarskih municipija, kao i u sklopu srpske crkveno-narodne autonomije. ; In this paper are, in detail, analyzed the political activities of Serbian supporters of the Hungarian government in Hungary proper from the Austro-Hungarian Compromise in 1867 to the defeat of Liberal Party in the 1905 elections. With the setup of the compromise legal framework, Hungarian political elite considered conditions had been met in order to declare that there was only one political nation in Hungary. Leaders of non-Hungarian population were supposed to decide whether to try to force a better position for their nation within the ruling political party or to commit themselves to national and legal-state opposition. However, part of the Serbian intelligence believed that state-legal opposition could no longer be regarded as useful to Serbian national, cultural and educational interests. This is why they have not formed a separate political party but they acted within the parties of Ferenc Deak and Kalman Tisza, which were united into Liberal Party in 1875. Apart from the Hungarian Parliament, they were also acting within the Hungarian municipalities, as well as within the Serbian church-national autonomy.
The aim of this study was to determine whether there is a difference between female abstinents in Bosnia and Herzegovina in terms of certain demographics (age, education, rural-urban, party and ethnicity) and socio-psychological characteristics (interest in politics, the ways of getting their information about politics, trust in institutions, dogmatism, nationalism, cosmopolitanism, the end justifies the means, the attitude towards the leader, conservatism, liberalism and authoritarianism). The study was conducted in the first half of March 2013, on a sample of 483 adult women who did not plan to vote in the upcoming elections, who in the past six years (three election cycles) either voted occasionally, or they voted, but have no intention of voting again, or they have never voted. We started from the assumption that the different modes of political abstinence differ with respect to the measured variables. The results show that the three categories of women abstinents differ in terms of certain socio-demographic variables: age, education, ethnicity, party affiliation and religious beliefs. There are differences among respondents concerning political interests. The greatest interest was found among the respondents who manipulate their turning out to the polls, followed by those who were disappointed in the elections, while the slightest interest in politics was among the respondents who have never voted. Television is still the dominant medium for getting information about political events, the second and third ones are newspapers and radio, but they are much less influential. Yet among the three categories of women abstinents significant differences were found only regarding television and radio. Three categories of women abstinents differ only in cosmopolitanism and liberalism variables. There is a difference between women abstinents in their confidence in institutions. The most trust in institutions is found in women who occasionally took part in the elections, followed by those who voted, but no longer do so. The least trust in institutions is found among women who have never voted. ; Cilj ovog istraživanja je ustanoviti da li postoji razlika među apstinenticama u Bosni i Hercegovini prema određenim demografskim (starost, obrazovanje, selo-grad, stranačka i etnička pripadnost) i socio-psihološkim karakteristikama (zainteresovanost za politiku, način informisanja o politici, povjerenje u institucije, dogmatizam, nacionalizam, kosmopolitizam, cilj opravdava sredstvo, odnos prema vođi, konzervativizam, konzervativistička autoritarnost i liberalizam). Istraživanje je provedeno u prvoj polovini marta 2013. godine na uzorku od 483 punoljetne žene koje ne planiraju da glasaju na predstojećim izborima, a koje su u posljednjih šest godina (tri izborna ciklusa) nekad glasale, a nekad ne, glasale su, ali više neće, ili nikad nisu glasale. Pošli smo od pretpostavke da će različiti modaliteti političke apstinencije da se razlikuju s obzirom na mjerene varijable. Dobijeni rezultati pokazuju da se tri kategorije apstinentica razlikuju po pojedinim sociodemografskim varijablama: starost, obrazovanje, etnička i stranačka pripadnost i vjerska ubjeđenja. Ispitanice se međusobno razlikuju i zainteresovanošću za politiku. Najveće interesovanje nalazimo kod ispitanica koje manipulišu svojim izlaskom na izbore, a slijede one koje su se razočarale u izbore, dok je zainteresovanost za politiku najmanja kod ispitanica koje uopšte ne glasaju na izborima. Televizija je još uvijek dominantan medij za informisanje o političkim dešavanjima, dok su na drugom i trećem mjestu dnevne novine i radio, ali su znatno manje uticajni. Ipak, između tri kategorije apstinentica nalazimo značajne razlike samo kod televizije i radija. Tri kategorije apstinentica se međusobno razlikuju samo po varijablama kosmopolitizam i liberalizam. Prisutna je i razlika između apstinentica po njihovom povjerenju u institucije. Najviše povjerenja u institucije nalazimo kod ispitanica koje nekad izlaze, a nekad ne izlaze na izbore, slijede ispitanice koje su glasale, ali više neće. Najmanje povjerenja u institucije nalazimo kod ispitanica koje nikad ne glasaju.
