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The successive stages of development of constitutional democracy in the USA, in particular the experience of "judicial supervision paradox," show us that the U.S. Supreme Court performed at least two different functions: (1) norm enforcement, & (2) policy-making through re-examination & interpretation of the Constitution & the laws in cases brought before the Court. Dissent among American legal experts related to this & other matters prove that debates on judicial activism are not a thing of the past. Still, both advocates & critics of judicial activism share the view that judges have been an important part of the American constitutional process since its inception. The Marbury v. Madison case (1803) affirmed the institution of judicial supervision & denoted a gradual shift of judicial power into the field of public law. Thus further expansion & transformation of judicial power was made possible. In this article, the author establishes a connection between judicial activism & judicial supervision, & adheres to the standpoint that the "judicializing aspect of modern liberalism" deserves as much attention as any other aspect of democratization. Adapted from the source document.

The author analyzes political, philosophical, ethical, & legal implications of the trial in which, in August of 1997, some former members of the Politburo of the United Socialist Party of the former Democratic Republic of Germany were sentenced to prison terms after they had been found guilty for the murders committed by the East German border patrols when trying to prevent people from fleeing to the West. The legal grounds for such a sentence are dubious, not only because it runs counter to the ban on the retroactive enforcement of legal provisions but also because it presupposes the universal validity of the Western concept of human rights. If the intention was to react legally to what, from the Western point of view, were unpardonable acts during the communist reign, then the most prominent representatives of that system should have been -- in accordance with wartime law -- treated as enemies defeated in a (cold) war. Adapted from the source document.