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A STXUE de 26-7-2018 (Asunto M. B) declara o carácter discriminatorio dunha normativa nacional (británica) que esixe ás persoas transexuais casadas a anulación do seu matrimonio para acceder ao recoñecemento xurídico pleno do seu cambio de xénero, en tanto condicionante do acceso á pensión de xubilación á idade establecida polo ordenamento nacional para as persoas do sexo adquirido. Este axuizamento leva a cabo en relación á Directiva 79/7/CEE, do 19 de decembro de 1978 relativa á aplicación progresiva do principio de igualdade de trato entre homes e mulleres en materia de seguridade social. ; Este traballo analiza este pronunciamento xudicial situándoo no conxunto da (escasa) xurisprudencia comunitaria que abordou as consecuencias do cambio de sexo desde a normativa comunitaria de carácter socio-laboral. Apúntase tamén a ( fragmentaria e dispersa) regulación xurídica española relativa ao cambio de sexo-xénero e as consecuencias en materia de seguridade social. O traballo pon de manifesto que non son poucos -e leste é un deles- os casos nos que a pesar da diferenciación sexo-xénero ambos os termos utilízanse no mesmo sentido. O traballo avoga por un Dereito "de-xenerado" e "de-xenerador" no sentido sinalado pola autora no epílogo final. ; The ECJ ruling of 26th July 2018 (MB) declares the discriminatory nature of a national (British) regulation that requires married transgender people to annul their marriage in order to have full legal recognition of their gender change, as a conditioning factor of access to retirement pension at the age established by the national law for persons of acquired sex. This prosecution is carried out in relation to Directive 79/7/EEC of 19th December 1978 on the progressive application of the principle of equal treatment of men and women in social security. This paper analyzes this judicial pronouncement placing it in the whole of the (scarce) EU jurisprudence that has addressed the consequences of sex change in the EU regulations of a socio-labour nature. It also points to the (fragmented and dispersed) Spanish legal regulation regarding the sex-gender change and the consequences in terms of social security. The paper shows that there are not a few - and this is one of them - cases in which, despite the sex-gender differentiation, both terms are used in the same sense. The paper advocates a Law "de-generated" and "degenerator" in the sense indicated by the author in the final epilogue.