Predmet ove uporedne analize je istraţivanje sadrţaja i realizacije izbornih programa relevantnih političkih partija iz BiH, Srbije i Hrvatske u periodu od 2002 do 2012 godine. Analizom izbornih programa utvrĎeni su sadrţaji po relevantnosti, mjerljivosti, sektorskoj pripadnosti, obećanjima i usklaĎenosti sa javnim interesom, a istraţivanjem realizacije izbornih programa relevantnih vladajućih partija dobijeni su rezultati o ispunjavanju izbornih obećanja. TakoĎe, analiziran je partijski, izborni i politički kontekst i procesi, kako bi se rezultati ove analize doveli u vezu sa rezultatima analize sadrţaja i realizacije izbornih programa relevantnih političkih partija. Za ovo istraţivanje odabrani su izborni programi relevantnih političkih partija, koje su bile vodeće vladajuće i opozicione u prethodna tri izborna ciklusa, u tri susjedne drţave, koje imaju zajedničku drţavnu prošlost i druge sličnosti. UsklaĎenost izbornih programa sa javnim interesom i njihova realizacija su problem koji je direktno povezan sa izbornim legitimisanjem, zastupanjem javnog interesa, predstavničkom demokratijom, partokratskim i drugim sistemskim deformacijama i potrebom redefinisanja partijskog i drugih dijelova političkog sistema. Kriza izbornog legitimiteta i institucionalnog zastupanja graĎana polazi od partijskih izbornih programa, koji su nesuklaĎeni sa javnim interesom i koji se, kao takvi, nezadovoljavajuće realizuju, a manifestuje se kada partokratija zamijeni demokratiju, kada privatno-partijski nadvlada javni interes i kada, umjesto zastupanja javnog interesa u institucijama vlasti, postoji samo puko predstavljanje. NeusklaĎeni izborni programi sa javnim interesom i neispunjavanje izbornih obećanja su posljedica sistemske greške, čijim se otklanjanjem stvaraju uslovi za uspostavljanje i postojanje predstavničke i drugih oblika demokratije. ; Subject of this comparison analysis is research of contents and realization of electoral programs of relevant political parties from BiH, Serbia and Croatia in period from year 2002 to 2012. By analysis of electoral programs contents were determined by its relevance, measurability, sector belonging, promises and harmonization with public interest, and by research of realization of electoral programs of relevant ruling political parties results were acquired about fulfilment of electoral promises. Also, we have analyzed partisan, electoral and political context and processes, so we could correlate results of this analysis with results of content analysis and realization of electoral programs and relevant political parties. For this research we have selected electoral programs of relevant political parties which were prime ruling and opposition parties in previous three electoral cycles in three neighbouring countries and which have mutual state history and other similarities. Harmonization of electoral programs with public interest and its realization is a problem which is directly linked with electoral legitimacy, representing of public interest, representative democracy, partisan and other systematic anomalies and need for redefining partisan and other parts of political system. Crisis of political legitimacy and institutional representation of citizens derives from partisan electoral programs which are in disharmony with public interest and which are, as such, and not sufficiently realized, and it is manifested when partisanship replaces democracy, when private-partisan overcomes public interest and when, instead of representing public interest in institutions of authority, there is only mere or symbolic representation. Electoral programs which are not harmonized with public interest and lack of fulfilment of electoral promises is consequence of systematic error, and by its removal, conditions are created for establishing and existence of representative and other forms of democracy.
Sustainable development is a developmental concept that takes into account the economic, the environmental, and the social dimension of development. The modem approach to the concept of sustainable development implies acknowledgement of new dimensions or pillars of development. The subject of this paper is the institutional dimension as the fourth dimension of sustainable development. The path to sustainable development requires interconnectedness, harmonization, and coordination of different dimensions of development. Institutionally, new principles or concepts are necessary to improve the functioning of the various institutions and actors involved in the process of achieving the goals of sustainable development. The aim of this paper is to indicate that economic, ecological, and social development based on sustainability requires institutional support as a complementary and necessary dimension.
When researching multiculturalism and the process of Europeanisation in Serbia and countries of the region, one must first examine the status of multiculturality and multiculturalism, from the normative framework to states' policies which decidedly determine the nature and functioning of a political community. Starting from the fact that the context, nature and structure of a political community determines the essence of rights and freedoms stipulated by the constitution and laws, as well as that a synergy of good laws and sound policies enables an effective policy of multiculturality, integration and interlacing of cultures of diverse national communities in a society, the proclaimed multiculturalism was studied in this paper, with a view to ascertain whether such constitutional and legislative framework and policies exist, and if they did, whether there was concerted action between them. The key finding was that the states of the region support a civil state in principle, that they are exclusively or predominantly nationally legitimised by the highest legislative acts and that the factual state is marked by various national cultural identities that are not integrated into the model of plural citizenship. The paper shows that there is a lack of political will to transform the declared support for a pluralistic civil state into public policies affirming the values of multiculturalism, as well as that there is a lack of strong institutions to support such policy. Creating civil awareness, strengthening civil values and virtues are not priorities for state institutions or media controlled by governments. Rather than that, their priority is to strengthen national identities. Hence, based on the above, we can affirm that civil states, civil values and civil identities are only at initial stages, i.e. that they are still, only occasionally, at the level of general programme orientation and set aims. The necessary ingredient for their firm establishment is a consolidated democracy and acceptance of universal values of developed democracies, such as the rule of law and protection of human rights and freedoms.